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When are people more likely to evaluate race-targeted government assistance
based on ideological principles rather than racial prejudice? In order to answer this
question, it is necessary to understand the mechanisms by which prejudice influences
political attitudes. In this dissertation, I develop a theoretical model for explaining how
deep-seated, automatic group biases interact with higher-order, ideological principles in
order to influence attitudes toward race-targeted government assistance. I suggest groupbased principles are more important than individualistic values or ingroup favoritism in
explaining race-targeted policy attitudes. I argue that when people evaluate race-targeted
policies, controlled neural processes translate automatic neural processes into broad
group-based principles, which then become the primary tool people use to evaluate racetargeted policies. As such, the degree to which people’s race-targeted policy opinions are
driven by principles rather than automatic group biases is a function of how much
controlled processing has occurred. I find support for this model across an array of
empirical investigations. In a survey experiment, I find group-based principles to
outperform an array of other constructs in predicting race-targeted policy attitudes. Then,
in a laboratory experiment, I replicate the primary findings from the survey experiment
and show further that the only influence ingroup favoritism has on race-targeted policy

attitudes is through automatic, implicit processes. Further, group-based principles are
comprised of a combination of ingroup bias and individualistic values. Next, I investigate
the translation process from automatic to controlled processes by examining the
implications of discrepancies between people’s implicit and explicit attitudes – known as
implicit ambivalence. I find that individuals with the most “resolved” racial attitudes are
the most likely to evaluate race-related political objects ideologically. Finally, I directly
examine the automatic and controlled neural processes hypothesized to underlay this
model by using functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI). I find evidence that
activation in brain regions implicated in controlled processing is associated with explicit
evaluations of race, and this relationship is strongest among individuals with more
extreme group-based principles. I conclude by discussing implications of this model for
existing literature as well as possible public policy interventions for reducing the role of
prejudice in politics.
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CHAPTER 1
Lizard Brain M e e ts Highe r-Orde r Thinking
“There's no reason that we should give up that lever on people's behavior - namely,
the inhibition systems of the brain - just because we're coming to understand more
about the temptation systems.”
- Stephen Pinker1
How much control do people have over their racial attitudes and behaviors?
The answer to this question holds considerable implications for not only how
individuals of different races interact with one another in face-to-face situations, but
also how racial groups interact broadly, whether people think the government should
play a role in encouraging group equality, and how societal resources are distributed
across groups through government. If it were up to “controlled,” conscious
motivations alone, perhaps most people would maintain a consistently egalitarian set
of attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors. However, we know from decades of research in
social and evolutionary psychology that humans are deeply engrained with
motivations to favor ingroups and derogate outgroups. Even beyond ingroups and
outgroups, individuals are often motivated to preserve hierarchy within groups such
that the dominant members stay on top and the subordinate members stay on the
bottom. It can be comforting to think that if we want to, we can override whatever
prejudiced instincts we might have and treat individuals the same regardless of race,
but subconscious, unintentional group biases can influence a wide swath of attitudes
and behaviors even among individuals who for the most part embrace egalitarian
values. The central question of this dissertation is: how do “higher-level,” conscious

1

Pinker, S. (2008). A biological understanding of human nature. In Brockman, J.
(Ed.), Science at the Edge: Conversations with Leading Scientific Thinkers of
Today (pp. 37-56). New York, NY: Sterling Publishing Company.
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values, beliefs, and ideological thinking interact with primal, often nonconscious
group-based motivations to influence attitudes toward race-targeted policies?
Answering this question is a crucial first step to answering another, more
normatively motivated question: can “higher- level,” conscious thoughts and beliefs
override group biases? On the one hand, egalitarian principles pervade Western
culture, children are taught from a young age that racism is bad, and all in all, overt
forms of racial discrimination have decreased substantially over the past several
decades. On the other hand, it is abundantly clear that racial prejudice has not
vanished. Instead, covert and implicit forms of racial biases continue to cast a shadow
on virtually every facet of society, from who gets hired for jobs, to the probability of
being shot during an altercation with law enforcement, to whether or not a patient is
prescribed painkillers by a doctor, to who people find sexually attractive. Despite
people’s ability to, under many circumstances, inhibit racial biases – despite humanmade institutions created to instill egalitarian norms and human beings’ ability in
many cases to abide by the norms set forth by those institutions – we seem continually
compelled by a puppet master from our evolutionary past to prefer a government set
up so that our group gets first dibs.
A substantial literature exists in political science and psychology that speaks
to the above question in the context of studying attitudes toward race-targeted
policies. In addressing this question, which some have referred to as the “principles or
prejudice” question, scholars have debated whether opposition to policies like
affirmative action is based on individualistic principles – e.g., the belief that everyone
should “pull themselves up by their bootstraps” – or racial prejudice. The empirical
evidence is largely mixed, which is likely at least in part due to some conceptual
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ambiguity. Although much of the literature addresses how individualism and racial
prejudice might interact, researchers have essentially skipped answering the central
question of this dissertation – that is, how “higher- level” processes interact with
automatic group biases – and so we never gained an understanding of the
psychological processes that “principles” and “prejudice” actually reflect. Do the
effects of individualism simply indicate socially acceptable expressions of deepseated group biases, or are people genuinely capable of inhibiting their biases and
adhering to a consciously held ethos?
There has been an explosion of research in psychology, economics,
neuroscience, and more recently political science showing that people’s attitudes and
behaviors – including those related to political outcomes – are driven largely by
imperceptible, automatic biological processes that hum along under the surface of
conscious awareness (e.g., Eagleman 2011; Gazzaniga 2012; Hibbing, Smith, and
Alford 2013; Kahneman 2011; Lodge and Taber 2013; Marcus 2013). Many attitudes
people have and decisions they make are easily interpreted as the result of conscious
deliberation, when in reality they are heavily influenced by forces operating
subconsciously. Messy, foul-smelling rooms can influence people’s moral judgments
(Schnall, Haidt, Clore, and Jordan 2008). Disease salience can make people more
likely to oppose gay marriage (Faulkner, Schaller, Park, and Duncan 2004). Room
temperature can influence people’s views on global warming (Risen and Critcher
2011). Drinking Sprite, which increases blood glucose levels, can decrease support
for social welfare (Aarøe and Petersen 2013). Exemplifying perhaps the most
imperceptible forces on political opinions and behavior is the work showing that
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political ideology is between 25% and 60% genetically heritable (e.g., Alford, Funk,
and Hibbing 2005; Hatemi et al. 2010; Hatemi et al. 2014; Settle et al. 2010).
This work seems to fly in the face of traditional theories of human decision
making that assume individuals weigh costs and benefits, deliberate about important
decisions, and in particular relation to this dissertation, form political opinions based
on careful consideration of issues in relation to one’s own consciously held values.
Accordingly, it is reasonable to expect that in the domain of race-targeted government
assistance, despite conscious efforts, deep-seated motivations to favor one’s ingroup
will continue to dominate people’s evaluations. In other words, genuine adherence to
“principles” may not stand a chance in the face of automatic group biases.
Yet a substantial amount of evidence supports the idea that people are indeed
capable of doing exactly these things, under some circumstances. “System 2”
thinking, or thinking that is slow, deliberate, and analytical, is readily acknowledged
by many scholars as existing alongside “System 1” thinking, which is fast, automatic,
and instinctual (Kahneman 2011; Stanovich 2004). A stable personality trait shown to
vary significantly across people is Need for Cognition (NFC), which is the degree to
which someone is motivated to think effortfully and solve complex problems
(Cacioppo and Petty 1982), suggesting there is at least some variation in the degree to
which people utilize what might be called “System 2” thinking. Although many of the
assumptions of rational choice theories of voting behavior (e.g. Arrow 1963; Downs
1957; Muller and Satterthwaite 1977) have often been lambasted by proponents of
behavioral models (e.g. Green and Shapiro 1994), in the aggregate, some rational
choice models do fairly well at predicting voting patterns (e.g. Feddersen, Gailmard,
and Sandroni 2009; Levine and Palfrey 2007). In many cases, it is hard to argue that

5
humans do not possess some ability to weigh costs and benefits, even if the weighing
of costs and benefits is constrained substantially by affective processes and attentional
limits (Simon 1946; 1982). Most proponents of the role of nonconscious processes
readily acknowledge some role – even a substantial role – for conscious factors
influencing people’s attitudes and behavior (e.g. Jost et al. 2003; Lodge and Taber
2013; Mondak 2010; Smith, Oxley, Hibbing, Alford, and Hibbing 2011). “Strategic”
behavior based on expected utility is particularly evident among political elites (e.g.
Aldrich 1995; Downs and Rocke 1994; Fearon 1994), who are presumably just as
human as anyone else. Even rhesus monkeys have shown evidence of behavior
consistent with utility maximization (Pastor-Bernier, Plott, and Schultz 2017).
With regard to race, a great deal of work has shown that individuals vary in
the degree to which they are motivated to inhibit racial biases, and that through topdown neural processes individuals can often inhibit prejudiced behavior (Cunningham
et al. 2004; Plant and Devine 1998; Stanley, Phelps, and Banaji 2008). Specifically
regarding attitudes toward race-based government assistance, although many scholars
maintain that the predominant factor driving opposition to such policies is racial
prejudice (e.g., Henry and Sears 2002; Kinder and Sears 1981; Reyna, Henry,
Korfmacher, & Tucker 2005), the empirical evidence nonetheless suggests ostensibly
nonracial ideological principles play at least a substantial role, if not the predominant
role (Sniderman, Crosby, and Howell 2000; Sniderman et al. 1996). If people are
indeed able to consciously deliberate to exert influence over deep-seated biases, then
it is plausible that individuals can override racial biases when evaluating race-targeted
policies; even further, it is possible that under the right conditions, nonconscious
motivations may even become trivial in comparison to conscious considerations.
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The main takeaway from the research described above is that although
burgeoning literatures in psychology, economics, and political science shed light on
the deep-seated, gut-level motivations that silently drive human behavior, other recent
work shows that these forces are not the be-all and end-all. Just as millennia-old
evolutionary selection processes have imbued humans with tribal motivations to favor
ingroups and avoid outgroups, more recent (though still millennia-old), humanspecific evolutionary selection processes have endowed humans with existential
motivations, “principled” ideological beliefs and thoughts, the ability to deliberately
estimate costs and benefits, and the capacity to evaluate issues in relation to
consciously held values.
In this dissertation, I develop a theoretical model that updates our
understanding of political cognition by extending work on nonconscious, primal
factors that drive human behavior in combination with the ability of humans to
consciously engage with their environment and carefully evaluate issues according to
ideological principles. I focus particularly on political cognition as it relates to racerelated political attitudes because the influence of racial prejudice in politics is an oftstudied and central topic in political psychology, and because there are clear
implications for how automatic biases might interact with higher- level principles
when people evaluate race-related political issues. I utilize a variety of survey and
experimental designs, as well as an examination of neural activity via functional
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), to study the degree to which individuals’ racetargeted policy attitudes are influenced by sheer ingroup bias, ideological principles,
and the interaction of these two broad categories of factors.
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In the remainder of this chapter, I outline two broad schools of thought
underlying how we understand political cognition and how most contemporary work
suggests some middle ground between these schools of thought likely holds the most
promise for advancing understandings of political attitudes. Next, I describe the state
of the political science literature that seeks to understand attitudes toward government
assistance, and in particular whether “principles” or “prejudice” are primarily
responsible for opposition to policies like affirmative action. I explain how the most
recent work on this topic acknowledges to some degree how automatic processes
might interact with conscious perceptions and attitudes to influence policy opinions,
but this work nonetheless fails to fully explicate the implications of these different
processes. I leverage neuroscience and evolutionary psychology literature on how
human-specific, evolutionarily young neural systems have evolved on top of basic,
evolutionarily old systems in order to explain how nonconscious and conscious
processes may interact to influence policy attitudes. Then, I summarize where the
political science literature has left us, and how acknowledging the interaction between
deep-seated nonconscious motivations and higher- level ideological principles is
necessary to understand the psychological mechanisms of how people evaluate racetargeted government assistance. Thus, ultimately, and perhaps somewhat
unsatisfyingly, I suggest the answer to the question of whether “principles” or
“prejudice” underlay race-targeted policy attitudes is: both do. However, this answer
has less to do with the main effects of two distinct psychological variables and more
to do with the neural processes that force principles and prejudice to interact with one
another. Finally, I describe several caveats regarding the framework I am proposing
before outlining the remaining chapters of the dissertation.
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Two Schools of Thought about Political Thought
An overarching distinction can be made in political science between work that
focuses on the controlled, conscious factors influencing political outcomes and work
that focuses on the automatic, often nonconscious factors influencing these outcomes.
I refer to these branches of work as emanating from distinct schools of thought
throughout this dissertation, but this distinction is intended as an illustrative tool
rather than an accurate depiction of discrete classes of political science scholarship.
The two schools of thought I describe do not embody all political science research,
and in fact most contemporary work on political attitudes and behavior readily
acknowledges both schools of thought. Nonetheless, these two schools of thought can
be seen as reflecting the ends of a spectrum upon which models of political attitudes
and behavior lay.
One branch of political science research, a school of thought I refer to as the
“Conscious Considerations” School of Thought (CCSoT), is comprised of work that
draws from a wide range of political science subfields and is centrally concerned with
studying the conscious decisions individuals make when evaluating political objects
(e.g., issues, candidates, parties, policies, or anything political that individuals may
form an opinion on). The CCSoT encompasses research on topics such as candidate
evaluations, elite decision making, international diplomacy, war, trade, judicial
behavior, issue attitudes, vote choice, political participation, interest group behavior,
and many others, but the central tenet of the CCSoT is that individuals are to be
viewed as self-aware actors who consider information from their environment and
behave accordingly. This school of thought is heavily influenced by work in rational
choice and economics, as the conscious considerations studied under this school of
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thought often amount to what is referred to as a “utility function” in econometrics
literature. Yet it is not limited to these perspectives. Rather, sociological and
psychological work on the influence of social movements, stereotypes and culturally
or historically imbued knowledge could also fall under the umbrella of the CCSoT.
The CCSoT has been an integral part of understanding political behavior since
before political science was recognized as a discipline, and it largely remains central
to the field, but work building on neuroscience as well as social and evolutionary
psychology has gained a significant amount of traction in the field over recent
decades. This body of political science research, which I refer to as the
“Nonconscious Motivations” School of Thought (NMSoT), is also comprised of work
in a fairly wide range of political science subfields, but is predominantly made up of
work in political psychology, political behavior, and more recently, biology and
politics and political neuroscience. Scholarship advancing the NMSoT hasprimarily
(although not entirely) centered on a narrower range of topics than work on the
CCSoT – topics such as political ideology, candidate evaluations, vote choice, issue
stances, and political participation – largely because of the relative youth of this
school of thought and the direct relevance of these topics to psychology (for counterexamples, see e.g., Gibson 1981; Klein and Mitchell 2010; McDermott 2004; Mutz
and Kim 2016). The NMSoT is primarily concerned with the deep-seated,
evolutionarily imbued, often nonconscious neural and biological factors that drive
people’s political attitudes and behavior. A cornerstone of this school of thought is
that the bulk of factors driving human behavior lay outside of conscious awareness,
and that the effects of conscious considerations such as those studied under the
CCSoT pale in comparison to the power of primal, nonconscious motivations. In fact,

10
some scholars subscribing mostly to the NMSoT have suggested conscious attempts
to “control” one’s attitudes and behaviors are merely post-hoc rationalizations of
mental processes that have occurred long before the individual is aware of the issue
(e.g., Eagleman 2011; Kahneman 2011; Lodge and Taber 2013; Pinker 2002; 2008).
A good deal of empirical work has supported both the CCSoT and the NMSoT
in relation to politics, and as mentioned earlier, most contemporary scholars
acknowledge both. In line with the CCSoT, individuals do seem to consciously
weight costs and benefits pertaining to politics in some circumstances (e.g. Aldrich
1995; Downs and Rocke 1994; Fearon 1994; Simon 1982). Walter Lippmann spoke
explicitly of the “images in our heads” that we construct to evaluate the political
world (1946), and a tremendous amount of work has since shown consciously held
perceptions acquired through culture, the media, or parental socialization to be
integral to political cognition (Iyengar and Kinder 2010; Jenning, Stoker, and Bowers
2009; Zaller 1992), including race-related political cognition (Hurwitz and Peffley
1997; Peffley, Hurwirtz, and Sniderman 1997; Kinder and Sears 1981).
However, in line with the NMSoT, “hot” affective responses to political
stimuli often predict political attitudes and behaviors better than “cool” deliberative
thought (Lodge and Taber 2005; 2013; Redlawsk 2002). Activity in the sympathetic
nervous system (electrodermal activity, or EDA) independently predicts a range of
political attitudes (Dodd et al. 2012; Gruszczynski et al. 2013; Mutz and Reeves
2005). Baseline levels of cortisol – a hormone associated with stress – predict voter
turnout (French et al. 2014; Neiman et al. 2015). As already mentioned, political
ideology is estimated to be between 25% and 60% genetically heritable (e.g., Alford,
Funk, and Hibbing 2005; Hatemi et al. 2010; Hatemi et al. 2014; Settle et al. 2010).
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With regard to race, environmental cues need not be explicitly tied to race to evoke
prejudiced responses (Hurwitz and Peffley 2005; Mendelberg 2001; Valentino,
Hutchings, and White 2002; but see Huber and Lapinski 2006). Critically, however,
most of this work advancing the NMSoT has not done so by ignoring the CCSoT, and
it has often been that case the scholars studying nonconscious motivations argue that
the manifestations of nonconscious motivations are often shaped by contextual forces
and conscious processes (e.g. Jost et al. 2003; Mondak 2010; Smith et al. 2011).
A particularly important strand of research on nonconscious motivations is
work on implicit racial attitudes. Implicit measures of racial attitudes utilize computer
tasks to gauge the associations people have between racial groups and positive or
negative words or images. Implicit measures such as the Implicit Association Test
(IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz 1998) and Affect Misattribution Procedure
(AMP; Payne et al. 2005) tap automatic mental processes that occur before
individuals have the chance to edit their responses consciously, and have been shown
to be valid independent predictors of a wide range of race-related variables (Fazio,
Jackson, Dunton, and Williams 1995; Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, and Banaji
2009; Olson and Fazio 2009).
Ultimately, there is overlap between the CCSoT and NMSoT, but a critical set
of tenets of each school of thought nonetheless differentiate the factors emphasized by
the two. In their extreme forms, the two schools of thought may be best thought of as
two incomplete regression equations. The CCSoT focuses centrally on conscious
factors influencing human attitudes and behavior and tends to leave nonconscious
factors to the error term. For example, research falling strictly under the purview of
the CCSoT might aim to understand attitudes and behavior by focusing on factors

12
related to the values and beliefs by which individuals aim to abide, the stereotypes
upon which people form beliefs, the weighing of costs and benefits that goes into a
decision, or conscious reactions to life events or events in the world (Equation 1, E.1).
Conversely, factors related to the NMSoT might include genetic predispositions (or
other prenatal factors), individual differences in personality traits, nonconscious
physiological responses to environmental stimuli, or implicit associations (Equation
2, E.2).
E.1:
Attitude or Behavior = Consciously Held Beliefs and Values +
Conscious Decisions + Conscious Reactions to Life Events + e
E.2:
Attitude or Behavior = Genetic Predispositions + Personality Traits +
Physiological Responses to Environment + Implicit Preferences and Biases +
e
This is not an exclusive list of the factors emanating from each school of thought,
but rather examples of factors that reflect each. Other factors may be studied within
each school of thought, but in this dissertation a set of central tenets unites those
within each incomplete equation. Table 1.1 contains the central tenets of each school
of thought.
Table 1.1. Basic Tenets of Nonconscious Motivations School of Thought
(NMSoT) versus Conscious Considerations School of Thought (CCSoT)







NMSoT
Not necessarily human-specific
Based largely in the limbic
system
Evolutionarily “older” brain
regions and neural networks
Manifests as attitudes/behaviors
that are fairly ubiquitous across
contexts and domains
Most ubiquitous features in
relation to race and politics:
ingroup favoritism/group biases







CCSoT
Human-specific
Based largely in the frontal
cortical regions
Evolutionarily “younger” brain
regions and neural networks
Manifests as attitudes/behaviors
that vary across contexts and
domains
Most ubiquitous features in
relation to race and politics:
existential thought/ideological
principles
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To reiterate, the tendency for research to acknowledge one school of thought
while neglecting the other is not universal and the distinction between the CCSoT and
NMSoT is mainly illustrative, as many studies do indeed model the effects of both
conscious and nonconscious motivations (e.g., Balzer and Jacobs 2011; Ditonto, Lau,
and Sears 2013; Greenwald et al. 2009; Smith et al. 2011; Wagner et al. 2015).
However, even work taking into account the direct effects of both conscious and
nonconscious factors mostly fails to account for the interaction between them, and
instead focuses primarily on comparing effect sizes to determine which exerts a
stronger influence. The missing component here is the unique contribution of the
processes that occur when automatic, often nonconscious factors are translated into
conscious considerations, beliefs, and ideological principles.
The model I develop in this dissertation seeks to draw on both the CCSoT and
the NMSoT in the context of race and politics, as there are clear implications for each
school of thought in this literature. Most of the political science work on the topic
stems from the CCSoT, focusing mainly on how historically imbued knowledge about
racial conflict, consciously held racial stereotypes, and egalitarian values affect
people’s attitudes toward race-targeted government assistance. However, psychology
work has been more likely to acknowledge NMSoT factors, and more recent political
psychology research on race-related political attitudes has embraced the NMSoT in a
variety of ways, such as comparing the effects of self-reported racial attitudes to those
of implicit measures of racial attitudes when predicting an array of race-related
political attitudes (e.g., Ditonto, Lau, and Sears 2013; Greenwald et al. 2009; Payne,
Krosnick, Pasek, and Lelkes 2010). However, all of this work nonetheless stops short
of acknowledging that deep-seated motivations to favor ingroups, higher-order
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thinking aimed at inhibiting those deep-seated motivations, and ideological principles
such as a belief in limited government all interact with one another. How do people
evaluate policies such as affirmative action for Blacks when their gut-level group
biases, conscious beliefs about racial equality, and ideological values are all pulling in
different directions? To rephrase the first question posed in this chapter, how much
influence, if any, do the conscious beliefs and intentions highlighted by the CCSoT
have over people’s evaluations of race-related political objects in spite of the deepseated motivations emphasized by the NMSoT?
The “Principles or Prejudice” Literature in Political Science
It is uncontroversial in the majority of academic literature that despite societal
norms of racial tolerance and notable decreases in overt racism, racial prejudice still
exists at substantial levels in the United States. Yet what has been less clear is how,
exactly, such prejudice manifests itself in light of pressures toward political
correctness and egalitarian values, and the degree to which prejudice subverts
pressures toward political correctness and egalitarianism to influence policy opinions.
A lengthy debate in political science has occurred over the past several decades
regarding whether people oppose government assistance to Blacks because the
recipients are Black or because such policies are perceived as violating individualistic
values. Both sides of the debate fall mainly under the CCSoT, but the early work in
this debate was conducted before the NMSoT was even beginning to be integrated
into political science and more recent work has taken into account NMSoT factors to
some degree.
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CCSoT Work on “Principles versus Prejudice”
Symbolic racism was among the first and most influential concepts introduced
to explain opposition to race-based policies as a function of covert racial prejudice
that has developed in the public sphere as a reaction to decreasing social acceptability
of explicit racism. It is hypothesized to be a blend of negative affect toward Blacks
and conservative individualistic values, and consists of the beliefs that 1) racial
discrimination is no longer a barrier for Blacks, 2) Blacks' disadvantages are due to
their own reluctance to take personal responsibility for their lives, and 3) as such,
efforts to aid Blacks are unwarranted (Kinder and Sears 1981; Sears and Henry 2003;
Sears, van Laar, Carrillo, and Kosterman 1997). The same basic logic underlays the
development of several other concepts such as modern racism (McConahay 1986),
racial resentment (Kinder and Sanders 1996), and laissez-faire racism (Bobo and
Smith 1998), among others. Proponents of this general viewpoint suggest that racial
prejudice is the key catalyst of opposition to policies like affirmative action, and that
prejudice and ideological principles like individualism cannot be entirely disentangled
because contemporary individualism serves merely as a socially acceptable vehicle
for expressing prejudice. According to Kinder and Mendelberg (2000),
“today...prejudice is expressed primarily in the language of individualism; today
individualism is part of racism” (p. 61). It is thus suggested that when the recipients of
government assistance are Black, racial prejudice guised as individualism will lead to
opposition to such assistance.
This viewpoint, however, was challenged on both methodological and
theoretical grounds. Sniderman and colleagues primarily led the charge in proposing
that individualistic values associated with conservatism are distinct from race-specific
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attitudes and that when both are taken into account, nonracial individualistic values
account for the majority of variance in race-based policy opinions (e.g., Sniderman
and Carmines 1997; Sniderman et al. 2000; Sniderman and Tetlock 1986). The
Symbolic Racism Scale (Kinder and Sears 1981; Henry and Sears 2002), according to
Sniderman and colleagues, is a poor indicator of prejudice because it is confounded
with conservative principles. Further, opposition to affirmative action based on
individualistic principles is higher among conservatives, and conservatives tend to be
relatively unaffected by whether the targets of a policy are Black or of some other
particular group (e.g., Sniderman & Carmines, 1997; Sniderman et al., 1991;
Sniderman et al., 1996). Accordingly, the reason for opposition to race-based policies
is not the recipients' race by itself, but rather conservative, individualistic values. In
other words, unless the target group of government assistance is perceived as
violating individualistic values, which Blacks so often are perceived as doing, the race
of the target group alone will not yield opposition to assistance.
Proponents of both sides of the “principles or prejudice” debate would fall
largely under the umbrella of the CCSoT because the primary factors proposed to
underlay race-based policy attitudes all involve consciously held beliefs. The
difference between the two sides of the debate boils down to whether race-targeted
policy support is driven by beliefs about discrimination and the work ethic of Blacks
or beliefs about how involved government should be in ensuring group equality.
Scholars engaged in this literature have examined the roles of ideological values,
stereotypes, and beliefs but an account of stable personality traits, implicit
preferences, or any other factor highlighted in the NMSoT remains absent throughout
early work.
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Principles or (Implicit?) Prejudice: Bringing in the NMSoT
Despite the lack of acknowledgement of NMSoT factors by most work on the
“principles or prejudice” question, scholars studying racial attitudes more broadly
have incorporated measures of deep-seated, automatic group biases into their
understandings of prejudice for decades. The seminal work on aversive racism by
Dovidio and Gaertner showed that although direct, explicit measures of racial
attitudes suggest prejudice has decreased substantially since the Civil Rights era,
when people have the opportunity to rationalize or explain away prejudiced attitudes
or behavior, high levels of prejudice and discrimination are unveiled (Gaertner and
Dovidio 1977; 1986; Dovidio and Gaertner 2000). Since this research was conducted,
various indirect measures of racial attitudes have been developed to gauge racial
preferences in a way that avoids influence from people’s conscious attempts to tailor
or edit their responses. For example, it has been shown that physiological responses to
members of racial outgroups independently predict racial policy attitudes (Smith et al.
2011), fear responses to males of one’s same race become extinct quicker than fear
responses to males of another race (Olsson, Ebert, Banaji, and Phelps 2005), and
activation in the startle and frown muscles in the face is greater when responding to
racial outgroup members than racial ingroup members (Dambrun, Despres, and
Guimond 2003; Vanman et al. 2004). The implication of these findings is that when it
comes to racial attitudes, individuals have a motivation to edit or hide their opinions,
and are often even unaware of their deep-seated preferences, and so simply asking for
their opinions through survey self-reports can be incredibly problematic.
The primary workhorse when it comes to indirect measures of racial attitudes
has been implicit association measures. As described earlier, implicit association
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measures are an accessible and feasible means of gauging automatic biases with
large-N survey and experimental samples. These measures are central to the NMSoT
because they tap reflexive biases that are presumably unaltered by conscious
deliberation and effortful thought (see Olson and Fazio 2009), and some work has
even shown that implicit racial biases but not explicit racial biases are associated with
activation in limbic regions of the brain such as the amygdala (Phelps et al. 2000).
With regard to the relationship between racial attitudes and political opinions and
behaviors, the use of implicit association measures has been critical. Anti-black
implicit biases measured via the IAT have been shown to predict a range of political
outcomes such as negative attitudes toward former President Barack Obama and
opposition to the Affordable Care Act (Greenwald, Smith, Sriram, Bar-Anan, and
Nosek 2009; Knowles, Lowery, and Schaumberg 2010). The IAT has also been used
to show that Anti-Latino implicit biases predict conservative immigration attitudes
(Pérez 2010; Pérez 2016). The AMP has also been instrumental in shedding light on
how implicit prejudice influences political attitudes, as anti-Black implicit biases
using the AMP have been shown to predict lower probabilities of having voted for
Barack Obama in the 2008 presidential election, negative feelings toward Barack
Obama as well as the idea of a Black president more broadly, and opposition to racetargeted policies such as affirmative action (Ditonto, Lau, and Sears 2013; Finn and
Glaser 2010; Greenwald et al. 2009; Pasek et al. 2009; Payne, Krosnick, Pasek, and
Lelkes 2010; Segura and Valenzuela 2010).
Mediation of Implicit Measures by Explicit Measures
The research using implicit racial attitude measures to predict political
outcomes has shown that automatic group biases predict political opinions in a
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manner consistent with the broader tenets of the NMSoT. However, crucially, much
of this work has also shown that the role of implicit attitudes is often mediated by the
role of explicit attitudes (Ditonto, Lau, and Sears 2013; Finn and Glaser 2010; Payne,
Krosnick, Pasek, and Lelkes 2010), suggesting the political attitudes and behaviors
political scientists are often interested in studying may be better predicted by
measures of conscious, controlled processing than by measures of quick, reflexive
preferences. This makes sense if the political variables being studied are
conceptualized and measured in a way that they are influenced by the controlled
processing that implicit measures are specifically designed to ignore, such as social
desirability or consciously held stereotypes. In other words, CCSoT factors may
matter more than NMSoT factors in predicting political outcomes because the
psychological processes that occur when reporting political opinions or behaving
politically are more similar to the processes that occur when reporting racial attitudes
consciously than they are to the processes that underlay implicit racial attitude
measures.
The work described above has not been interpreted in terms of the CCSoT or
NMSoT, or in terms of “principles or prejudice” for that matter. Instead, this research
has been mainly framed as a demonstration of the utility of implicit attitude measures
compared to explicit attitude measures, or a methodological contribution to the study
of prejudice. But is the full extent of these findings methodological, or are there
substantial theoretical implications of the dominant role of explicit racial attitudes
(rather than implicit racial attitudes) in predicting race-related political outcomes? If
we are really only interested in public expressions of political opinions, do we really
need to be concerned with implicit preferences? I suggest even in the case that the
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political outcomes we are interested in are overt and explicit, implicit, automatic
processes are still crucial. I suggest this work reflects the interaction between NMSoT
and CCSoT factors.
From the viewpoints of social neuroscience and evolutionary psychology, it
makes sense that measures of controlled processes such as explicitly reported racial
preferences are more correlated with political outcomes than IAT or AMP scores
because policy attitudes, vote choice, and self-reported racial preferences all
presumably involve a relatively high level of deliberation and effortful thought.
However, in this dissertation I suggest the interaction between automatic and
controlled processes strongly influences the overt political expressions that people
ultimately exhibit. Further, the work mentioned above on implicit racial attitudes and
political outcomes has yet to incorporate implicit measures into the “principles or
prejudice” framework. Specifically, how do ideological values, or principles, fit into
the picture?
Group-Based Principles
There is some existing work in the race and politics literature that I suggest
acknowledges the role of ideological values in conjunction with the interaction
between automatic and controlled processes without necessarily knowing it. Work on
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, and Malle 1994)
has become a cornerstone of the literature on how group-based attitudes influence
political opinions, and represents psychological motivations to endorse hierarchy in
society and strive for a system in which some groups dominate others (Pratto, 1999;
Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius, 1993; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Sidanius et al., 1996;
Sidanius, Levin, & Federico, 2001; but see more recent work on SDO as discussed in
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Chapter 2). It has been offered as a theory to explain racial prejudice from a broad
standpoint that acknowledges multiple levels of analysis and the various forces that
ultimately create group-based inequality in society, including societal institutions that
reinforce hierarchy, “real” conflict between groups over scarce resources, learned
stereotypes about different groups, and psychological motivations to favor ingroups
and derogate outgroups. Some work has even addressed the potential for evolutionary
selection processes to drive individual differences in SDO (e.g., Pratto, Sidanius, and
Levin 2006), although most SDO work does not put much attention on evolutionary
factors. As such, the construct of SDO, though measured as a set of survey items, can
be thought of as representing a combination of what would be referred to in this
dissertation as CCSoT and NMSoT factors.
SDO research also addresses the role of ideological values. Individual
differences in SDO are thought to correspond to differences in the “legitimizing
myths” people subscribe to in order to rationalize or justify group-based inequality.
Legitimizing myths are defined as “consensually held values, attitudes, beliefs,
stereotypes, and cultural ideologies” (Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin 2006, p. 275). One of
the most prominent legitimizing myths in contemporary society, according to Pratto,
Sidanius, and colleagues, is individualism. Based on this hypothesized relationship
between SDO and individualism, SDO has made its way into the conversation on
“principles or prejudice.” It has been shown that SDO is highly predictive of racetargeted policy attitudes and also explains the relationship between principled
arguments against race-targeted policies and racial prejudice (Sidanius, Pratto, &
Bobo, 1996). Further, Federico and Sidanius (2002) provided evidence that principled
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objections to race-targeted policies are more associated with group-based dominance
than they are with nonracial individualism.
SDO may therefore reasonably be seen as emanating from the interaction
between deep-seated group biases and higher-order, learned values such as
individualism. Humans have been shown to be driven largely by automatic, often
innate motivations to favor ingroups. However, such motivations are not expressed
without being filtered through societal norms and institutions, and so higher-order
“principles” – i.e. legitimizing myths, which can be hierarchy-enhancing or hierarchyattenuating – interact with automatic group biases to form broad group-based belief
systems, such as SDO. Thus, SDO is not purely an indicator of innate motivations to
favor ingroups or higher-order ideological values, but rather it is the product of the
interaction between the two. The implications of the role of SDO are therefore distinct
from the implications of the roles of “principles” or “prejudice” separately. Unlike
with “prejudice” alone, high levels of SDO imply support for group-based inequality
in a way that does not necessarily favor the ingroup, but instead applies a uniform set
of preferences across all groups. Yet unlike with “principles” alone, high levels of
SDO also do not imply a lack of group-based discrimination, but instead entail
support for a system in which some groups dominate others. I refer to constructs like
SDO, which seem to lay at the intersection of innate group biases and higher-order
values, as group-based principles. The central thesis of this dissertation is that it is
group-based principles, which represent the interaction between automatic group
biases and higher-order principles, rather than automatic group biases or ideological
principles alone that drive opinions toward race-targeted government assistance.
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Although it is uncontroversial that SDO reflects an interaction between groupbased biases and ideological values, the SDO literature nonetheless does not engage
with the distinction between automatic and controlled processes. Sidanius and
colleagues draw on sociological models such as the group positions model (Blumer
1961), the expectation states model (Berger et al. 1970), the realistic group conflict
model (Bobo 1983; 1988; Jackman 1991), the racial oppression model (Turner,
Singleton, and Musick 1984), and neoclassical hegemony models (Gramsci 1976;
Mosca 1939; Pareto 1943; Scott 1990) to postulate that:
(a) to one degree or another, almost all human societies are viewed as
group-based hierarchies in which at least one dominant group enjoys a
disproportionate share of positive social value (e.g., wealth, health,
leisure time, education), and at least one subordinate group endures a
disproportionate share of negative social value (e.g., social restrictio ns,
poor health, low-status occupations, prison sentences). (b) At its core,
politics can be viewed as an exercise in intergroup competition over
scarce material and symbolic resources (e.g., wealth, high relative social
status). (c) In this intergroup competition, groups will use ideologica l
instruments such as notions of natural rights, national superiority,
national destiny (e.g., manifest destiny, racism, the Protestant work
ethic), and political ideology in an effort to legitimize each group’s
claims over these real and symbolic resources. (Sidanius, Pratto, and
Bobo 1996, p. 477)
As such, the role of SDO in explaining the relationship between racial
prejudice and individualistic values, as well as its role in predicting race-based policy
opinions, is assumed by SDO theorists to emanate from perceived conflicts between
groups and ideologies that are used deliberately to justify claims over contemporary
real and symbolic resources. In other words, the roles of both group biases and
ideological principles are thought to be conscious and intentional. Therefore, although
the SDO framework identifies a more universal set of causes for race-based policy
opposition than other work on the “principles or prejudice” question, it nonetheless
pinpoints people’s conscious beliefs about how modern groups in society should be
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organized as the cause of race-based policy opposition. The goals of this dissertation
therefore include not only establishing that group-based principles such as SDO
underlay race-targeted policy attitudes, but also broadening the range of factors
thought to underlay group-based principles by examining how automatic and
controlled processes interact to influence these attitudes.
Evolution, Ingroup Bias, Conscious Control, and the Development of GroupBased Principles
Although this dissertation builds largely on the theoretical foundations of
existing work on “principles versus prejudice,” which primarily stem from sociology
and social psychology, one of its central contributions is fitting existing work into an
evolutionary psychology framework. The reason for this is that the primary
distinction between the automatic and controlled processes examined in this
dissertation emanates in evolutionary theory – specifically, when the neural regions
underlying automatic versus controlled processes are thought to have evolved and for
what functions. Further, I suggest that the psychological processes driving the factors
mainly focused on within the NMSoT are best characterized as evolutionarily “older”
than the psychological processes driving the factors focused on within the CCSoT, yet
these processes continually interact with one another. As is most often the case with
work building on evolutionary models, the overarching hypothesis that the processes
studied in this dissertation have evolved through natural selection is not directly
tested. Nonetheless, placing the empirical tests of this dissertation in the context of
evolution is essential because it is from an evolutionary perspective that hypotheses
are derived. Many of the hypotheses tested in this dissertation would be substantially
different or non-existent if not informed by evolutionary theory, because many of the
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hypotheses are based on theories of where automatic biases and “higher-order”
thought come from and what their adaptive functions are.
It is increasingly common among scholars studying political psychology for
evolutionary theory to be used to derive hypotheses (e.g. Alford, Funk, and Hibbing
2005; Fowler and Schreiber 2008; Haidt 2012; Hatemi and McDermott 2011;
Hibbing, Smith, and Alford 2014; Marcus 2013; Petersen 2014; Petersen and Aarøe
2012; Sidanius and Kurzban 2003). In the following section, I summarize
evolutionary theory on the selection processes thought to underlay automatic versus
controlled processes and their interaction. In doing so, I elaborate on the difference
between automatic and controlled processes as well as clarify how both emanate from
the process of natural selection.
The “Lizard Brain” in Politics
All social primates, including humans, exhibit behaviors that might reasonably
be called “politics” (Alperson-Afil et al. 2009; Brown 1991; Buss 2005; de Waal
1996). In fact, group conflict, including within- and between-group conflict, has been
around for millions of years and likely predates the appearance of Homo sapiens and
tracks back to small-scale group living arrangements among human ancestors (e.g.,
Boehm 2000; Buss 2005; Wrangham and Peterson 1996; Petersen 2014; Petersen and
Aarøe 2012). In other words, to a nontrivial degree, the political and group-based
conflict we see today – clashes between national or subnational coalitions, disputes
over resources, trade, rules enforcing hierarchy, punishments for rule breakers, and
decisions about how resources are distributed between groups within countries – are
hardwired consequences of being social animals.
The “lizard brain,” or “reptilian brain,” as some have referred to it (e.g.
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LeDoux 1998; Lieberman 2009; MacClean 1973), consists of the millennia-old, core
psychological adaptations humans carry with them as they navigate the contemporary
world, such as the “fight or flight” system of the autonomic nervous system (ANS) or
motivations to eat food and fornicate. The reference to reptiles stems from the fact
that a reptile brain consists only of the most evolutionarily old brain regions necessary
for survival. As such, the use of the term to reflect social processes is somewhat
misleading, as the social processes discussed here, although evolutionarily old and
basic, are not shared by reptiles. Nonetheless, the phrase has been used often simply
to delineate between primal, innate motivations and higher-order executive functions
that are unique to humans.
A major difference between the group conflict that took place millennia ago
and the group conflict of current-day politics is the size and scope of group
interactions. Whereas the group conflict of the vast majority of human history took
place within and between small groups, clans, and tribes of 25-200 people (Kelly
1995), contemporary politics spans a much broader range of levels of analysis,
including small groups just as before but also including national and international
groups made up of millions (and often billions) of individuals who most often do not
know each other. Importantly, mass-scale society has not been around until relatively
recently in human history (within the last 500 years; Diamond 1998), and so the most
powerful and ubiquitous adaptations humans have for interacting with one another in
mass-scale society evolved in response to small-scale interactions (Petersen 2014;
Petersen and Aarøe 2012;Tooby and Cosmides 1992). As such, the psychological
tools humans bring to the table when interacting with today’s political world were not
“designed” for mass-scale politics. This implies political attitudes and behaviors are
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largely driven by the momentum of millions of years of evolutionary forces that we
are not only unaware of but also blind to their purpose. Much NMSoT work is
grounded in these principles of evolutionary theory.
Political scientist Michael Bang Petersen and colleagues have done
groundbreaking research exploring the political implications of the mismatch between
mass-scale society and the (often “outdated”) psychological tools humans have to deal
with it. By deriving hypotheses from evolutionary theory, Petersen and others have
developed studies showing a range of empirical findings that might seem quite
strange if not understood from the perspective that political conflict is based in the
small-scale group conflict of human ancestors. For example, in one experiment,
participants who consumed a sugary soft drink were less likely to support social
welfare than participants who consumed a drink with artificial sweetener, which
makes sense if in small-scale group living situations, humans were more likely to rely
on sharing a key resource, food, to survive during periods of temporary hunger (Aarøe
and Petersen 2013). In another study, it was shown that the flexed bicep
circumference of a man’s dominant arm – a key morphological indicator of upperbody strength – is associated with support for economic redistribution among lowSES males and opposition to economic redistribution among high-SES males
(Petersen et al. 2013). According to Petersen and colleagues, this is because
historically, in small-scale group living situations, the physically formidable males
were the ones most able to acquire and defend resources in line with their selfinterest, and so it should be expected that in contemporary society these individuals
will be most likely to support a political system that benefits their own interests – i.e.
high levels of economic redistribution among low-SES males and low levels of
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economic redistribution among high-SES males. The overarching implication of the
model developed by Petersen and colleagues is that most (if not all) of the grouprelated political attitudes we like to think of as the product of conscious
considerations, beliefs, values, and the weighing of costs and benefits (i.e. CCSoT
factors) are actually driven by primitive, evolved psychological tools designed for
small-scale group interactions (i.e. NMSoT factors).
One of the most dominant adaptations evolved from small-scale group
interactions that still influences political attitudes and behavior today is ingroup
favoritism (e.g., Arceneaux 2012; Brewer 1999; Fiske 2000; Petersen 2012;
Yamagishi and Mifune 2004). Indeed, for decades, psychologists have found the
tendency for individuals to express bias in favor of members of their perceived
ingroups to be a powerful and ubiquitous human phenomenon (e.g., Brewer 1986;
Hogg and Abrams 2007; LeVine and Campbell 1972; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner
et al. 1981). From an evolutionary perspective, ingroup favoritism has been adaptive
because it allows individuals to rely on others without indiscriminately trusting
everyone (Brewer 1997; 1999; Insko, Schopler, and Sedikides 1998; Tooby,
Cosmides, and Price 2006). As Marilynn Brewer puts it:
Social differentiation and clear group boundaries provide one
mechanism for achieving the benefits of cooperative interdependence
without the risk of excessive costs. Ingroup membership is a form of
contingent altruism. By limiting aid to mutually acknowledged ingroup
members, total costs and risks of nonreciprocation can be contained
(1999, p. 433).
Thus, as long as humans have been living socially, it has been strongly
adaptive to demarcate individuals along group lines and favor ingroup members over
outgroup members. Ingroup favoritism is therefore substantially hardwired into the
human brain. Importantly, which individuals comprise ingroup members versus
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outgroup members is decidedly not hardwired. Instead, the boundaries of group
membership are fluid and context-dependent. Groups are perceived, and so the
individuals people identify as members of their ingroup can depend highly on
whatever demarcating characteristic of individuals is salient in the current
environment (Efferson, Lalive, and Fehr 2008; Kurzban, Tooby, and Cosmides 2001;
Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner et al. 1981). As such, the tendency to favor one’s
ingroup is not bound to particular types of groups or periods of time; ingroup
favoritism can manifest in any situation involving multiple individuals. If the
previously stated premise is true – that humans engage in 21st century politics with
prehistoric minds – we should expect most, if not all, of the political conflicts and
disputes over resources that characterize contemporary politics to be driven primarily
by sheer ingroup favoritism.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, ingroup favoritism and social identity motives have
been shown to underlay a tremendous range of politically-relevant attitudes and
behaviors (Fowler and Kam 2007; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2004; Greene
2004; Huddy 2001; Huddy and Khatib 2007; Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Kinder
and Kam 2009; Mutz and Kim 2016), including attitudes toward affirmative action
(Lowery et. al. 2006). Further, it is evident that ingroup bias is automatic and occurs
at a nonconscious level (Cunningham et al. 2004; Molenberghs et al. 2013; Van
Bavel, Packer, and Cunningham 2008; Volz et al. 2009). The implication of these
findings in conjunction with an evolutionary model of ingroup favoritism is that
group biases are instantiated deep enough into the human psyche that they are
triggered well before anything reasonably called a “conscious consideration” can take
place.
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Despite the predominance of group biases, there are also many instances in
which ingroup favoritism does not manifest, or is even the exception rather than the
rule. In various circumstances, many people embrace group equality, diversity, and
globalism while rejecting hierarchy, racism, and nationalism. Further, ingroup
favoritism is in many cases the antithesis of commonly held egalitarian values, and
humans seem capable (at least sometimes) of adhering to such values; it is not
uncommon for individuals to be somewhat self-aware regarding the pitfalls of ingroup
favoritism. How is this possible? The picture painted by considering ingroup
favoritism alone – a world where who’s team you are on is the defining characteristic
of you as a person – seems partly accurate but does not leave any room for genuine
principles such as egalitarianism, or individualism for that matter.
Controlled Processing, Rules, and Higher-Order Thought
To understand how primal motivations such as ingroup favoritism might be
overridden, it is necessary to understand the development of the inhibition systems of
the brain. Alongside motivations to form coalitions and delineate between ingroup
and outgroup members automatically, humans have also evolved to be able to regulate
and inhibit their primal motivations – or as Kahneman (2011) would put it, “think
slowly.” Whereas automatic group biases evolved to allow individuals to quickly
distinguish between trustworthy and untrustworthy individuals, “controlled”
processes – also often called “executive function” – evolved so that individuals could
interact with and respond to novel environments in a finer-grained, albeit slower
fashion. Controlled processes allow individuals to refrain from applying blanket rules
to every situation (e.g. “always favor ingroup members over outgroup members”),
and instead to push an inhibitory lever that adjusts decision-making based on
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circumstances (e.g. “sometimes favor ingroup members over outgroup members, but
sometimes don’t”; see Tooby and Cosmides 1992). To put it simply, controlled
processes let individuals adapt to complex environments by allowing nuance in the
degree to which more primal “rules” for behavior are followed.
Consistent with this understanding of the role of controlled processes, the
development of controlled processes throughout the lifespan is thought to be central
to how humans learn and abide by increasingly complex rules. Specifically, the
development of regions of the brain associated with controlled processing – e.g. the
prefrontal cortex, or PFC – is believed to correspond to increasing complexity in rule
usage by humans such as going from using a single rule, to switching between rules,
to switching between pairs of incompatible rules (Bunge and Zelazo 2006; Zelazo,
Frye, and Rapus 1996; Zelazo, Muller, Frye, and Marcovitch 2003). It is through
activity in the PFC, in particular, that humans are able to engage in higher degrees of
self-reflection, or “levels of consciousness” (LOCs), and inhibit automatic reactions
to environmental stimuli (Kerr and Zelazo 2004; Ortner, Kilner, and Zelazo 2007;
Zelazo 2004). If we consider, for a moment, higher-order beliefs and principles to be
complex sets of rules or guidelines for shaping behavior, it makes sense that whereas
“lizard brain” processes might be more responsible for sheer ingroup favoritism in
humans, lofty values such as individualism and egalitarianism may be driven more by
executive function and controlled processes.
Interactions between Controlled and Automatic Processes
Up to this point, I have outlined the “older” evolutionary forces such as
ingroup favoritism that are ubiquitous in human behavior today, as well as the
“younger” evolutionary forces that allow humans to inhibit primal motivations and
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abide by more complex rules and principles. However, it would be mislead ing to
suggest that this means there are essentially two major forces working against one
another and that one represents variables such as ingroup favoritism and the other
represents variables such as individualism and egalitarianism. A central argument of
this dissertation is instead that these forces continually interact with one another to
drive the full range of attitudinal variables, including ingroup favoritism, ideological
principles, and ultimately attitudes toward race-based government assistance. All of
these variables exist on a spectrum from “more influenced by automatic processes” to
“more influenced by controlled processes.” Where attitudes exist on this spectrum
may be more difficult to decipher than some might imagine, as evidence exists
suggesting automatic and controlled processes interact constantly.
The most basic manifestations of controlled processing, such as directing
attention, coordinating motor functions, and accessing memory, are not unique to
humans and are not all that “young” evolutionarily. Rudimentary controlled processes
are evident in monkeys (Fuster 1989) as well as rats (Kolb and Tees 1990), and the
PFC is thought to have evolved at least 175 million years ago when the ancestors of
all present-day mammals first appeared (Jerison 1997), which is “younger” than most
brain regions associated with the “lizard brain” but still not recent by any means. In
other words, if we are looking for the evolutionary basis of higher-order principles
such as individualism or egalitarianism, it is unlikely to be found simply in the
appearance of the PFC in human evolution. Further, contrary to much prior thinking
(e.g. Deacon 1997; Holloway 1998), the human PFC is not proportionately larger than
that of other mammals (Jerison 1997; Semendeferi, Damasio, Frank, and Van Hoesen
1997; Uylings and Van Eden 1990), suggesting the uniqueness of controlled
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processing in humans – the set of neural processes that underlay existential thought,
ideals, and belief systems – is not due to the mere existence of certain brain regions
absent in other species, but instead is most likely due to connectivity within and across
areas of the brain (de Schotten, Dell’Acqua, Valabregue, and Catani 2011; DeFelipe,
Alonso-Nanclares, and Arellano 2002; Fuster 2002; Holloway 2002; Ramnani et al.
2006). That is, the unique executive functions of the human brain have likely evolved
because “selectional pressures that bring about brain evolution do so by acting on
interconnected systems rather than simply on individual brain areas” (Ramnani et al.
2006, p. 817). Humans have evolved so that quick, automatic and nonconscious
motivations are in constant communication with controlled, reflective thought.
The Iterative-Reprocessing (IR) model of the neural bases of evaluation
provides a roadmap for understanding how automatic and controlled processes
continually interact with one another (Cunningham, Haas, and Jahn 2011;
Cunningham and Zelazo 2007; Cunningham, Zelazo, Packer, and Van Bavel 2007).
According to the IR model, environmental stimuli trigger an iterative evaluative
process between automatic and controlled processes in the brain whereby the stimuli
are interpreted repeatedly with regard to increasingly complex representations
(Cunningham and Zelazo 2007). Critically, as Cunningham and Zelazo note,
“Whereas evaluations that are based on few iterations of the evaluative cycle are
relatively automatic, in that they are obligatory and might occur without conscious
monitoring, evaluations based on additional iterations and computations are relatively
reflective” (p. 97). Time is therefore a crucial element in this model because
evaluations become more “complex” as controlled processes reinterpret, or reprocess,
the stimuli.
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Bringing it back to Race-Targeted Policies
The implication of the IR model for understanding the variables of interest in
this dissertation is therefore fairly straightforward. The range of factors thought to
drive opinions toward race-targeted government assistance, from primal group biases
to lofty ideals about individualism and the proper role of government, exists entirely
on a spectrum from “more influenced by automatic processes” to “more influenced by
controlled processes”, and no factor exists solely as a function of automatic or
controlled processes alone. In line with the growing scholarship that acknowledges
both NMSoT and CCSoT factors, I suggest the variables most influential in driving
support for race-based government assistance are neither completely automatic nor
entirely conscious. As such, the existing “principles or prejudice” literature, which is
predominantly based in the CCSoT but has recently embraced some aspects of the
NMSoT, is theoretically limited. Instead, I suggest race-targeted attitudes are driven
primarily by the interaction between automatic and controlled processes. I propose
that group-based principles directly reflect this interaction because they reflect the
translation of innate group biases into broad guidelines for thinking about
contemporary politics – i.e. principles. I suggest group-based principles will be the
dominant predictor of these race-targeted policy attitudes because such policies
exemplify the intersection between primal group-based motivations and ideological
principles. Critically, I propose the mechanism of the dominant role of group-based
principles is the iterative process that occurs when automatic reactions interact with
controlled processes. As individuals have more time to evaluate race-based policies,
their evaluations should transition from being based on automatic group biases to
being based on broad principles.

35
Caveats
The distinction between automatic processes and controlled processes is
crucial in this dissertation, and so it is worth elaborating. Basically, the distinction
between automatic and controlled processes reflects the distinction between reflexive,
often nonconscious neural processes that occur primarily in the limbic system and
conscious, controlled processes that occur primarily in the frontal cortical regions of
the brain. Whereas automatic processes are evolutionarily older and motivate
individuals primarily toward basic survival, controlled processes are evolutionarily
younger (although still quite old) and serve to allow individuals to interact with the
complexities of the contemporary world. Automatic and controlled processes are both
thought to underlay group biases and higher-order thought (i.e. ideological principles
and values) to some degree, although group biases are theorized as emanating more
from automatic processes whereas higher-order thought is theorized as emanating
more from controlled processes. Below, I explain several important caveats regarding
what the distinction between automatic and controlled processes, as conceptualized in
this dissertation, does not represent.
1. “Controlled” does not mean “superior.” One way some readers might
interpret the distinction between automatic and controlled processes is as
suggesting controlled processes are “better” than automatic processes because
they are more deliberate and aimed at accuracy. However, this would not be
an accurate characterization because as explained above, both are integral to
human survival, and both underlay even the most “reasoned” and “logical”
thoughts humans are capable of to some degree. Further, automatic processes

36
are essential for making quick decisions and motivating individuals toward
goals (see e.g., Eagleman 2011; Kahneman 2011).
2. Controlled processing does not mean “controlled” in the metaphysical sense.
The use of the term “controlled” in this dissertation is not meant to reflect a
role of “free will.” As explained above, controlled processes are
conceptualized as products of natural selection just as automatic processes are,
and so the term “controlled” is used simply to denote the more complex
processes of the frontal cortical regions of the brain, which individuals can be
consciously aware of.
3. The distinction between automatic and controlled processes is not simply a
distinction between implicit and explicit attitudes. Although much work has
used implicit and explicit attitude measures to tap automatic versus controlled
processes, and indeed such measures are used several times for this purpose in
this dissertation, these measures are not pure indicators of automatic or
controlled processes. In line with the IR model described earlier, automatic
and controlled processes are both thought to influence implicit and explicit
attitude measures; the difference is the degree to which each measure is
influenced by each type of process.
4. In line with the above caveat, the distinction between automatic and
controlled processes is not simply a distinction between quick reactions and
evaluations made over a longer period of time. Although it is theorized, in line
with the IR model, that time is a critical factor in determining the degree to
which controlled processes play a role in evaluation, even the quickest
evaluations (including those made in less than a second) are believed to be
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influenced somewhat by controlled processes (Cunningham, Haas, and Jahn
2011). As such, although time plays a central role, the primary distinction is
between regions in the brain rather than time.
5. The distinction between automatic processes and higher-order thought is not a
distinction between processes based in evolution and processes not based in
evolution. As explained earlier, both automatic and controlled processes are
thought to have evolved millions of years ago, and although the “higher-order
thought” examined under the CCSoT (i.e. principles, ideological values, and
existential thought) is human-specific, controlled processes are not because
they can be found in all mammals to some degree.
6. The distinction between automatic and controlled processes is not due to when
humans began interacting in mass scale society. As explained earlier, massscale society has only been around for approximately 500 years (Diamond
1998) whereas both automatic and controlled processes have been around for
millions of years. In that sense, this dissertation is not at odds with the work of
Petersen and colleagues on the mismatch between contemporary politics and
evolved human psychology. However, it is proposed in this dissertation that
controlled processes are what allow humans to apply primal motivations to the
complex political world of today.
7. The focus of this dissertation is not simply an interaction term in a regression
equation. The interaction between gut-level processes and higher- level
thinking can be operationalized in many different ways and is not simply an
interaction between two particular variables in a regression. The idea is to
acknowledge the iterative process by which higher-level “principles” are built
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from the iterative reprocessing that occurs between limbic and cortical regions
of the brain. This might be an interaction between two variables aimed at
gauging these processes, or it might be a single variable that captures the
combination of these processes.
Chapter Outline
In the remainder of this dissertation, I present empirical findings aimed at
shedding light on different aspects of the model outlined in this chapter. First, in
Chapter 2, I take a step back and examine the multitude of constructs that may
embody the group-based and higher- level factors influencing attitudes toward racerelated political outcomes. I do so using only self-report measures to survey items.
Specifically, I conduct a survey experiment through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to
examine the degree to which race-targeted policy attitudes are related to group biases,
individualistic values, or group-based principles. To examine the role of group biases,
I use survey items tapping social identity motives – i.e. identification with ingroups.
To gauge the role of ideological principles and values, I measure adherence to
individualistic values such as work ethic and self-reliance. Finally, to gauge groupbased principles, I measure SDO. I find that race-targeted policy attitudes are
explained mostly by preferences for group-based social hierarchy (the “Equality”
subdimension of SDO). Further, manipulating the work ethic of Whites versus Blacks
has no effect on policy attitudes. These findings suggest race-targeted policy
opposition is not purely “principled” but also does not simply boil down to ingroup
favoritism. Rather, group-based principles seem to be the primary predictor of racebased policy attitudes. However, these results are constrained to policies assisting
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Blacks only, and so it is impossible to know if the role of SDO-E is masking ingroup
favoritism or attitudes specific to Blacks.
Therefore, in Chapter 3, I address the concern that social desirability might
account for the seemingly negligible role of ingroup favoritism by utilizing the
Minimal Groups Paradigm (MGP), in which participants are divided into arbitrary,
meaningless groups within a laboratory setting. This is crucial because the methods
used up to this point have likely been influenced by the desire of respondents to
provide socially acceptable answers that indicate racial tolerance or egalitarianism. To
tap the role of ingroup favoritism more directly, I strip away the “priors” people have
about specific racial groups by having them interact with meaningless groups for
which societal pressures are minimal. In this way, the MGP allows me to look at the
conditions under which race-specific attitudes and stereotypes are absent. I also
employ an implicit attitude measure to tap automatic processes underlying evaluations
of the minimal groups. However, I am still able to introduce opportunities for
individuals to rely on broad individualistic principles. To do so, I manipulate the work
ethic of the minimal groups so as to vary the degree to which participants are cued to
evaluate the groups based on “merit” rather than ingroup/outgroup distinctions. By
looking at the degree to which ingroup favoritism versus merit-based evaluation in the
MGP predicts real-world race-targeted policy attitudes, I can gauge the degree to
which the “principles” people use to judge race-based policies are indeed principled
as well as the degree to which such judgments are based in ingroup favoritism. I find
that the only significant predictor of real-world race-based policy attitudes is implicit
ingroup favoritism in the MGP. I also find that group-based principles are
significantly associated with both ingroup favoritism (implicit and, to some degree,
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explicit) and merit-based evaluation. These results suggest that a) the role of
individualistic principles in predicting race-based policy opinions is inherently tied to
group-based evaluations, b) the role of ingroup favoritism in evaluations of racebased policies is based primarily in automatic rather than controlled processes, and c)
group-based principles embody some combination of automatic group biases and
conscious, “principled” responses to environmental cues.
In the chapters thus far, I will have rigorously tested the degree to which racebased policy opinions can be declared “principled” versus “group-based,” and
concluded that the answer is both – i.e. group-based principles play the dominant role
in predicting race-based policy opinions, principles that are not group-based seem to
be negligible (except for the role they play in influencing group-based principles), and
the role of ingroup favoritism seems to emanate from automatic processes. In Chapter
4, I turn my attention to further drilling down on the role of automatic versus
controlled processes. I demonstrate the utility of acknowledging the interaction
between automatic preferences and controlled processes by examining the impact of
implicit racial ambivalence – or discrepancies between implicit and explicit racial
attitudes – on a variety of race-related political outcomes. Implicit racial ambivalence
is not necessarily a direct operationalization of the interaction between automatic and
controlled processes, but it nonetheless reflects the gap between individuals’
conscious considerations (“more controlled” factors) and implicit preferences (“more
automatic” factors). Using the 2008 ANES data, I show that individual differences in
implicit racial ambivalence regarding Whites and Blacks have a substantial impact on
a range of race-related political outcomes, and that implicit racial ambivalence
moderates the influence of higher-order principles such as egalitarianism and political
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ideology on these outcomes. Therefore, the interaction between automatic and
controlled processes seems not only to influence race-based policy attitudes directly,
but also to moderate the role of higher-order principles. Returning briefly to the data
used in Chapter 3, I demonstrate further that implicit ambivalence is negatively
associated with ingroup favoritism.
In Chapter 5, I directly examine the neural processes that have thus far been
assumed to underlay the roles of automatic and controlled processes by using fMRI.
By using fMRI, I am able to determine the degree to which brain regions associated
with controlled processing such as the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC) relate to racial biases in support for government assistance as well as
reliance on group-based principles. In the experiment, I introduce participants to
hypothetical individuals applying for government assistance and ask whether they
support or oppose assistance to that individual. I experimentally manipulate the race
of the applicant as well as whether the applicant’s race is known consciously or only
primed subliminally. This way, I can compare what happens when individuals are
only implicitly made aware of the race of the target of government assistance versus
when individuals are consciously aware of the target’s race. According to the model
laid out in this dissertation, we should see greater activity in the cortical regions of the
brain (the PFC and ACC, to be specific) when individuals are consciously aware of
the applicant’s race compared to when they are only nonconsciously aware of the
applicant’s race. Further, individuals’ evaluations should fall more in line with their
broader ideological principles (specifically, SDO) when race is consciously known
than when race is only subconsciously known because controlled processes can then
exert greater influence. I find increased pro-Black biases in support for government
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assistance in trials where race is consciously primed, and these increased pro-Black
evaluations are associated with being low in SDO-D, but not SDO-E. More centrally
for the purposes of this dissertation, I also find that brain activation patterns in the
ACC and PFC largely behave as expected, although primarily with regard to the
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and SDO-E.
Finally, in Chapter 6, I summarize the empirical findings of the previous
chapters and assess the implications of these findings for the overarching framework
outlined in this dissertation. Specifically, I summarize the results of my empirical
investigations and discuss how the findings of the studies presented suggest the
primal, gut-level factors studied under the NMSoT necessarily interact with controlled
processes in order to yield higher-order principles and attitudes toward politics. The
model developed in this dissertation holds substantial implications for how we
understand a range of popular concepts, such as social desirability bias, symbolic
racism, and system justification. With regard to race-based policy attitudes,
specifically, these findings hold substantial implications for advancing and in some
cases revising the “principles or prejudice” literature. Importantly, these findings also
hold implications for predicting the utility of interventions designed to reduce the role
of racial prejudice in contemporary politics.
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CHAPTER 2
Dis e ntangling “Principle s ” and “Pre judice ”: Ingroup Favoritis m,
Individualis m, and Group-Bas e d Principle s
“In the social scientific imagination, it is as if the advantaged are relentlessly looking
to cash in on their dominance and the disadvantaged are proud revolutionaries-inwaiting. Both types of groups are seen as primarily self-interested, and overt conflicts
of interest are assumed to be endemic.”
- John T. Jost, Mahzarin R. Banaji, and Brian A. Nosek2
Disputes over the legitimacy of policies like affirmative action are often
framed as emanating from principled disagreements over the proper role of
government, with those opposing such policies arguing the government should not be
selectively assisting any person, regardless of their group memberships. Others argue
such justifications for opposing race-targeted policies are really just rationalizations
for deep-seated racial prejudice or group biases. As outlined in the previous chapter,
this conflict is reflected in the mixed empirical research on the topic, with evidence
building in support of the roles of both prejudice (e.g. Henry and Sears 2002; Kinder
and Sears 1981; Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1996) and individualism (e.g. Sniderman
and Tetlock 1986; Sniderman et al. 1996) depending on how individualism and
prejudice are operationalized. I suggest these mixed findings are partly due to a
critical source of confusion: we don’t fully understand how the multi- faceted
constructs of individualism and group-based attitudes relate to one another, and how
they interact to yield attitudes toward race-targeted policies. In other words, existing
work in the “principles or prejudice” literature has yet to thoroughly define what the
roles of “principles” or “prejudice” represent, let alone make a distinction between
ingroup favouritism and group-based principles.

2

Jost, J. T., Banaji, M. R., & Nosek, B. A. (2004). A decade of system justification theory:
Accumulated evidence of conscious and unconscious bolstering of the status quo. Political
Psychology, 25(6), 881-919.
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Existing work has predominantly evaluated whether individualism or
prejudice underlay race-based policy attitudes by gauging the role of single attitudinal
constructs or testing whether or not racial biases exist in support for government
assistance policies. However, it remains unknown which sorts of individualistic
values underlay the role of individualism, as well as whether the role of prejudice
conveys ingroup favoritism or broad group-based ideologies. If the central thesis of
this dissertation – that group-based principles rather than automatic group biases or
individualistic principles alone drive opinions toward race-targeted government
assistance – then the distinction between ingroup favoritism and group-based
ideologies is a critical one. Further, how should we be thinking about “individualistic
principles”? Are such principles most likely to manifest as a blanket opposition to
government assistance to anyone, or do such principles allow for some to receive
assistance so long as they are “deserving”? Shedding light on these questions is a
critical first step in this dissertation, as it allows us to move beyond the question of
whether principles or prejudice influence race-based policy attitudes and toward the
question of how each influences such attitudes.
There are two primary goals of this chapter. First and most critically, this
chapter unravels the often unclear and overlapping conceptualizations of the
dimensions making up individualism and group-based preferences that beset the
existing literature on race-based policy attitudes. Three primary categories of factors
are examined: individualistic values, social identity motives, and group-based
ideologies. I refer to “social identity motives” instead of “ingroup favoritism” because
in this chapter, I simply examine the role of beliefs and motivations related to
people’s ingroups rather than constructing some measure of bias against other groups.
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I do so in order to directly gauge individuals’ ingroup attachments rather than relying
on a measure reflecting some manifestation of those attachments. The social identity
literature has been key to understanding the functions of these attachments and
motivations (e.g. Hogg and Abrams 2007; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner et al.
1981).
Each of these three primary dimensions are broken up further into several
components. Individualism, in particular, is often assumed to be unidimensional. This
study acknowledges distinct aspects of individualism such as self-reliance and work
ethic. Regarding “prejudice,” research has yet to disentangle whether social identity
motives or group-based ideologies best represent the role of prejudice in predicting
race-based policy attitudes. Further, work has shown both Social Dominance
Orientation (SDO; Pratto et al. 1994) and ingroup identification are multidimensional
(Ho et al. 2012; Roccas et al. 2008). This study pits the roles of individualism, social
identity, and social dominance – as well as the multiple dimensions comprising each –
against one another to shed light on which ideological and group-based processes are
most central to race-based policy attitudes.
The second goal of this chapter is to test the proposition that group-based
attitudes underlay the effects of individualism on race-targeted policy attitudes while
acknowledging the multi-dimensional nature of both group-based attitudes and
individualism. Prior work has shown the effects of SDO on race-targeted policies are
often mediated by individualism-related constructs (Federico and Sidanius 2002;
Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1996), suggesting “principled” objections to policies like
affirmative action are more “prejudiced” than they claim to be (also see, e.g. Reyna et
al. 2005). This assertion has significant implications for the questions tackled in this
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dissertation because if the role of individualism is entirely explained by group-based
motivations, it is strong evidence in favor of the dominant role of NMSoT factors
over CCSoT factors, and contrary to what I propose in this dissertation, we may not
need to account for higher-order principles at all when predicting race-based policy
attitudes. However, it remains unknown which aspects of group-based attitudes,
whether a particular dimension of SDO or some aspect of group identity, explain
which aspects of individualism (e.g. self-reliance, work ethic) and thus account for
this mediation. Thus, if group-based factors do underlay the role of individualism, we
still do not know whether this is because of innate motivations to favor ingroups or
group-based principles, which entail some degree of higher-order thought.
Competing Conceptualizations of Individualis m
The traditional conservative stance on government assistance is often summed
up as a belief in “pulling yourself up by your bootstraps.” But what does it mean to
pull oneself up by one’s bootstraps? Is the value being placed on the fact that people
are doing it on their own—independently and without help? Or, does the intrinsic
value of such an act hinge on the hard work that inevitably goes into overcoming an
obstacle? Ambiguity surrounding the concept has plagued the existing literature, with
measures of individualism ranging from questions roughly approximating the
Protestant Work Ethic (Furnham 1990; e.g. Kinder and Mendelberg 2000) to sheer
self-reported political conservatism (e.g. Sniderman et al. 1996). Despite some
grappling with this conceptual problem (e.g. Sniderman, Crosby, and Howell 2000),
we still lack an empirical investigation of how to best operationalize individualism as
it pertains to race-targeted policy attitudes. In this chapter, I acknowledge the
potentially distinct roles of two factors underlying individualism: work ethic and self-
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reliance. In both cases, these are consciously held values consistent with what is
called higher-order thought in this dissertation, but there are important differences in
the implications associated with each. If the role of individualism is explained by selfreliance, higher-order thought manifests in the formation of race-based policy
opinions as equal rejection of government assistance to individuals regardless of
group membership. However, if the role of individualism is explained by work ethic,
higher-order thought should be conceptualized as reliance on deservingness cues to
determine who may receive government assistance.
A common conceptualization of individualism is the Protestant Work Ethic, or
the belief that hard work is the key to success. According to some, adherence to such a
work ethic is thought to “fuse” with racial prejudice to form symbolic racism as
explained in the previous chapter (Kinder and Sears 1981; Henry and Sears 2002;
Rabinowitz, Sears, Sidanius, and Krosnick 2009; Sears and Henry 2003; Sears et al.
1997). Work ethic is posited to be inherent to constructs like symbolic racism, in which
Blacks are seen as not sufficiently hardworking to warrant assistance. Kinder and
Mendelberg (2000) utilize a measure of individualism developed by Feldman (1988),
which closely approximates the values related to work ethic, and find that symbolic
racism outperforms sheer individualism in predicting race-based policy attitudes.
The lack of conceptual clarity regarding this brand of individualism has been
identified by Sniderman, Crosby, and Howell (2000) in a critical analysis of symbolic
racism. According to Sniderman et al., the items used in the symbolic racism scale
“have nothing to do with individualism” (p. 243). Sniderman et al. defer to an
Emersonian view of individualism as an ethic of self-reliance in one’s own life. As
such, individualism is conceptualized as a high valuation of independence regardless
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of how hardworking an individual is. They proceed to use political ideology as a more
apt proxy for individualism as it represents preferences for limited government and thus
the degree to which people prefer a society unassisted by government interventio n.
They find preferences for limited government to outperform racial attitudes in
predicting policy attitudes.
Yet even if one agrees with the proposition that symbolic racism muddies the
concept of individualism, is Emersonian self-reliance the “true” individualism that we
should be concerned with, and is political ideology a sufficient proxy for such
individualism? Further, there is still ambiguity regarding whether the key aspect of
individualism underlying race-targeted policy attitudes is self-reliance or a high
valuation of hard work. Kinder and Mendelberg (2000) explicitly discuss individualis m
in terms of both Tocqueville’s ideas about the American citizen being isolated from
large-scale society (p. 45) and Weber’s ideas about work ethic (p. 46). However, no
work to date explicitly sets out to disentangle the effects of these alternative notions of
individualism.
Perhaps most concerning is the fact that the measures of political ideology
used in existing work constitute a wide range of factors beyond preferences for
limited government, some of which are explicitly related to group-based attitudes
(e.g. Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009; Jost et al. 2003). In other words, research that
uses ideology measures as proxies for individualism are likely conflating
individualism with a variety of other factors that may include the very group-based
attitudes that the role of individualism is being compared to.
Social Dominance, Group Identity, and the Multiple Facets of Each
As with individualism, the role of “prejudice” in existing literature has also
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been construed quite broadly. This is because the primary goal of existing research
has been to determine whether people’s attitudes toward race-based policies are due
to racial biases or nonracial principles. As such, this literature has gauged the relative
influence of individualism versus prejudice by testing the explanatory power of scales
measuring racial prejudice against scales measuring individ ualism (Bobo 1998; Henry
and Sears 2002; Kinder and Mendelberg 2000; Sears and Henry 2003; Sniderman,
Crosby, and Howell 2000) or by examining whether biases exist in support for
government assistance to racial minority groups compared to nonracial groups
(Kinder and Mendelberg 2000; Kuklinski et al. 1997; Reyna et al. 2005; Sears et al.
1997; Sniderman et al. 1996; Sniderman, Crosby, and Howell 2000; Sniderman et al.
1991). Although these efforts have made tremendous headway in advancing
understandings of how racial attitudes compete with individualism in predicting racerelated political outcomes, in order to more precisely determine the specific
mechanisms of these relationships, it is necessary to break down “prejudice” into its
constituent parts. This study considers two distinct aspects of group-based attitudes
that might reasonably comprise the role of “prejudice” yet have unique implications
for understanding how, exactly, group-based preferences influence policy attitudes.
One component of group-based attitudes examined in this study is the set of
beliefs individuals have about how groups in society should be organized. Such
beliefs, defined in the previous chapter as group-based principles, are distinct from
social identity motives because they do not necessarily entail favoring the groups one
belongs to. Instead, group-based principles are broad ideological beliefs about how
groups should interact with one another irrespective of the groups one belongs to.
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This chapter focuses on one particular form of group-based principles that has been at
the center of research on race-based policy attitudes: Social Dominance Orientation.
SDO researchers have made great strides in showing that broad preferences
regarding how groups in society are organized significantly predict attitudes toward
policies assisting minority groups (e.g. Federico and Sidanius 2002; Pratto, Sidanius,
and Levin 2006; Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1996). Critically, social dominance
theory differs from psychology work centered on social identity because it strives to
encompass the wide array of factors associated with the universal tendency for
societies to organize hierarchically in groups beyond just individuals’ motivations to
identify with and favor ingroups. These factors include cultural ideologies,
institutions, “real” conflicts between groups over finite resources, personality
differences between individuals, and evolutionary mechanisms, among others (Pratto,
Sidanius, and Levin 2006). Accordingly, individual differences in SDO are thought to
reflect differences in the legitimizing myths – or “consensually held values, attitudes,
beliefs, stereotypes, and cultural ideologies” (Pratto, Sidanius, and Levin 2006, p.
275) – that people rely upon to either enhance or attenuate group-based hierarchy in
society. In contrast to social identity forces, which motivate individuals to favor their
ingroup, both dominant and subordinate group members can latch onto the same
legitimizing myths, and so it is often the case that subordinate group members
subscribe to hierarchy-enhancing myths and dominant group members subscribe to
hierarchy-attenuating myths (Pratto, Sidanius, and Levin 2006; see also Sidanius and
Pratto 1999).
SDO has been shown to consist of two distinct dimensions: SDO-Dominance
(SDO-D), which represents individuals’ support for active dominance by superior
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groups over inferior groups, and SDO-Equality (SDO-E), which represents
individuals’ rejection of equality between groups via subtle, often indirect means (Ho
et al. 2012). Thus, whereas SDO-D predicts variables such as old-fashioned racism,
nationalism, and support for immigrant persecution, SDO-E predicts variables such as
opposition to welfare, affirmative action, and other redistributive policies (Ho et al.
2015; Jost and Thompson 2000; Kugler, Cooper, and Nosek 2010). Essentially,
whereas manifestations of SDO-D tend to be overt and easily recognizable,
manifestations of SDO-E tend to be covert and guised as unrelated to group
preferences.
Although studies have largely parsed out the differential effects of SDO-D and
SDO-E on race-targeted policies, the explanatory power of the dimensions of SDO (or
any group-based principle for that matter) relative to other group-based preferences
remain unknown. Specifically, as suggested throughout this dissertation, people’s
attitudes toward how groups in society should be arranged hierarchically are not
necessarily the same as their attitudes toward the groups they belong to. Several
studies find that of the two dimensions of SDO, it is SDO-D that seems to be most
related to ethnocentrism and other social identity motives (Jost and Thompson 2000;
Kugler, Cooper, and Nosek 2010). However, Ho et al. (2015) find that neither SDO-D
nor SDO-E are related to ethnic identity among disadvantaged minority groups in a
way that would be consistent with ingroup favoritism. Thus, despite the
preponderance of research showing that SDO is a substantial predictor of race-based
policy attitudes, it remains unknown how the explanatory power of SDO compares to
social identity motives to favor ingroups.
Indeed, as summarized in the prior chapter, seminal work in psychology has
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shown the tendency to favor ingroups to be a fairly universal and powerful force in
driving human attitudes and behavior (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner et al. 1987), yet
there is substantial variation in the degree to which people identify with ingroups and
derogate outgroups in general (Brewer 1999, 2001; Sumner 1906). Kinder and Kam
(2009) have shown broad identification with groups, or ethnocentrism, varies quite a
bit across individuals and predicts a wide array of political issue attitudes (see also
Huddy 2001). Specifically with regard to attitude toward affirmative action, Lowery
et al. (2006) showed ingroup favoritism to predict opposition to affirmative action
independent of concerns regarding outgroups. This work is crucial because it suggests
sheer ingroup favoritism, rather than broad preferences for group-based hierarchy,
may be a driving factor behind race-based policy attitudes. However, existing work is
still lacking because it has yet to directly pit these distinct forces against one another,
and also because even social identity motives are not unidimensional.
Roccas et al. (2008) test a multi-dimensional conceptualization of ingroup
identification. According to this work, group identity can vary along four dimensions:
Importance, or the degree to which individuals feel that the groups they belong to are
important to who they are; Commitment, or the degree to which individuals aim to
benefit and help the groups they belong to; Superiority, or the degree to which
individuals view the groups they belong to as superior to other groups; and Deference,
or the degree to which individuals believe it is important to honor and revere their
groups’ norms, symbols, and leaders. They show that SDO (modeled as a single
dimension) is most related to the Superiority dimension of group identification,
suggesting even if SDO-D is related to social identity motives as suggested by other
studies (Jost and Thompson 2000; Kugler, Cooper, and Nosek 2010), it nonetheless
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only reflects a single dimension of identity concerns. In order to fully gauge the role
of identification with ingroups relative to group-based principles in predicting racetargeted policy attitudes, this study acknowledges the multidimensionality of group
identity.
Is Individualis m Just an Excuse for Prejudice?
A critical goal of this chapter is to shed light on a central finding of existing
work on race-based policy attitudes: that “principled” individualistic arguments
against race-targeted policies are often explained by group-based preferences. This
suggests individualistic values are primarily used as an “excuse” for evaluating racebased policies based on what group receives assistance from the policy. In this
chapter, this is referred to as the “principled mediation” hypothesis, and its
proponents generally suggest contemporary individualism often serves as a socially
acceptable vehicle for expressing prejudice.
Empirical work addressing this issue has generally concluded that although
measures of individualism tend to largely predict race-based policy opposition, their
roles are largely explained by group-based preferences. Correlational analyses have
suggested SDO explains principled objections to affirmative action (Federico and
Sidanius 2002; Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1996), and experimental evidence suggests
the link between conservatism and affirmative action attitudes is explained by
stereotypes about Blacks (Reyna et al. 2005). However, a test of this proposition that
acknowledges a distinction between group-based principles and social identity
motives, and the multiple dimensions of each, has yet to be done. Do group-based
preferences explain the role of work ethic or self-reliance? Is the relationship between
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individualism and opposition to race-based policies explained by broad hierarchyenhancing ideologies or by ingroup favoritism?
The distinction between the role of social identity motives and group-based
principles is key because if the role of individualism is entirely explained by ingroup
favoritism, it suggests higher-order thought has little, if anything, to do with racebased policy evaluations. However, if the role of individualism is explained by groupbased principles, it suggests higher-order thought plays a role but we have simply
been misunderstanding it. Then again, the principled mediation hypothesis has not
been tested with the array of measures used in this study, and so it is also possible that
with more direct measures of the distinct dimensions of “principles” and “prejudice,”
the principled mediation finding of past research does not replicate.
Work building on evolutionary theory actually supports the idea that
individualistic principles may be deeply rooted and are not necessarily just vehicles
for the expression of group biases. Petersen and colleagues have argued that reliance
on deservingness heuristics to evaluate whether or not individuals should receive
assistance is evolutionarily rooted in within-group interactions in small-scale group
living among human ancestors. Specifically, it was adaptive for humans only to share
resources with “hardworking” others because according to the “logic of social
exchange,” these individuals were the most likely to be able to reciprocate with favors
or resources. Conversely, “lazy” individuals or “cheaters” who exploited the good
will of others were less likely to reciprocate (Petersen 2012; Petersen, Sznycer,
Cosmides, and Tooby 2012; see also Cosmides and Tooby 1992; 2005; Price,
Cosmides, and Tooby 2002). In the context of present-day politics, it is suggested
these evolved psychological tools are applied to evaluations of social welfare
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programs because, through aspects of the environments such as media or
socialization, individuals learn to apply this deep-seated mechanism of determining
one’s deservingness to mass-scale politics (Petersen 2012; Petersen et al. 2012).
Accordingly, individualistic values – or at least work ethic because work ethic allows
for the possibility of assisting others as long as they are deserving – may be expected
to influence race-based policy attitudes net any effects from group-based attitudes.
Overview and Hypotheses
The empirical tests of this chapter were done using data from an online
survey, and include correlational analyses using Structural Equation Modeling (SEM)
in conjunction with an experimental manipulation of the degree to which different
groups are seen as hardworking.
Self-Reliance versus Work Ethic
Two conceptualizations of individualism are measured: 1) self-reliance, i.e. a
belief that individuals should strive to be self-sufficient and avoid dependence on
others, and 2) work ethic, i.e. a belief that hard work is a necessary and sufficient
prerequisite for success. Most existing literature interprets the role of individualism as
a combination of self-reliance and work ethic, and so there is no strong empirical
basis for expecting one to play a role rather than the other. However, most work,
including work based in evolutionary theory by Petersen and colleagues, makes the
implicit assumption that there are instances in which most people will support
assistance to certain individuals even if they are opposed to government assistance in
general, which would favor the role of perceptions of deservingness and work ethic
rather than blanket opposition to any government assistance in line with self-reliance.
If deservingness heuristics are indeed, as Petersen and colleagues claim, evolved

56
mechanisms for detecting cheaters, people should be willing to assist individuals seen
as hardworking. As such, the experimental manipulation targets the role of work ethic
by varying the degree to which Blacks versus Whites are seen as hardworking.
Nonetheless, the ideals associated with living on one’s own, isolated from broader
society, are prominent in the United States. Tocqueville’s observations of American
society are often reflected in libertarian rhetoric as well as popular media such as
television shows about the charm of frontier living.
Group-Based Principles, Social Identity Motives, and the Dimensions of Each
I disentangle “prejudice” by including separate measures of group-based
principles (SDO-D and SDO-E) and social identity motives (ingroup importance,
ingroup commitment, ingroup superiority, and ingroup deference). Most existing
work on the role of “prejudice” in influencing race-based policy attitudes has focused
on racial prejudice without aiming to distinguish between group-based principles and
social identity let alone the subdimensions of each, and so remains agnostic as to
which is the primary factor driving the role of prejudice. However, some research
points decidedly at one versus the other. On the one hand, SDO research suggests
opposition to race-targeted government assistance is driven by hierarchy-enhancing
ideologies that can be embraced by both dominant- and subordinate-group members,
and so sides with the role of group-based principles (Federico and Sidanius 2002;
Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1996; Ho et al. 2015; Jost and Thompson 2000). If enough
controlled processing occurs when people evaluate race-targeted policies, we should
expect deep-seated ingroup bias to be translated into higher-order principles that
apply to how groups should be organized broadly. On the other hand, the role of sheer
ingroup favoritism has been noted by several studies as well (e.g. Dovidio, Mann, and
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Gaertner 1989; Lowery et al. 2006). Ingroup favoritism is fairly deep-seated in human
attitudes and behavior and occurs automatically, and scholars have increasingly
argued that quick, automatic preferences dominate people’s political evaluations (e.g.
Lodge and Taber 2013). Given that I expect sufficient controlled processing to occur
when people evaluate race-targeted policies, I nonetheless expect SDO to outperform
ingroup favoritism.
Explaining “Principled Mediation”
Mediational analyses using SEM are used to disentangle the dimensions of
individualism and group-based attitudes that explain the “principled mediatio n”
finding of past research. Most prior work seems to suggest individualism masks
ingroup favoritism, because people use individualistic arguments to abide by social
norms that frown upon the self-interest inherent in ingroup favoritism. However, it
would be consistent with the proposed model of this dissertation if individualism were
mediated by group-based principles – i.e. SDO – because it is hypothesized
throughout this dissertation that group-based principles will be the dominant predictor
of race-based attitudes. With regard to the dimensions of SDO, some research would
suggest SDO-E is the main factor underlying the role of individualism because it
reflects the subtle, hierarchy-enhancing ideologies often used to justify inequality and
thus should be most related to how individualism is used as a rationale for opposing
redistributive policies.
There is little a priori theory for predicting which dimension of individualism
group-based attitudes underlay. On the one hand, group-based attitudes may underlay
self-reliance because a laissez-faire approach to government allows dominant groups
to remain on top and subordinate groups to remain on the bottom. The caveat here is
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that if social identity motives are the primary factor underlying self-reliance, we
would expect this mediation to occur only among members of dominant groups. If
group-based principles underlay self-reliance, this mediation should occur regardless
of group membership. On the other hand, according to work suggesting stereotypes
about Blacks being lazy are key to race-based policy opposition (Henry and Sears
2002; Reyna et al. 2005), work ethic may be the dimension of individualism most
driven by group-based attitudes because such values can be relied upon selectively as
a means of assigning deservingness to groups.
Data and Measures
Eight hundred and twenty-four adults were recruited through Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) between January 7 th and January 16th 2015 in exchange for
$1 in compensation. Participants were required to have successfully completed at
least 500 MTurk Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs), have been approved for at least
95% of the HITs they completed, and had to reside in the United States. Due to
incorrect responses on attention questions implemented throughout the survey, 199
participants had to be dropped from the sample. 3 Further, only White respondents
were analyzed for the purposes of this study due to the large amounts of expected
heterogeneity in support for race-targeted government assistance across races (see e.g.
Kinder and Sears 1981; Sears and Henry 2003). The remaining sample of 513 adults
was 40.9% male, and had a median age of 37 years old. Politically, the sample was
53.2% liberal, 20.1% moderate, and 26.7% conservative as measured by a five-point

3

For the attention questions, participants were asked to mark a specific response option on a 5-point
scale from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree” for each of 3 items dispersed throughout the
survey. Participants who marked the wrong option for any of these 3 items were dropped from
analyses. This fairly strict criterion may explain the somewhat high rate of failure on these questions.
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self-report measure. MTurk has been shown to be reasonably representative of the
U.S. population when compared to student samples but less representative –
specifically, more educated and more liberal – than national surveys using random
sampling (e.g., Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz, 2011; Buhrmester et al., 2011; Clifford,
Jewell, and Waggoner, 2015). Thus this survey displayed similar biases to a typical
MTurk sample (barring education, which was not measured).
Individualism. The development of questions gauging self-reliance and work
ethic was influenced by widely-used measures of Protestant Work Ethic (PWE;
Furnham 1990), but were specifically adopted from prior work on the
multidimensionality of PWE, which divides items into one of several dimensions
including self-reliance and work ethic (Miller, Woehr, and Hudspeth 2001).
Social identity motives. Broad identification with ingroups were measured via
a modified version of a scale created by Roccas et al. (2008), which measures four
dimensions of group identity as described earlier: Commitment, Importance,
Deference, and Superiority.
Social Dominance Orientation. Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) was
measured via the original 16-item scale (Pratto et al. 1994) and consisted of two
dimensions: SDO-Dominance (SDO-D) and SDO-Equality (SDO-E), which gauge
preferences for the domination of some groups over others and rejection of equality
between groups, respectively (see Ho et al. 2012).
Race-targeted policy attitudes. Participants indicated on 7-point scales from
“Strongly Oppose” to “Strongly Support” how they felt toward three redistributive
race-targeted government assistance policies (affirmative action for Blacks in hiring
for jobs, increased federal education spending in neighborhoods predominantly
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populated by Blacks, and federally funded college scholarships for Blacks). These
three items were used as indicators of a latent construct reflecting support for racebased government assistance (α = 0.92).
Work Ethic Manipulation. Participants were split randomly into one of five
conditions: a Control condition, the Blacks High Merit condition, the Blacks Low Merit
Condition, the Disabled High Merit condition, or the Disabled Low Merit condition. In
every condition, participants were asked to read several pages of information that were
collected in March 2014 as part of a scientific report aimed at looking at how various
demographic groups are similar to or different from one another. This information was
not shown to participants until all questions had been answered except the manipulatio n
check items (described below) and items aimed specifically at group-based policy
attitudes, which the manipulations were intended to influence.
The information shown was all fabricated, which participants were told in a
debriefing letter sent out after all data collection was complete. In all conditions, three
sets of results from the fictitious study were presented to participants with short
summaries of the result, why the topic was investigated, a graph displaying each result,
and a few sentences explaining each graph. The content of these three results of the
fictitious report was held constant across conditions and was related to the geographic
distribution of Mormons in the United States, the age distribution of voters in the 2008
Presidential Election, and gender differences in perceptions of who is the “head of the
household” – a male or a female.
In each of the four conditions besides the control condition, the three findings
from the report described above were preceded by an additional finding related to the
average amount of hours per week spent working across two demographic groups. In
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the Blacks High Merit condition, participants were shown the (fictitious) finding that
on average, Blacks work more hours per week (47 hours) than Whites (30). In the
Blacks Low Merit condition, these numbers were simply reversed so that Whites were
shown to work more hours on average per week. The Disabled High Merit and Disabled
Low Merit conditions reflected these exact same conditions except that the groups
being compared were disabled persons and non-disabled persons. The reason for
including manipulations aimed at disabled persons, as well as the results regarding
these manipulations,

are explained

in the next chapter. For this chapter, the

manipulations of interest involve Blacks and Whites. As explained above, non-White
participants were omitted from analyses so that Blacks are always the outgroup.
Following the presentation of information from the fictitious report,
participants were asked questions gauging their perceptions of a variety of traits
among a variety of groups including Blacks and disabled persons. Perceptions of how
“hardworking” each group was (on a 7-point scale from “not hardworking” to
“hardworking”) were included in each battery as a manipulation check to ensure that
the information they read did, on average, influence perceptions of the work ethic of
the relevant groups. The survey concluded with participants answering a series of
questions about their levels of support for or opposition to group-based policies as
described above.
Each model in the analyses controls for the effects of age, sex, religion
(Christian or non-Christian), and political ideology (on a 7-point scale from “Strongly
Liberal” to “Strongly Conservative”). 4 The exact items used for each measure as well
as the materials for the work ethic manipulation can be found in the Appendix.

4

The effects of control variables are not discussed in this chapter but are available upon request.
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Results
Confirmatory Factor Analyses
Confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs) using robust maximum likelihood
(MLR) estimation were performed in order to disentangle the potentially distinct
dimensions comprising both individualism and group-based attitudes. The MLR
estimation procedure adjusts standard errors to take into account the degree to which
the data are not normally distributed, and is recommended for data that involve
Likert-scale items such as those used in this study (e.g. Rhemtulla, Brosseau-Liard,
and Savalei 2012). A scaling correction factor is estimated through the use of MLR to
reflect the degree to which the data are not normally distributed, with numbers farther
from 1 indicating greater skewness.
CFAs were first run separately for each individualism- and group-related
construct to ensure the dimensions underlying each were measured adequately, and
then jointly in a single model to assess relationships between dimensions and test
whether each dimension was indeed distinct. Error covariances were added between
individual factor items to account for large positive residual covariances (which
indicate left over covariance between items not accounted for by the factor) and thus
improve model fit. This resulted in three error covariances for the self-reliance factor
of individualism and two error covariances for the work ethic factor of individualism.
For group-based attitudes, one error covariance was estimated for the commitment
dimension of group identity, one for SDO-D, and two for SDO-E. Error covariances
between indicators were estimated only if they were theoretically appropriate (in all
cases, they involved items from the same factor that had very similar wording) and
significantly improved model fit. Items for which error covariances were estimated
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are noted in the Appendix. The best-fitting model estimated each dimension
separately, lending support to the idea that group-based principles, social identity
motives, and individualism, as well as their subdimensions, are distinct. The
correlations between each factor are shown in Table 2.1 and model fit for the joint
CFA is shown in the caption. Full results from each CFA are available upon request.
Table 2.1 shows the individualism factors were significantly related to one
another as expected. However, it should be noted that although both of the
individualism factors were significantly related, they were not redundant. When we
turn to group-based attitudes, it is evident that just as with individualism, a
unidimensional conceptualization of group-based preferences is not appropriate.
Although there was a high degree of correlation within the sub-dimensions making up
group identity and group-based principles, the correlations between factors
representing group identity and factors representing SDO were quite low. Although
many correlations were in the expected direction, many of the factors assumed to be
related in past work were only modestly correlated if at all. In particular, the
correlations between each of the four dimensions of group identity were only
modestly correlated with SDO-D (except for Commitment, which was uncorrelated)
and the only two correlations with SDO-E were quite weak. The largest correlation
between SDO and the group identification constructs existed between the deference
dimension of group identity and SDO-D, despite the fact that prior work has
suggested that SDO should be most related to the superiority dimension. These results
thus illustrate the multi-dimensionality of group-based attitudes and a distinction
between SDO (i.e. group-based principles) and ingroup-related attitudes (i.e. social
identity motives).

Table 2.1. Correlation Matrix for All Latent Factors of Individualis m, Social Identity Motives, and GroupBased Principles
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Of particular interest for this chapter are the crossover relationships between
individualism, social identity motives, and SDO. Both individualism factors were positively
related to superiority and deference, although the correlations for work ethic were substantially
stronger than the correlations for self-reliance. Importance and commitment were also positively
related to work ethic, but unlike any of the other group-based attitude factors, they were
unrelated to self-reliance. Finally, turning to group-based principles, SDO-D was weakly
positively correlated with both individualism factors and SDO-E was positively associated with
work ethic but unrelated to self-reliance.
Structural Equation Models
The primary analyses of this chapter involve using the multiple dimensions of
individualism, social identity motives, and group-based principles to predict race-based policy
attitudes as well as to explain the relationship between individualism and race-based policy
attitudes. Analyses were first conducted to estimate the simultaneous effects of all individualism
and group-related constructs on race-based policy attitudes. Then, based on these full model
results, subsequent models tested the degree to which the relationship between individualism and
race-based policy attitudes was explained by either social identity motives or group-based
principles. SEMs were run with the same estimation procedures as with the CFAs. Due to high
collinearity between the commitment and importance dimensions of group identity, these factors
were combined in this and all subsequent models. 5
Figure 1 illustrates the results of an SEM predicting support for race-based government
assistance with all factors comprising individualism, social identity motives, and group-based

5

The results did not change substantially when using these factors individually instead.
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principles. It should be noted that even with just these variables in the model, nearly half of the
variation in support for race-based government assistance was explained. This amount of
explained variance was approximately the same when control variables were excluded from the
model (R2 = .506 without control variables).6

Figure 2.1: SEM Predicting Race-Based Policy Attitudes with Individualis m, Social
Identity Motives, and Group-Based Principles
SDO-E was the most predictive factor out of all categories of constructs, followed by
importance of/commitment to ingroups, which is positively associated with support for racebased government assistance, and finally self-reliance. Work ethic was only marginally related to
support for government assistance. SDO-D, superiority, and deference all showed no significant

6

This slight increase in the amount of variance explained when control variables are excluded is likely due to the
fact that the unique variance explained by each primary independent variable increases when the collinearity
between those variables and the control variables is excluded from the model.
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relationship with race-based policy attitudes when the effects of the other constructs were
simultaneously estimated. The results of this model are notable for several reasons. First, groupbased principles – specifically, SDO-E – were dominant in predicting race-targeted policy
support.7 However, SDO-E was not the only dimension that mattered. Social identity motives
were influential, but in the opposite direction than expected. The importance and commitment
factors were actually positively related to support for race-targeted policies assisting Blacks.8 It
thus seems that the effects of group identity on policy attitudes are far from unidimens ional.
Although other social identity motives such as believing one’s ingroups are superior to other
groups or believing ingroup norms and leaders should be obeyed are unrelated to race-based
policy support, merely valuing membership in ingroups is associated with greater support for
government assistance to Blacks. Finally, contrary to the “principled mediation” hypothesis,
there was evidence of significant independent effects of individualism alongside the effects of
SDO and group identity, although only self-reliance was significant at the p < .05 level.
The full model results therefore provide evidence suggesting the different dimensions of
individualism and group-based attitudes have distinct effects on race-targeted policy attitudes but
the dominant portion of explanatory power comes from SDO-E. Nonetheless, with independent
effects from individualism even in the face of group-based attitudes, it seems there is still some
chance the individuals are able to evaluate government assistance programs based on the
perceived deservingness of the target group rather than whether the target group is an ingroup or
outgroup, or where the target group stands hierarchically in society.

7

It should be noted that the lack of effects from SDO-D is likely due to collinearity with SDO-E, as SDO-D
negatively predicts policy attitudes as expected when SDO-E is removed from the model.
8 When importance and commitment are included as separate constructs in the model, it is evident that importance is
predominantly driving this relationship but commitment has a consistent relationship in the same direction.
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Putting Merit to the Test: Effects of Work Ethic Manipulations
Table 2.2 shows the results of OLS regressions illustrating the manipulation checks
testing whether the information presented in each condition influenced participants’ perceptions
of how “hardworking” the target groups of the manipulations were. The Black High Merit
condition led to a significant increase in how hardworking participants saw Blacks but had no
effect on how hardworking participants saw Whites. Conversely, the Black Low Merit condition
led to a significant increase in how hardworking participants saw Whites but had no effect on
their perceptions of Blacks. As such, it can be said that although the manipulations did not make
the group depicted as working less hours per week seem less hardworking, they did make the
group depicted as working more hours per week seem more hardworking. Thus, the
manipulations did have an effect on evaluations of how hardworking Blacks and Whites are
relative to one another.
Table 2.2: Manipulation Check – Perceptions of “Hardworking” by Condition

Yet turning to Table 2.3, it is evident that despite the effects of the conditions on
perceptions of how hardworking Blacks and Whites are, there was no discernible effect of the
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conditions on policy attitudes. These results call into question the independent effects of work
ethic seen earlier, but corroborate the overall finding that the effects of individualism are limited
nonetheless.
Table 2.3: Effects of Work Ethic Manipulations on Race-Based Policy Attitudes

Testing the “Principled Mediation” Hypothesis
A critical question remains: is the relationship between individualism and support for
race-based government support explained by group-based preferences? In other words, is there
support for the “principled mediation” hypothesis and can we identify the dimensions of
individualism and group-based attitudes responsible for it? The full model results shown in
Figure 2.1 suggest individualism maintains an independent relationship with policy attitudes
despite the roles of group-based principles and social identity motives, but the lack of effects of
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the work ethic manipulation calls into question what the work ethic survey items really
measured. Further, it is still possible that a significant portion of what would otherwise be
interpreted as individualism is actually explained by group-based attitudes.
Table 2.4 compares the results of the full model with the results of a model in which
SDO-E is removed from being a predictor of race-based policy attitudes. SDO-E is removed
because the full model results suggest it is the only group-based attitude variable predicting racebased policy attitudes in the expected direction, and so is the only factor that can reasonably
explain the role of individualism. The only individualism coefficient that changes notably when
SDO-E is removed from the full model is the coefficient for work ethic. The relationship
between work ethic and race-based policy support goes from being only marginally significant to
being significant at the p < .05 level. This suggests that of the two individualism factors, work
ethic shows the most evidence of potentially being mediated by group-based attitudes. Indeed, as
shown in Table 2.1, SDO-E is unrelated to self-reliance but significantly positively related to
work ethic.
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Table 2.4: Predicting Race-Based Policy Attitudes With and Without SDO-E

The change in the coefficient for work ethic when SDO-E is removed from the full model
suggests SDO-E may at least partially mediate the relationship between work ethic and racebased policy support (the term “partially” is used because even in the full model the coefficient
for work ethic is marginally significant). However, to properly test the degree to which the effect
of work ethic is explained by SDO-E, a model was tested that replicates the full model but also
makes SDO-E endogenous by regressing it on work ethic, self-reliance, and the control variables
that are already predicting race-based policy attitudes. Further, indirect and direct effects were
calculated for work ethic through SDO-E to quantify the degree to which the relationship
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between work ethic and race-based policy support is explained by SDO-E (see Sobel 1988). The
direct relationship between work ethic and support for race-based government assistance as well
as work ethic’s indirect effect through SDO-E are illustrated in Figure 2.2.

Figure 2.2: Testing “Principled Mediation” of Work Ethic by SDO-E
As shown in Figure 2.2, the direct relationship between work ethic and race-based policy
support is again significant, and with the control variables in the model predicting SDO -E, work
ethic no longer exhibits a significant relationship with SDO-E. In conjunction with the lack of an
indirect effect of work ethic through SDO-E, these results suggest the effects of work ethic on
support for race-based government assistance were not mediated by SDO-E. Work ethic exhibits
a fairly weak but independent relationship with race-based policy support that is not explained by
group-based attitudes.
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Taking Stock of What “Really” Matters
The findings presented in this chapter provide a much needed clarification to
understanding what factors are “really” at play when people evaluate race-targeted policies. The
existing literature is beset by conflicting empirical findings regarding the roles of “principles”
versus “prejudice.” I have suggested this is largely due to conceptual ambiguity. This study not
only clarifies the roles of various constructs in predicting race-based policy attitudes but also
allows for a second look at previous findings on the topic. At a broad level, it is evident that both
individualism and group-based attitudes are complex, multi-dimensional constructs and the
dimensions of each have distinct relationships with race-based policy attitudes that are at times
contrary to what would be expected given unidimensional understandings of the role of each.
Is There Room for Non-Group-Based Principles?
The values commonly thought of as underlying the role of individualism such as work
ethic and self-reliance have been largely assumed in research grappling with the philosophical
theories of Tocqueville, Emerson, and Weber. The findings in this chapter suggest the effects of
individualistic values seem best encapsulated by self-reliance rather than work ethic, although
both constructs showed evidence of consistent, independent (albeit fragile in the case of work
ethic) relationships with policy attitudes in the expected direction. However, the null effects of
the work ethic manipulation call into question what measures of these values – work ethic in
particular – are really gauging. Do independent effects of self-reliance and work ethic suggest
there is room, after all, for reliance on higher-order principles that are not fused with groupbased attitudes? Or, perhaps when people report a strong adherence to the virtues of working
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hard, they are really exposing some more deep-seated group-based preference not measured in
these data.
The Dominant Role of Group-Based Principles
With regard to group-based attitudes, the distinction between group-based principles and
social identity motives seems key. SDO-E is the most dominant predictor of race-based policy
opinions above and beyond group identity and individualistic values. This finding should not be
taken lightly, as much of the existing research on race-based policy attitudes makes the implicit
assumption that ingroup favoritism is a major driver of opposition to government assistance. The
results presented here suggest that on the contrary, broad ideological beliefs about how groups
should be organized in society are more central to people’s attitudes about government assistance
to racial minority groups. Yet the results also show SDO is not the only game in town, and the
relationships between people’s attitudes toward groups they belong to and how they think groups
should be organized broadly is more complex than suggested by prior research. Group identity
variables seem more correlated with SDO-D than SDO-E, as expected (Jost and Thompson 2000;
Kugler, Cooper, and Nosek 2010), but these correlations are rather weak and inconsistent.
Further, although SDO-E is the most dominant predictor of race-based policy attitudes, group
identity variables exhibit unique relationships with policy attitudes alongside and independently
from SDO-E.
Crucially, importance of and commitment to ingroups is positively associated with
support for race-based policies. This finding is unexpected given the decades of work in
psychology and political science on the relationship between group identity and ingroup
favouritism (see e.g. Hogg and Abrams 2007), as well as research specifically suggesting
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ingroup favoritism leads to opposition to race-based policies (Lowery et al. 2006). It seems given
the findings of this chapter that positive attitudes toward ingroups in the form of deference to
ingroup norms and leaders or beliefs that one’s ingroups are superior to all other groups are fairly
irrelevant, but those who simply value their group memberships and seek to help members of
their ingroups are often actually more likely to support race-based government assistance. How
could this be? One possibility is that by controlling for the “negative” aspects of group identity
such as the superiority and deference dimensions, the effects of the importance and commitment
dimensions of group identity reflect broader communitarianism rather than positive feelings
aimed only at ingroups. However, this possibility is not testable in the current data, nor is it a
primary focus of this dissertation, and so I leave further exploration of this unexpected finding to
further research.
Individualism: Not Just an Excuse for Prejudice
“Principled mediation” was not evident in the data. Although the relationship between
work ethic and race-based policy support was slightly influenced by whether or not SDO-E was
included as a covariate, further analysis suggested the effects of work ethic were not significantly
explained by SDO-E. Work ethic maintained an independent relationship with race-based policy
opinions, and so the proposition that principled objections to race-targeted policies are a facade
for prejudice was not supported. This calls into question existing work suggesting SDO explains
the role of individualism in predicting race-based policy attitudes (e.g. Federico and Sidanius
2002; Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1996). There are multiple differences between this study and
the existing work on the topic that may explain this discrepancy in results, but the primary
distinction this study focused on was the operationalization of individ ualism. Whereas prior
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research showing evidence of “principled mediation” has operationalized individualism as
political conservatism or examined how SDO mediates the role of individualistic arguments
against race-based policies, this study used direct measures of the individualistic values that the
“principles or prejudice” literature has centered on. Thus, it is possible that some other form of
individualism is at the core of “principled mediation.” Or, it is also possible that when measured
directly, the doctrines associated with “pulling yourself up by your bootstraps” play a genuine
role, albeit one that pales in comparison to the role of group-based principles and is not reflective
of work ethic as generally conceived (according to the null effect of the manipulation).
But Have We Really Ruled Out Ingroup Favoritism?
All of the analyses presented in this chapter have predicted attitudes toward government
assistance to Blacks, but given the broad nature of what I am trying to address in this dissertation
– that is, the interplay between evolutionarily rooted group biases and broad higher-order
principles – shouldn’t these findings hold up for a broad array of target groups besides Blacks?
Most of the “principled or prejudice” literature examines attitudes toward specific racial groups
(mainly Blacks) without considering how people view group-based resource distribution broadly.
This is sufficient when the question is simply whether “principles” or “prejudice” underlay
policy attitudes, but it does not say much about the mechanisms of these relationships. By
limiting investigations to policies aimed at a particular racial group, it does not properly allow
for disentangling ingroup favoritism from group-based principles because it remains possible
that the role of, for example, SDO is explained by the fact that Whites are answering the SDO
questions with Blacks in mind. If this is the case, it would suggest it is still about ingroups and
outgroups. This concern is addressed in Chapter 3.
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CHAPTER 3
Ingroup Bias in the Raw: The M inimal Groups Paradigm
“There is no doubt that under some conditions all men can and do display hostility towards
groups other than their own, be they social, national, racial, religious or any other. There is also
no doubt, however, that under other conditions this hostility either does not appear or can be
modified.”
- Henri Tajfel9
In 1954, Muzafer Sherif gathered 22 White, middle-class, twelve-year-old boys from
Protestant backgrounds on a 200-acre Boy Scouts of America camp in the Robbers Cave State
Park in Oklahoma. He split the boys into two groups, which the boys named the “Eagles” and the
“Rattlers.” Over the course of three weeks, he had the boys engage in group activities to
reinforce their group membership and then compete in various tasks against the other group such
as baseball, swimming, and tug-of-war. He found that the “Eagles” and the “Rattlers” each
developed their own hierarchical structures and that competition between the groups bred
ingroup pride and negative attitudes and hostile behaviors across group lines (Sherif 1954; 1958;
Sherif et al. 1961). Sherif’s somewhat unsurprising findings and simple research design – flawed
in many ways relative to contemporary research standards – demonstrated what decades of
research in social psychology would identify as a universal human tendency: ingroup favoritism.
It is not surprising, then, that a prominent explanation for why people disagree on policies that
dictate how societal resources should be distributed across groups – policies such as affirmative
action and race-based education spending – is that people simply prefer whatever policy favors
the groups they belong to (e.g. Dovidio and Gaertner 1996; Dovidio, Mann, and Gaertner 1989;
Lowery et al. 2006).

9

Tajfel, H. (1981). Human groups and social categories. New York, NY: Cambridge University
Press.
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Yet the idea that people evaluate government assistance policies solely on the basis of
whether or not their group benefits from the policy runs directly counter to arguments that such
evaluations are not racial or group-based, but are instead based on individualistic values.
According to this viewpoint, people who oppose race-targeted government assistance do so
because they believe everyone is capable of “pulling themselves up by their bootstraps” if they
so desired, and so group-based assistance unfairly favors some individuals over others. Despite
much evidence to the contrary (Henry and Sears, 2002; Kinder and Mendelberg 2000; Kinder
and Sears, 1981), the perspective that individualism rather than prejudice drives race-based
policy attitudes is to some degree backed up with empirical evidence (e.g., Sniderman and
Carmines, 1997; Sniderman et al., 2000). However, so far in this dissertation, I have found
evidence in favor of neither the role of individualism nor the role of ingroup favoritism.
In the previous chapter, I found group-based principles – specifically, SDO-E – rather
than ingroup bias or individualism, to be the foremost predictor of attitudes toward race-targeted
government assistance. Although this dissertation is far from the first study to show the dominant
role that SDO plays in race-based policy attitudes (e.g. Federico and Sidanius 2002; Ho et al.
2015; Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1996), it is the first study to pit its effects against the effects of
ingroup favoritism and individualism simultaneously. The fact that SDO outperforms social
identity motives and individualism suggests race-based policy attitudes are not driven simply by
whether or not one’s own group is perceived as benefiting, but they are also not driven solely by
lofty principles about work ethic and self-reliance. Instead, race-based policy opinions seem
group-based yet principled at the same time. People favor certain groups over others, but in a
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manner that reflects broader rules regarding group hierarchy that should be applied regardless of
which groups one actually belongs to.
These findings may be surprising given the ubiquitous nature of ingroup favoritism,
which scholars since Sherif have demonstrated in a wide variety of settings using a wide range of
methods (Hogg and Abrams 2007; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner et al. 1981). Yet the central
argument of this dissertation is that group-based principles rather than ingroup favoritism or
individualistic values alone drive race-based policy opinions because evolutionarily speaking,
humans have developed controlled neural processes that allow for higher-order thought to
interact with innate, automatic group biases. In other words, the simple set of behavioral
guidelines that automatic ingroup favoritism provides – a simple rule set that was developed
primarily for small-scale group interactions – can be modified in such a way that addresses the
broad specter of mass-scale society. Group-based principles allow individuals to translate innate
group biases into generalized belief systems applicable to society as a whole.
I argue that although ingroup favoritism is a dominant force in many aspects of human
behavior, it takes a back seat to group-based principles when people evaluate race-based policies
because race-based policy opinions occur at a high enough level of consciousness (“LOC” in
terms of social neuroscience research; Zelazo 2004) that there is ample time for automatic group
biases to interact with controlled processes and higher-order thought. Therefore, I suggest the
dominant role of group-based principles is due to controlled processes that interact with
automatic group biases when people evaluate race-based policies.
Despite this theoretical framework, and the findings presented in Chapter 2, it is possible
I have not adequately ruled out the roles of sheer ingroup favoritism and individualistic values.
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Prior studies, including my analyses in Chapter 2, have been specific to particular races (almost
entirely, Blacks – but see Akrami, Ekehammar, and Araya, 2000; Bahr and Chadwick, 1974; and
Hurwitz and Peffley, 1992 for examples with other races). But this is problematic because
examinations of “real-world” groups and policies come with the limitation that history and
context inherently influence perceptions of such groups and policies. Thus, a stereotype such as
that Blacks are lazy, for example, makes it difficult if not impossible to distinguish whether the
role of group-based principles is due to where groups broadly are perceived as “belonging” in the
social hierarchy or perceptions that Blacks, in particular, have violated individualistic principles
and thus deserve lower standing in the social hierarchy. Both mechanisms would result in racial
biases in support for government assistance and significant effects of group-based principles but
they have substantially different implications. The former mechanism reflects group-based
principles as conceptualized in this dissertation, but the latter reflects an application of
individualistic values. Indeed, these sorts of conceptual problems have been at the core of
disagreement in much of the “principles or prejudice” literature (see e.g., Sniderman, Crosby,
and Howell 2000).
In addition, by only examining the attitudes of Whites toward Blacks, it is possible that
group-based principles still act as a proxy for ingroup-outgroup dynamics. The items comprising
the SDO survey battery refer to “group” in a general sense. However, if the participants are all
White and the primary group they have in mind when answering the SDO questions is Blacks, it
is possible the SDO measures are picking up on ingroup favoritism and social identity motives
rather than broad principles about how groups should be organized regardless of one’s ingroup.
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In this chapter, I use the Minimal Groups Paradigm (MGP) to examine the degree to
which ingroup favoritism in a Minimal Groups (MG) setting, in which group distinctions are
entirely arbitrary and have no history or context attached to them, is predicted by opposition to
race-based government assistance. In doing so, I isolate ingroup favoritism in its purest form to
determine the degree to which it is associated with race-based policy attitudes while avoiding
confounds related to specific racial groups. Further, to isolate the role of individualistic values,
the perceived merit of each minimal group is experimentally manipulated. As such, I artificially
apply deservingness stereotypes to otherwise meaningless groups, and examine the degree to
which individuals adjust their attitudes and behavior in accordance with the relative merit of the
groups, as well as the degree to which sensitivity to merit manipulations is predicted by
opposition to race-based policies.
I also utilize both implicit and explicit attitude measures within the context of the MGP in
order to gauge automatic versus controlled processes as related to ingroup favoritism in the MGP
as well as race-based policy attitudes. A major argument I make in this dissertation, which has
thus far been untested, is that group-based principles are a dominant predictor of race-based
policy opinions because they represent the interaction between automatic group biases and
higher-order ideological values. Two components of this argument are tested in this chapter: 1)
the relationship between ingroup favoritism and race-based policy attitudes is due to automatic
processes, and 2) group-based principles are associated with automatic/implicit group biases as
well as controlled/explicit higher-order principles (in this experiment, sensitivity to the relative
merit between groups).
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Ingroup Bias: A Versatile Tool
The details of how and why ingroup favoritism manifests have been augmented
substantially since the Sherif experiments that showed how prejudice could evolve from
competition between groups. Importantly for the purposes of this dissertation, it has been shown
that “real” competition between groups over resources is not necessary for perceived group
distinctions and ingroup favoritism to develop (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner et al. 1981).
Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979) and Self-Categorization Theory (Turner et al.,
1987) have been the most dominant models of intergroup attitudes and behavior for decades, and
suggests that in an effort to cultivate structure in the social world and build self-esteem,
individuals will construct group distinctions by utilizing available cues from the environment
(e.g. Hogg and Abrams 2007; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner et al. 1981). In other words, the
human motivation to identify as members of a group is universal, but the precise group
distinctions at play in any given situation depend on what traits and characteristics are salient.
Therefore, group distinctions are fluid, and individuals can find traits to use to delineate between
ingroups and outgroups in any social context. Indeed, using the MGP, research has shown that
people will favor ingroups and express bias against outgroups even when group membership is
arbitrary (e.g. Tajfel and Turner 1979).
Recent research in social neuroscience has corroborated the innate tendency to favor
ingroups by identifying neural components associated with group categorization beyond mere
racial categorizations (Van Bavel, Packer, and Cunningham 2008; 2011; Ratner, Kaul, and Van
Bavel 2013). The central implication of this research is that people tend to categorize themselves
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into ingroups and outgroups at an automatic level and so prejudice can manifest spontaneously
across a variety of groups beyond just those laden with historically imbued negative stereotypes.
By constraining the role of prejudice in the “principles or prejudice” literature to being
aimed at Blacks, it also makes it impossible to parse out the role of ingroup favoritism from the
role of consciously held beliefs and stereotypes about groups. For instance, if we constrain the
role of prejudice to attitudes toward Blacks, prior work showing that people oppose assistance to
other groups besides Blacks (e.g. Sniderman and Carmines, 1997; Sniderman et al., 1991;
Sniderman et al., 1996) may seem like evidence of individualism when in reality it could be
evidence of broad ingroup favoritism. In order to fully determine whether learned stereotypes are
a necessary condition for opposing government assistance to a group, it would be ideal to
experimentally manipulate whether stereotypes are attached to the group.
Overview and Hypotheses
In this chapter, I use the Minimal Groups Paradigm (MGP) to examine the degree to
which attitudes and behavior in a MG setting predict “real-world” policy attitudes – namely,
attitudes toward race-based government assistance. By manipulating perceptions of merit
between two minimal groups – one of which is the participant’s ingroup and the other of which
is the participant’s outgroup – it will be possible to examine the degree to which the perceived
merit of groups influences attitudes and behaviors toward those groups, as well as if these
attitudes and behaviors in a MG setting differentiate supporters of race-based policies from those
who oppose such policies. Further, I utilize both implicit and explicit measures of attitudes
toward each of the minimal groups in order to account for the distinction between automatic and
controlled processes. I conduct my analyses in three main stages.
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First, I use the same survey measures that were used in Chapter 2 to see if my results
from Chapter 2 replicate in the smaller laboratory sample. The only difference between the
measures used in Chapter 2 and those used in this chapter is that the ingroup identification
measures – i.e. the measures of social identity motives – are all directed specifically at the
minimal ingroup in this experiment as opposed to ingroups in general. I expect that as in Chapter
2, group-based principles will predict race-based policy attitudes more strongly than
individualism or social identity motives.
Second, I estimate the degree to which participants favored their ingroup and were
influenced by the merit manipulation across three MG bias variables: an implicit MG bias
variable, an explicit MG bias variable, and a behavioral MG bias variable determined by
decisions in a point distribution task. I interpret greater ingroup favoritism when the ingroup is
high in merit (relative to the outgroup) and less ingroup favoritism when the ingroup is low in
merit (relative to the outgroup) as evidence of an influence of individualism. However, ingroup
favoritism and effects of the merit manipulation in the context of the MGP alone are not the
primary concern of this stage of analyses. Instead, I go on to determine whether ingroup
favoritism and sensitivity to the merit manipulation (in the expected direction) is predicted by
opposition to race-based policies. My hypotheses for this stage of analyses depend on the
measure of MG bias. I expect that only implicit MG bias (rather than explicit or behavioral MG
bias) will be associated with opposition to race-based policies because the role of ingroup
favoritism should, according to my theoretical model, be limited to automatic processes. On the
other hand, I expect that only explicit and behavioral MG bias will be influenced by the merit
manipulations, as merit-based considerations and the role of individualism more broadly should
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be mainly constrained to controlled processes. Thus, sensitivity to the merit manipulations
should only be predicted by race-based policy opposition with regard to the explicit and
behavioral MG bias variables.
In the third and final stage of analyses, I examine the relationships that SDO – my
measure of group-based principles – has with ingroup favoritism and sensitivity to the merit
manipulations. I have argued that the reason group-based principles will be the dominant
predictor of race-based policy attitudes is because they represent the interaction between
automatic group biases and higher-order thought. Accordingly, I expect implicit (but not explicit
or behavioral) MG bias to be associated with greater levels of SDO, but the impact of explicit
and behavioral (but not implicit) MG bias on SDO to be moderated by the merit manipulations.
In other words, at the implicit level, I expect ingroup bias to have a direct relationship with
group-based principles, but at the explicit level, I expect group-based principles to predict
sensitivity to merit manipulations.
Data and Methods
Ninety undergraduate students from a mid-sized Midwestern university enrolled in
various Political Science courses participated in the study for course credit. Data collection took
place over the course of 3 semesters between April 2015 and March 2016. The sample was
53.3% male, 86.7% White, 4.4% Latino, and 66.7% Christian. Forty-four percent of the sample
identified as Democrats or leaning Democrat, 40% identified as Republicans or leaning
Republican, 12.2% identified as Independent, and 3.3% identified as something else. The sample
was 45.6% liberal, 16.7% moderate, and 37.8% conservative. All survey questions and
experimental procedures took place in a computer lab where no more than 5 participants were
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run through at a time. Partitions separated each participant to ensure maximum isolation during
the experiment. The experiment consisted of four components: a survey component (see
Appendix for exact items), minimal groups assignment via the Numerical Estimation Style Test
(NEST), a resource distribution task (the Tajfel matrices), and measurement of implicit attitudes
via the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP; Payne et al. 2005).
Race-based policy attitudes. Students reported attitudes toward the same three racetargeted government assistance policies as in Chapter 2, which were averaged together to form a
composite variable (α = 0.82).
Social Dominance Orientation. The same 16 SDO items as in Chapter 2 were used to
construct variables indicating SDO-E (α = 0.85) and SDO-D (α = 0.88).
Social identity motives. Variables for the same four dimensions of ingroup identification
as in Chapter 2 were used to construct measures of ingroup importance (α = 0.83), commitment
(α = 0.85), deference (α = 0.79), and superiority (α = 0.87). Importantly, instead of referring to
groups broadly, these items referred specifically to the minimal ingroup in the experiment.
Individualism. Measures of work ethic (α = 0.91) and self-reliance (α = 0.89) were
constructed using the same items as in Chapter 2.
Explicit MG bias. Measures of explicit attitudes toward each of the minimal groups
consisted of feeling thermometers ranging from 0-100 with labels above the 0 (“Very Cold”), 50
(“Neutral”), and 100 (“Very Warm”) marks. A value of “2” was used as a starting point for all
participants to be better able to distinguish between those who intended to mark a “0” on the
scale and missing data. A measure of explicit Minimal Groups (MG) bias was constructed by
subtracting each participants’ feeling thermometer score for the outgroup from their feeling
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thermometer score for the ingroup. Thus, higher scores on this variable indicate greater ingroup
bias.
Minimal Groups Assignment and NEST
After completing the survey component of the study, participants completed the
Numerical Estimation Style Test (NEST; Tajfel et al. 1971), which is a commonly used method
for randomly assigning participants to groups in the MGP. Specifically, participants were shown
a series of white screens with various numbers of black dots on each screen for 5 second each,
and asked to estimate the number of dots on each screen. Traditionally, participants are told a
bogus story about how dot-counting tendencies are significant personality traits and that people
tend to either be “Overestimators,” individuals who tend to overestimate the number of dots on
each screen, or “Underestimators,” individuals who tend to underestimate the number of dots on
each screen. They are told that these tendencies are randomly distributed in the population. In
this study, however, participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: the MGP
condition, High Merit Ingroup condition, and Low Merit Ingroup condition.
In the MGP condition, participants were simply divided into Overestimators and
Underestimators based on the same procedures as in the traditional NEST. In the High Merit
Ingroup and Low Merit Ingroup conditions, the NEST was still used but instead of dividing
participants into Overestimators and Underestimators, participants were divided into Accurate
Estimators and Inaccurate Estimators. As feedback, participants were randomly assigned to be
told that they were either relatively accurate or relatively inaccurate in their estimates compared
to others who completed the same task, and thus were categorized for the duration of the
experiment as Accurate Estimators or Inaccurate Estimators. Essentially, in these conditions,
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rather than representing a “true” minimal groups paradigm in which group membership is
meaningless, group membership indicated the degree of merit (accuracy) associated with group
members (see Appendix for Instructions for NEST and group assignments). Upon being
introduced to the minimal groups, participants were shown two abstract, colorful symbols and
told that one is the logo for their ingroup and the other is the logo for the other group (see
Appendix for logos). The logos were randomized between participants so that the ingroup logo
for half of the participants was the outgroup logo for the other half.
Resource Distribution Task
After being assigned to their groups, participants completed the resource distribution
task, which took the form of the “Tajfel matrices” originally developed by Henri Tajfel and
colleagues to measure ingroup favoritism and outgroup discrimination as behavior resulting from
minimal group assignments in the Minimal Groups Paradigm (e.g., Tajfel and Turner, 1979;
Bourhis, Sachdev, and Gagnon, 1994). This task involved participants choosing among options
in which points are distributed between their own group and the outgroup. Importantly,
participants were explicitly told that the points were not going to them personally, but rather to
the group as a whole. Participants completed 6 versions of this task in order to yield three
dependent variables: one that measures ingroup favoritism, or the degree to which a participant
distributed more points to the ingroup instead of choosing to maximize points for both groups,
one that measures maximum differentiation, or the degree to which a participant favored the
greatest difference in points between groups in favor of the ingroup rather than maximizing
profit for either the ingroup or both groups, and one that measures parity, or the degree to which
a participant preferred equal distribution of points between groups rather than favoring the
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ingroup (see Appendix for exact instructions and task). During each resource distribution trial,
participants were shown the minimal groups logos at the bottom of the screen with labels above
each to serve as a reminder of which represented which group.
Implicit MG Bias
Measures of implicit attitudes toward each of the two minimal groups were obtained via
the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, and Stewart 2005), in which
participants were shown abstract, meaningless symbols preceded by a quickly shown prime and
asked to rate whether the abstract symbol was “pleasant” or “unpleasant.” Participants completed
96 trials of the AMP. For each trial, a fixation cross was shown for 306 ms, followed by the
prime for 20 ms, then a black and white noise mask for 94 ms, the abstract symbol for 106 ms,
and finally another black and white noise mask until the participant registered a response. In
total, aside from the time taken for the participant to respond, the stimulus presentation occurred
over 526 ms. The inter-stimulus interval (ISI) between the participants’ responses and onset of
the next trial was 1 s. Although the original AMP employs primes that are shown for around 75
ms and without a first noise mask following the prime, more recent work has experimented with
various modifications to the protocol and suggested that a shorter stimulus presentation time with
a mask immediately following the prime yields effects that isolate affect misattribution processes
more appropriately (Rohr, Degner, and Wentura 2015).
The procedure is a measure of implicit biases that individuals have toward the primes, as
the affect attributed to the prime has been shown to pour over into evaluations of the target
symbols. This procedure has been used in a variety of research to measure implicit bias and
prejudice (Hofmann and Baumert 2010; Imhoff, Schmidt, Bernhardt, Dierksmeier, and Banse
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2011; Payne et al. 2005; Payne et al. 2010; Rohr, Degner, and Wentura 2015). The primes were
the group logos associated with the minimal ingroup and outgroup that the participants were
assigned to. Prime images were set in a random order across trials with the constraint that no
three primes of the same type (Ingroup or Outgroup) occurred consecutively.
Results
Replicating Chapter 2 Results
The results of an OLS regression mostly replicated the results discussed in Chapter 2.
Specifically, the dominant predictor of race-based policy opposition was SDO-E (SDO-D was
significant when SDO-E was removed from the model, just as in Chapter 2). Unlike the results of
Chapter 2, however, neither individualism factor predicted race-based policy attitudes. Further,
In Chapter 2, I unexpectedly found positive relationships between ingroup identification and
support for race-based policies. However, these unexpected relationships were not evident in
these data. As would normally be expected, the importance dimension of ingroup identification
was related to opposition to race-based policies. This suggests the unexpected positive
relationship between ingroup importance/commitment and race-based policy support found in
Chapter 2 may have indeed been spurious or due to the measures being aimed at groups in
general rather than particular, relevant ingroups. The results of this analysis are shown in Table
3.1.
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Table 3.1: Predicting Race-Based Policy Opinions with Group-Based Principles, Social
Identity Motives, and Individualis m

Preliminary MGP Results
Analyses were first conducted to examine baseline levels of ingroup favoritism versus
merit-based evaluations across these outcome measures. The difference between feeling
thermometer scores for the ingroup (M = 68.30, SD = 19.16) and feeling thermometer scores for
the outgroup (M = 55.88, SD = 17.12) was positive and significant (t = 5.32, df = 82, p < .001),
suggesting explicit ingroup bias in the aggregate. Similarly, there was evidence of significant
implicit ingroup bias in the aggregate as well, as a greater proportion of symbols following
ingroup primes were rated as pleasant (M = 0.31, SD = 0.23) than symbols following outgroup
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primes (M = 0.26, SD = 0.22; t = 2.74, df = 81, p < .01). Finally, there was mixed evidence of
ingroup favoritism in the aggregate with regard to resource distribution in the Tajfel matrices.
One-sample t-tests showed that participants were significantly more likely than chance to express
ingroup favoritism over maximum joint profit (M = 2.51, SD = 4.91; t = 4.78, df = 86, p < .001)
and maximum differentiation over maximum ingroup/joint profit (M = 1.82, SD = 4.81; t = 3.52,
df = 86, p < .001). However, participants were also significantly more likely than chance to
express parity over ingroup favoritism (M = 8.12, SD = 5.39; t = 14.05, df = 86, p < .001). These
somewhat contradictory descriptive statistics for the three resource allocation variables is not
surprising given prior work on how much variation exists in the strategies people use for these
types of tasks across contexts (e.g. Bornstein et al. 1983a; 1983b; Forgas and Fiedler, 1996).
Given that in this chapter the interest is in variation in resource allocation decisions rather than
descriptive levels of these variables in the aggregate, this concern is of little consequence for
tests of my hypotheses.
A series of OLS regressions were run to estimate the main effects of condition on explicit
MG bias and resource allocation decisions. All models controlled for the effect of ideology (5point scale from “very liberal” to “very conservative”) and included dummy control variables for
being male, nonwhite, Latino, non-Christian, being born outside the US, and not speaking
English as one’s first language. There was a marginal effect of condition on explicit MG bias
such that there was marginally less explicit ingroup bias in the Low Merit condition than in the
High Merit condition (b = -11.088, SE = 5.635, t = -1.970, df = 72, p = .053), suggesting weak
evidence for merit-based evaluation in the expected direction. However, neither the Low Merit
condition nor the High Merit condition showed a significant difference from the MGP condition.
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With regard to resource distribution via the Tajfel matrices, the merit conditions had
weak effects, if any, and in ways that only slightly resemble merit-based evaluation as
hypothesized. There were no effects of condition on ingroup favoritism or maximum
differentiation. There was marginally more evidence of parity in the Low Merit condition than in
the MGP condition (b = 3.018, SE = 1.532, t = 1.970, df = 76, p = .053), as would be expected
for merit-based evaluation, but there were no other significant differences between conditions.
To analyze implicit MG bias, multilevel logit models were run with each AMP trial as a
separate case and allowing intercepts to vary at the participant- level. Thus, these models estimate
the probability of any given symbol being rated as “Pleasant” (rather than “Unpleasant”) as a
function of which group logo (ingroup or outgroup) preceded the symbol, experimental
condition, and the control variables (which were the same as in the regression models above). An
empty linear multilevel model grouping by participant yielded an ICC that suggested 16% of the
variation across trials can be explained by participant. In the multilevel logit model, condition
had a significant main effect on the probability of rating symbols as pleasant. Participants were
significantly more likely to rate symbols as pleasant in the Low Merit condition than in the MGP
condition (b = 0.823, SE = 0.327, z = 2.519, p < .05) or the High Merit condition (b = 0.662, SE
= 0.320, z = 2.069, p < .05). However, there was no significant interaction between condition and
group, and so implicit ingroup bias did not differ as a function of merit condition.
Minimal Ingroup Bias and Race-Based Policy Attitudes
There was evidence of ingroup favoritism and a lack of merit-based evaluation in the MG
setting, but the hypotheses of this study have to do with the relationship between attitudes and
behavior in the MG setting and “real-world” race-based policy attitudes. In these analyses, I

94
model attitudes and behavior in the MG setting as my outcome variables and individual
differences in support for race-targeted policies as a predictor (along with the same control
variables as before). To restate my hypotheses, I expect implicit, but not explicit or behavioral
MG bias to be predicted by race-based policy opposition.
Table 3.2 shows the coefficients for explicit MG bias as well as each of the three
behavioral MG bias variables regressed on race-based policy support. Also shown are the
coefficients for interactions between race-based policy support and experimental condition,
which were calculated in separate regression models. All models controlled for the same
variables as in prior models. Race-based policy support showed no significant relationship with
any of the explicit or behavioral MG bias variables. Further, there were no significant
interactions between policy support and condition.
Table 3.2: Race-Based Policy Attitudes, Merit, Explicit MG Bias, and Behavioral MG Bias

Table 3.3 shows the results of analyses testing the same hypothesis as above except with
regard to implicit attitudes. Multilevel models allowing intercepts to vary by participant were
again run with interaction terms between the dummy variable for outgroup primes and the racebased policy attitude variable. These interactions indicate the extent to which the negative
relationship between outgroup prime and the probability of being marked “Pleasant” (which is
significant in the aggregate) changes across levels of support for race-targeted policies. Separate
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models were also run to calculate three-way interactions between the outgroup prime variable,
race-based policy attitudes, and condition. However, due to model convergence failure, the threeway interaction models are simple logit models.
Table 3.3: Race-Based Policy Attitudes and Implicit MG Bias

The interaction between the outgroup prime variable and race-based policy support was
significant and positive, indicating that at greater levels of support for race-targeted policies, the
gap between ingroup primes and outgroup primes was less negative than at lower levels of
support for each policy. Put simply, support for race-targeted policies was associated with lower
levels of implicit MG bias. Figure 1 illustrates how the effect of the outgroup prime variable (i.e.
implicit MG bias) varies across race-based policy support, from one standard deviation below the
mean to one standard deviation above the mean.
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Figure 3.1: Implicit MG Bias across Levels of Support for Race-Based Policies
Table 3.3 also shows that there were no significant three-way interactions with condition,
suggesting sensitivity to the merit manipulations in terms of predicting implicit MG bias did not
vary as a function of race-based policy support. Those who oppose race-targeted policies were
no more or less likely to exhibit merit-based evaluations than those who support race-targeted
policies.
Ingroup Bias, Merit, and SDO
The final set of analyses in this chapter concerned the relationships between attitudes and
behavior in the MGP and group-based principles. Table 3.4 shows the results of OLS regression
models regressing explicit MG bias and each of the behavioral MG bias variables on SDO -E and
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SDO-D as well as their interactions with the conditions. SDO-E and SDO-D are always included
in separate models to avoid collinearity problems. Further, the interaction terms shown in Table
3.4 are estimated in separate models from those used to estimate the main effects of SDO. I
hypothesized that at the explicit level (i.e. for the explicit and behavioral MG bias variables),
sensitivity to the merit manipulations rather than ingroup favoritism alone would be associated
with SDO. The findings shown in Table 3.4 offer mixed support for this hypothesis.
Table 3.4: SDO, Merit, Explicit MG Bias, Explicit MG Bias, and Behavioral MG Bias

As expected, the effects of the merit manipulations depended significantly on
participants’ levels of both SDO-E and SDO-D. Although there were no cases in which the Low
Merit condition led to decreased ingroup favoritism compared to the MGP condition, the High
Merit condition led to increased ingroup favoritism, as was hypothesized, but only significantly
among those high in SDO. This interaction is illustrated in Figure 3.2 with SDO-D. From
observing Figure 3.2, it can be seen that as SDO-D increases, the effects of the merit
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manipulations begin to look increasingly as they are expected to if individualism is at play. This
same pattern is evident for the interaction with SDO-E (not shown).

Figure 3.2: Effects of Merit Manipulations across Levels of SDO-D
Yet when it comes to behavioral MG bias, the effects of the merit manipulations do not
vary across levels of SDO except in one case, where as expected individuals are less likely to
exhibit parity (i.e. equal distribution between groups) in their point distribution patterns in the
High Merit condition at high levels of SDO-E. But for the other behavioral MG bias measures
and in all cases with regard to SDO-D, the relationship between behavioral MG bias and SDO
seems direct. That is, contrary to expectations, explicit ingroup bias is associated with groupbased principles when it comes to participants actually dividing up points between their group
and the other group.
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With regard to implicit attitudes in the MGP, it was expected that implicit MG bias would
have a straightforward relationship with group-based principles without any dependence on the
merit manipulations. Said differently, sensitivity to the merit manipulations in such a way that
reflects the effects of individualism on implicit MG bias should not be dependent on SDO. As
shown in Table 3.5, this hypothesis was mostly supported. The analyses used here used the same
exact MLM strategy as was the case when looking at the relationship between implicit MG bias
and race-based policy support. However, due to model convergence issues, all results showing
the three-way interactions and all SDO-E results shown in Table 3.5 are from ordinary logit
models.10 All interactions between SDO and each merit condition were significant, but not in a
way that suggested greater reliance on individualism was associated with SDO. For both SDO
variables, the interaction terms for both the High Merit condition and the Low Merit condition
were in the same direction. Decomposing these interactions showed that implicit MG bias
increased across levels of SDO primarily in the MGP condition but in both merit conditions, this
relationship was dampened significantly. Put simply, the effects of the merit manipulations
contained in the interactions shown in Table 3.5 do not seem to reflect individualistic behavior.

10

For the model estimating the two-way interaction between Outgroup Prime and SDO-E, the MLM allowing for
random intercepts by participant converged normally with an un -centered but not a centered SDO-E variable, and so
although the simple logit results are shown for this model so that the main effects are not misleading, the MLM
results did not differ substantially.
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Table 3.5: SDO and Implicit MG Bias

If we turn to the two-way interactions between Outgroup Prime and SDO, it is evident
that in the case of SDO-D, the degree to which symbols following outgroup primes were rated as
less pleasant than symbols following ingroup primes (i.e. implicit MG bias) was significantly
moderated by SDO-D. Specifically, the negative effect of Outgroup Prime, and thus implicit MG
bias, was significantly stronger at higher levels of SDO-D. This result is illustrated in Figure 3.3,
and supports the hypothesis that automatic ingroup bias will be associated with group-based
principles. This interaction was in the same direction but not significant with regard to SDO -E.
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Figure 3.3: Implicit MG Bias across Levels of SDO-D
The Subtle Role of Ingroup Bias, and theNot-So-Subtle Role of Group-Based Principles
Before discussing results related to the MGP in this experiment, it is worth noting that
correlational analyses basically replicated the results of Chapter 2. Group-based principles –
SDO-E, in particular – predicted race-based policy attitudes better than individualistic values or
social identity motives. Ingroup importance showed weak evidence of an independent negative
effect, which suggests the unexpected positive association this construct (as well as ingroup
commitment) had with race-based policy attitudes in Chapter 2 may have been spurious or due to
the fact that the items did not target specific, relevant groups. Nonetheless, group-based
principles were the foremost predictor of race-based policy opinions.
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Turning to the results pertaining to the MGP, ingroup bias was fairly ubiquitous across
explicit, implicit, and behavioral measures. Further, the ingroup bias that occurred in the MGP
predicted opposition to race-targeted policies, but as hypothesized, only with regard to implicit
attitudes. This suggests that in line with the theoretical foundations of this dissertation, there is a
role for ingroup favoritism in evaluations of race-targeted policies, but it is a subtle role that
results primarily from automatic rather than controlled processes. Across self-report measures, in
which individuals have the time to deliberate and engage in controlled processing, the role of
factors related to ingroup identification pales in comparison to factors related to group-based
principles. However, ingroup bias in its purest form – that is, at the implicit level in a setting
where groups have no context or prior beliefs associated with them – is significantly predicted by
opposition to race-based government assistance.
Evidence of “Pure” Individualism? Not Really…
Some research using the MGP has found that manipulating the status or merit of groups
has very limited effects on how the groups were treated (e.g. Bettencourt, Charlton, Dorr, and
Hume, 2001; Commins and Lockwood 1979; Ellemers, Wilke, and Van Knippenberg, 1993;
Tajfel and Turner, 1979). In the aggregate, the effects of the merit manipulations in this study
corroborate these past findings. There were no substantial effects of the merit manipulations on
implicit, explicit, or behavioral MG bias. There was also no evidence of sensitivity to the merit
manipulations being predicted by race-based policy attitudes in the aggregate. Although
participants in the Low Merit condition were less likely to mark symbols as pleasant in general,
this effect was not moderated by whether the symbol was preceded by an ingroup or outgroup
prime, and so implicit MG bias did not differ across conditions.
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The Group-Based and “Principled” Foundations of Group-Based Principles
A key contribution of this chapter to the dissertation more broadly was the ability to
examine whether automatic group biases and higher-order principles come together to form
group-based principles as hypothesized. I have argued that evolutionarily speaking, group-based
principles rather than ingroup bias or ideological values alone should predict attitudes toward
race-targeted government assistance because they represent the confluence between quick, deepseated motivations to favor ingroups and slower, controlled processes that allow individuals to
adjust the “simple” guidelines provided by sheer ingroup favoritism and translate them into
principles applicable to mass-scale society. The results presented in this chapter “mostly” align
with this theoretical framework.
As expected, implict ingroup bias was directly associated with SDO without being
moderated by the role of merit in a way that indicated individualism, and explicit attitudes
toward the minimal groups were associated with SDO in a way that indicated merit-based
evaluation, or individualism. However, when it came to behavioral MG bias variables, there was
weak evidence of a relationship between SDO and merit-based evaluation, as would be expected,
but for the most part the relationship between behavioral ingroup bias and SDO was direct. This
suggests that in certain instances – specifically, with regard to behavioral measures, which
“should” be influenced heavily by controlled processes – group-based principles can represent
ingroup bias that occurs at a fairly high level of consciousness. Therefore, this suggests the role
of ingroup favoritism is not entirely constrained to automatic processing.
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Implications for How We Think About Race and Politics
The findings presented in this chapter suggest three overarching conclusions. First, the
role of ingroup favoritism in predicting race-based policy opinions seems mainly automatic.
Second, reliance on individualism as evidenced by merit-based evaluations and use of
deservingness cues seems extremely limited in the aggregate. Finally, group-based principles
seem to comprise some combination of implicit and explicit group biases as well as sensitivity to
deservingness cues, i.e. individualism. These findings are mostly in line with the theory I have
presented in this dissertation, and suggest that people’s attitudes toward hot-button race-related
political issues such as affirmative action and race-targeted education spending are
predominantly influenced by the interaction between people’s deep-seated, primal motivations to
favor the groups they belong to and higher-order principles that people consciously strive to
abide by. But it is still reasonable to be somewhat puzzled by the fact that explicit and behavioral
MG bias did not predict race-based policy attitudes. What is going on psychologically when
people explicitly divvy up resources between groups in the MGP that is different from when they
explicitly divvy up resources between groups in the “real-world”? The MGP is, after all, a few
steps removed from “real-world” politics. In the next chapter, I go back to examining attitudes
toward Whites and Blacks and explore the implications of gaps between people’s implicit and
explicit racial attitudes. I suggest it is the translation process between automatic and controlled
processes that lead evaluations of “real-world” groups to differ from what goes on between
meaningless groups in the laboratory.
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CHAPTER 4
When Automatic and Controlled Collide
“His mind slid away into the labyrinthine world of doublethink. To know and not to know, to be
conscious of complete truthfulness while telling carefully constructed lies, to hold simultaneously
two opinions which cancelled out…to forget, whatever it was necessary to forget, then to draw it
back into memory again at the moment when it was needed, and then promptly to forget it
again…that was the ultimate subtlety; consciously to induce unconsciousness, and then, once
again, to become unconscious of the act of hypnosis you had just performed.”
- George Orwell11
In his seminal novel, Nineteen Eighty-Four, George Orwell introduced readers to a
psychological phenomenon he referred to as “doublethink,” or “the power of holding two
contradictory beliefs in one’s mind simultaneously, and accepting both of them” (214). Research
has shown that what might be called doublethink does indeed exist across a variety of beliefs and
attitudes, albeit in a less nefarious fashion than the government-induced doublethink Orwell
spoke of. Individuals often harbor both positive and negative beliefs and attitudes toward an
object concurrently – a phenomenon called ambivalence (Kaplan 1972), which has been studied
extensively for its relevance to understanding political attitudes (Alvarez and Brehm 1997;
Feldman and Zaller 1992; Lavine 2001; Rudolph and Popp 2007). Recent work in social
psychology has shown that individuals need not be consciously aware of their ambivalence for it
to exist and substantially influence how they think and process information (Petty, Tormala,
Briñol, and Jarvis 2006). With regard to race, for example, individuals can think one way about a
racial group at a conscious, or explicit, level and yet feel differently in their gut.
Work in political science and psychology has attempted to weigh the utility of implicit
versus explicit measures of attitudes when predicting political outcomes, but this work remains
11

Orwell, George. Nineteen Eighty-Four. London: Secker and Warburg, 1949.
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largely focused on simply comparing the main effects of implicit and explicit attitude measures
as predictors of political phenomena, thus neglecting the implications of individuals
simultaneously holding contradictory implicit and explicit preferences. It is precisely this
distinction between the implicit and explicit levels of evaluation that I am interested in. As
discussed throughout this dissertation, automatic and controlled neural processes interact with
one another over time, and it is this interaction that I suggest is key to understanding how people
evaluate race-targeted government assistance policies.
In the previous chapter, I showed that whereas the role of ingroup bias in race-based
policy attitudes seems primarily automatic, principles seem to enter the picture at a more
controlled level. Yet in a minimal groups setting, people are perfectly willing to explicitly favor
the ingroup, so what is different about how people process information in the MGP versus in the
“real-world”? I suggest the difference lays in the translation process between automatic group
biases and controlled thought that occurs when people evaluate “real-world” groups and policies
relevant to mass-scale politics. As such, instead of evaluating the utility of implicit versus
explicit attitude measures, I examine individual differences in the correspondence between
implicit and explicit attitudes that exists within individuals and use these individual differences
as a predictor of race-related political outcomes. Although the distinction between automatic and
controlled processes is not perfectly reflected by the difference between implicit and explicit
attitude measures, the difference between scores on these measures should indicate the gap
between “more automatic” and “more controlled” evaluations.
I also address the potential concern that given the dominant role of group-based
principles and the fact that group-based principles, along with other self-report measures, seem
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to subsume the role of automatic group biases, measures of automatic processes might be
unnecessary for understanding race-based policy attitudes. On the contrary, I suggest measures
of automatic group biases are critical because the gap that exists between one’s implicit and
explicit attitudes can tell us the degree to which we should expect them to think ideologically
rather than in terms of sheer ingroup favoritism in the first place. The observed relationship
between SDO and race-based policy opinions in this dissertation and in other work, though
substantial, has never been 1-to-1, and I have argued that group-based principles tend to predict
race-based policy opinions because they reflect some combination of automatic group biases and
higher-order principles. Therefore, in this chapter, I explore the idea that discordance between
evaluations made implicitly and evaluations made explicitly can, in itself, provide useful
information about the degree to which people are influenced by the “group-based” or
“principled” components of group-based principles.
By examining conflict between implicit and explicit attitudes, I address several questions
long overdue to be answered in the literature on race-related implicit cognition. What are the
political implications when someone reports unbiased racial attitudes in a survey yet exhibits
prejudiced implicit associations? Conversely, what about those who express prejudice explicitly
but show no evidence of racial biases implicitly? The answers to these questions has substantial
implications for understanding the preferences, biases, and motivations people bring to the table
when evaluating political phenomena, and in particular policies that have to do with socially
sensitive topics such as race-targeted government assistance.
In this chapter, I take advantage of the unique opportunity afforded by the the 2008
American National Election Study (ANES) Time Series data, which included participants’
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responses to a race-centered version of the same implicit attitude measure used in the previous
chapter, to examine implicit racial ambivalence, or the ambivalence created by the gap between
implicit and explicit racial attitudes, as it exists in the United States. Further, I look at the effects
of implicit ambivalence on several race-related political attitudes (including but not limited to
support for race-based government assistance) and, crucially, its moderating effect on the role of
ideology in predicting race-related political attitudes and behaviors. Therefore, in this chapter, I
take a step back from looking at the role of group-based principles and instead focus on what I
argue to be the mechanism underlying the dominant role of group-based principles –the
interaction between automatic group biases, conscious racial attitudes, and ideological values.
Do We Really Need Implicit Attitude Measures?
Implicit and explicit racial biases can be observed in children as young as 6 years old,
yet explicit bias decreases as children reach adulthood, suggesting that self-reported racial
attitudes shift toward being less prejudiced as people become entrenched in the egalitarian norms
of society (Baron and Banaji 2006). This finding highlights a critical aspect of attitudes that is
increasingly recognized in psychology and political science and has been noted repeatedly
throughout this dissertation: attitudes are comprised of a combination of both automatic and
controlled as well as conscious and nonconscious processes, and as such, self-report measures
are limited in their ability to encapsulate people’s preferences (e.g. Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, and
Williams 1995). When individuals have a motivation to obfuscate or edit their self-reported
responses to survey items, or when people are simply unaware of their biases, explicit measures
of racial attitudes can be especially problematic.
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Contemporary work on implicit racial biases uses a wide array of “indirect” measures to
gauge racial attitudes in ways that subvert more controlled processes that would otherwise lead
individuals to tailor self-reports. A relatively straightforward and feasible way to tap implicit
racial biases in large sample survey data is to measure people’s implicit associations. These
methods, described in Chapter 1,primarily involve measuring individuals’ quick, automatic
associations between visual stimuli and positive or negative words or images to assess deepseated and reflexive biases, and have been extremely useful in assessing racial attitudes. These
measures tap evaluations that are presumably less controlled and more automatic, and thus less
susceptible to the influence of social desirability (Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz 1998;
Olson and Fazio 2009).
A nontrivial amount of research has been done examining the relationship between
implicit racial attitudes and political preferences. As referenced earlier in this dissertation,
research has used the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz 1998)
to predict attitudes toward President Barack Obama, the Affordable Care Act, and immigration
policy (Greenwald, Smith, Sriram, Bar-Anan, and Nosek 2009; Knowles, Lowery, and
Schaumberg 2010; Pérez 2010; Pérez 2016). The same measure of implicit biases used
throughout this dissertation, the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP; Payne, Cheng, Govorun,
and Stewart 2005), along with the same data used here (as it is rare to find nationally
representative data with implicit measures), have been used in several articles examining how
scores on the AMP relate to vote choice in the 2008 presidential election, support for affirmative
action, attitudes toward Barack Obama, and other racial attitudes (Ditonto, Lau, and Sears 2013;
Finn and Glaser 2010; Greenwald et al. 2009; Pasek et al. 2009; Payne, Krosnick, Pasek, and
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Lelkes 2010; Segura and Valenzuela 2010). However, although most of this research finds
implicit racial attitudes can indeed be used to predict political outcomes, all of these studies also
find either that explicit attitude measures predict political outcomes just as well as implicit
attitude measures, or that explicit attitudes mediate the effects of implicit attitudes. As such, the
utility of measuring implicit attitudes has been far from self-evident with regard to predicting
political outcomes.
Explicit measures may be more predictive of political outcomes than implicit measures
because implicit measures often gauge learned associations and culturally embued stereotypes
rather than the racial preferences that ultimately drive political attitudes and behavior (Arkes and
Tetlock 2004). Indeed, implicit measures have been shown to predict a range of behaviors
indicative of racial discrimination no better than explicit measures (Blanton et al. 2009; Oswald,
Mitchell, Blanton, Jaccard, and Tetlock 2013). This may be because political attitudes and
behaviors are often influenced by the controlled processes that implicit measures are specifically
designed to ignore, such as social desirability, which has been shown to influence attitudes such
as those toward affirmative action (e.g. Wilson, Moore, McKay, and Avery 2008). Whereas
implicit attitude measures are often best at predicting quick, automatic behaviors such as whether
or not to shoot a potentially armed target (e.g. Correll, Urland, and Ito 2006; 2006; Petty, Fazio,
and Briñol 2009), the political attitudes and behaviors often studied by political psychologits
mostly take place over a period of time that allows for higher-level thinking, hesitation,
inhibition, deliberation, and sometimes rationalization. Payne, Burkley, and Stokes (2008)
showed that the correlation between implicit and explicit attitude measures depends heavily on
the “structural fit” between measures, or the similarity between measures in task demands. For
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example, the correlation between AMP scores and explicit evaluations of Black and White faces
was significantly higher than the correlation between AMP scores and survey batteries such as
the Modern Racism Scale (MRS; McConahay 1983). In other words, implicit attitudes tend to be
most strongly related to outcome measures that involve similar levels of conscious processing,
and political attitudes and behaviors tend to involve processing that is more deliberate than what
goes on during measurement of implicit attitudes (see also Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner,
Le, and Schmitt 2005).
So does this mean we should abandon implicit measures as a means of understanding
race and politics, or even political attitudes more broadly? I have argued that although racerelated political attitudes are largely steeped in automatic processes, by the time they are reported
in a survey or relied upon to cast a vote, they have interacted substantially with controlled
processes and higher-order thought. So why do we need to actually measure automatic
processes? I suggest that implicit attitude measures are actually central to understanding racerelated political attitudes and shed much needed light on the mechanisms of political cognition
broadly. I propose that focusing research around whether implicit or explicit attitudes better
predict political outcomes is problematic because such research ignores the unique value of the
interplay between implicit and explicit attitudes. By neglecting the spectrum upon which
attitudes exist from automatic (early processes) to controlled (later processes), we may be
missing a significant part of the picture and potentially building misleading models of when and
how things like racial prejudice influence political attitudes.
More broadly, neglecting the interplay between implicit and explicit preferences means
neglecting the full rage of motivations and attitudinal forces that shape public opinion. Racial
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attitudes, in particular, have been shown to be central to American public opinion, but they
compete with other values and considerations in driving political attitudes and behavior. The
results presented in this chapter suggest the degree to which race, rather than factors like political
ideology, is a driving force in evaluations of political phenomena depends largely on how much
individuals have used controlled processing to “resolve” their implicit and explicit racial
preferences.
Implicit Ambivalence: The Implicit-Explicit Gap
Multiple studies have examined the correlations that exist between implicit and explicit
attitude measures, and the findings of these studies indicate implicit attitude measures tend to
significantly predict explicit attitudes, with average correlations ranging between about .25 and
.35, suggesting they are correlated but far from redundant (Cunningham, Preacher, and Banaji
2001; Hofmann et al. 2005; Nosek 2006; 2007). Individual- level variation in the “gap” between
automatic and controlled processes therefore reflects individual- level variation in the mental
processes that mediate the relationship between implicit and explicit attitudes.
There is some disagreement as to what the moderate correlations between implicit and
explicit measures mean – i.e. why implicit and explicit measures tend to covary yet remain
distinct. Some scholars suggest a single attitude construct exists and low correspondence
between implicit and explicit measures occurs only to the degree that explicit measures are
altered by effortful, conscious processing (Fazio et al. 1995; Fazio and Olson 2003). Others
suggest implicit and explicit measures tap structurally separable constructs represented by
distinct mental processes, and that there are fundamental differences between the automatic,
unintentional processes picked up by implicit measures and the more controlled, deliberate
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processes picked up by explicit measures (Devine 1989; Dovidio et al. 1997; Greenwald and
Banaji 1995; Hofmann et al. 2005; Nosek 2006; 2007; see also Cunningham et al. 2004 and
Stanley, Phelps, and Banaji 2008 for neuroscientific evidence). However, regardless of whether
implicit and explicit measures tap a single mental representation or distinct constructs, there is a
near consensus regarding why scores on implicit and explicit measures often differ. People have
quick, automatic reactions to attitude objects, which are mostly gauged by implicit measures, and
controlled processes translate these automatic reactions into conscious evaluations reported in
explicit measures. With regard to race, individuals have automatic reactions to racial outgroups
and, over time, may inhibit, alter, or even rationalize their automatic racial biases to abide by
learned values, norms, and principles.
The fact that effortful mental processes intervene between automatic reactions to an
object and controlled evaluations of that object explains how people can feel positively toward
an object explicitly yet negatively at an implicit level, or vice versa. Implicit ambivalence refers
to ambivalence that manifests as a discrepancy between one’s implicitly and explicitly held
attitudes (Petty et al. 2006), and is to be expected with regard to attitudes that individauls are
motivated to change, such as racial attitudes (Petty et al. 2006; Plant and Devine 1998). Some
work has examined the ramifications of implicit ambivalence regarding race, specifically (Petty,
Briñol, and Johnson 2012). As noted by Alvarez and Brehm, “racial policy wears all the signs of
a policy debate that yields internal conflict, or ambivalence over policy choices” (1997, p. 345;
also see Dovidio, Mann and Gaertner 1989).
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Expectations for Implicit Ambivalence
Psychology work on implicit ambivalence suggests it leads to effortful thinking and
deliberation related to the target of ambivalence. With regard to race, individuals whose implicit
and explicit attitudes conflict – i.e. those high in implicit ambivalence – should deliberate more
about race than unambivalent individuals. This is because implicit ambivalence leads individuals
to dedicate cognitive resources to addressing the disparity between implicit and explicit
evaluations. Indeed some work has shown that priming implicit racial ambivalence led to greater
scrutiny of messages about hiring African American faculty at a university (Petty, Briñol, and
Johnson 2012). Therefore, I expect race to be a more central factor in the evaluation of political
targets among individuals whose racial attitudes are unresolved (i.e. high in implicit
ambivalence) compared to those whose attitudes are resolved (i.e. low in implicit ambivalence).
Greater controlled processing centered around race is therefore assumed to be the mechanism
underlying the role of implicit ambivalence.
Need for Cognition, Education, and Resolving Conflicting Attitudes
Given that implicit ambivalence is thought to yield increased controlled processing and
scrutiny over the target of ambivalence, it should be expected that individual differences in
implicit ambivalence are associated with various measures of sophistication such as education
and Need for Cognition (NFC; Cacioppo and Petty 1982), or the trait-like tendency to enjoy
effortful thinking. However, the expected direction of these relationships is uncertain. On the one
hand, it might be expected that because priming implicit ambivalence is associated with
deliberation and effortful thought, measures of sophistication like education and NFC will be
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positively associated with implicit racial ambivalence. Indeed, although more highly educated
individuals are generally less likely to express overt racial prejudice (e.g. Bobo and Licari 1989;
McClosky and Zaller 1984; Sniderman and Piazza 1993), implicit biases tend to be fairly
impervious to conscious attempts at controlling prejudiced expressions (e.g. Baron and Banaji
2006; Greenwald et al. 2009; but see e.g. Fazio and Olson 2003 on the malleability of implicit
attitudes). Thus, those higher in NFC and education may tailor their self-reports, causing their
explicitly reported racial attitudes to diverge from implicit measures. Further, it has been shown
that explicit ambivalence toward political parties and candidates is positively associated with
NFC, largely because such individuals are more likely to interact with heterogeneous
information networks (though this is mainly the case with weak partisans; Rudolph 2011;
Rudolph and Popp 2007).
On the other hand, it may be the case that NFC and education are negatively related to
implicit racial ambivalence because individuals who think more effortfully in general and are
highly educated may be better equipped to resolve discrepancies between their implicit and
explicit preferences. In other words, because implicit ambivalence is measured as an individual
differences variable (as opposed to being primed through an experimenta l manipulation), it may
be expected that low levels of implicit ambivalence indicate individuals who have, over time,
dedicated greater controlled processing to resolving their ambivalence. This hypothesis is
supported by an array of prior research findings. Explicit attitudinal ambivalence has
predominantly been shown to be negatively related to NFC because individuals who are
generally more cognitively sophisticated are better able to reconcile opposing beliefs and
preferences (Jonas, Diehl, and Brömer 1997; Thompson and Zanna 1995; Thompson, Zanna, and
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Griffin 1995). Work on motivated reasoning that suggests it is individuals with greater cognitive
sophistication who are best equipped to manipulate information in order to justify preexisting
biases (Lodge and Tabe 2013; Taber and Lodge 2006). Further, the role of implicit attitudes in
predicting policy preferences has been shown to be strongest among the highly educated (Pérez
2016). As such, individuals high in measures of sophistication may be the most adept at shifting
explicit attitudes to line up with and reinforce implicit preferences. Importantly, unlike with
explicit ambivalence, individuals are not necessarily aware of their implicit ambivalence, and so
this hypothesis suggests either that individuals high in NFC and education are more likely to be
aware of their implicit biases, or that NFC and education influence nonconscious processes that
resolve ambivalence.
Implicit Racial Ambivalence and Race-Related Political Outcomes
The relationships between implicit ambivalence and measures of sophistication described
above are critical with regard to the primary goal of this chapter – that is, understanding how the
interaction between automatic and controlled racial evaluations might influence attitudes toward
race-related political outcomes. Given psychology research on the mechanisms underlying
implicit ambivalence, individuals high in implicit ambivalence – i.e. those whose implicit and
explicit attitudes differ a great deal – should evaluate race-related political outcomes along a
racial dimension to a greater degree than individuals low in implicit ambivalence. Said
differently, race should play a weaker role, relative to other considerations, in the evaluation of
political targets among individuals with the cognitive capacity to have resolved their
ambivalence.
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I do not hypothesize a main effect of implicit racial ambivalence, but I do expect it will
moderate the influence of ideological values on political attitudes. As explained throughout this
dissertation, racial attitudes are not the only dimension along which individuals evaluate racerelated political targets, and the “principles or prejudice” literature in political science has
revolved around whether they are even a key dimension in light of competing values such as
individualism and preferences for limited government (e.g. Federico and Sidanius 2002; Kinder
and Mendelberg 2000; Kinder and Sears 1981; Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1996; Sniderman et al.
1996). I have also argued that whereas the influence of group biases tends to be automatic, the
influence of higher-order principles such as individualism and egalitarianism is primarily driven
by controlled processes. Therefore, I expect that individuals who have utilized controlled
processing to resolve disparities between their implicit and explicit racial attitudes will rely more
on ideological values and higher-order principles when evaluating race-related political objects
than individuals who have not utilized controlled processing to resolve their implicit
ambivalence. Conversely, as implicit ambivalence causes race to become the central dimension
along which political targets are evaluated, other factors – ideological values and higher-order
principles like ideology and egalitarianism – will be relied upon less for evaluating these targets.
In sum, as implicit ambivalence increases, the relationship between ideological values and racerelated political attitudes should be diminished.
Data and Measures
The analyses for this chapter were tested using data from the post-election interviews
conducted as part of the American National Election Study (ANES) 2008 Time Series Study.
These data provided a unique opportunity for testing the hypotheses of this study because at the
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end of the post-election interview, respondents were given the Affect Misattribution Procedure
(AMP), which has been shown to be a valid measure of implicit prejudice (Payne, Cheng,
Govorun, and Stewart 2005) and was the same measure used to tap automatic group biases in
Chapter 3. The ANES 2008 Time Series Study took place between November 5 and December
21, 2008, and was conducted via face-to-face interviews using computer-assisted personal
interviewing (CAPI). Complex sampling procedures were used to ensure adequate
generalizability to the adult U.S. population. This entailed a five-stage address-based sampling
frame split by county, census tract, census block group, and then household. The data were
weighted in all analyses to account for this complex sampling strategy. Black and Latino
respondents were oversampled, but due to the racial nature of this study, only non-Hispanic
Whites were included in the sample for analyses. The exclusion of Hispanics and non-Whites
was done to control for the heterogeneity that would otherwise be expected in the effects of
racial attitudes. This is common practice across studies focused on racial prejudice (see e.g.
Kinder and Sears 1981; Pèrez 2010; Sears and Henry 2003). Respondents received monetary
compensation for participation. The final sample used for analyses consisted of 1158 respondents
(44% male; median age = 49; 41% with a college degree or higher).
Prior research examining implicit ambivalence informed its measurement in this study,
and so was measured as the difference between implicit and explicit racial attitudes (Petty et al.
2006).
Explicit racial bias. Explicit racial attitudes were gauged via feeling thermometers for
Blacks and Whites (coded so that higher values indicate more positive feelings; Blacks: M =
66.28, SD = 19.46, n = 1037; Whites: M = 73.03, SD = 19.32, n = 1038). An explicit racial bias
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score was calculated by subtracting individuals’ feeling thermometer score for Whites from their
feeling thermometer score for Blacks, and dividing this score by 100 to yield a score between 0
and 1. Thus, higher values on these variables reflected greater pro-White/anti-Black explicit
racial bias (M = 0.07, SD = 0.19, n = 1033).
Implicit racial bias. Implicit racial attitudes were gauged via the AMP, which consisted
of 48 computerized trials in which a White or Black male face was shown for 75 milliseconds
(ms) after brief exposure to a fixation cross, followed by a Chinese ideograph shown for 250 ms
(although a technical error caused the first face image for each race not to appear for some
participants).12 Following the Chinese ideograph, a black and white noise mask (a screen with
random black and white pixels) was shown until respondents indicated the ideograph to be either
“pleasant” or “unpleasant.” Respondents were explicitly instructed to avoid influence from the
prior photos. The aggregate of binary responses to the ideographs following faces of each race
has been used as a valid measure of individuals’ implicit evaluations of racial groups, with lower
scores (i.e. lower proportions of “pleasant” to “unpleasant” responses) for ideographs preceded
by a particular racial group indicating greater prejudice toward that racial group (Payne et al.
2008). Due to the technical error mentioned above, the items corresponding to each of the first
face images for each race were omitted from all analyses, yielding 23 indicators for each AMP
construct (AMP-Blacks: M = 0.51, SD = 0.30, n = 1025, α = 0.92; AMP-Whites: M = 0.66, SD =
0.26, n = 1025, α = 0.90). An implicit racial bias score was calculated by subtracting individuals’

12

The differences between this AMP and the AMP used in Chapter 3 are therefore that the primes were shown for
longer (and thus more consciously perceived), the primes involved Black and White faces rather than minimal group
logos, and the symbols were Chinese ideographs rather than randomly generated symbols.
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AMP score for Whites from their AMP score for Blacks. Thus, higher values on these variables
reflected greater pro-White/anti-Black implicit racial bias (M = 0.16, SD = 0.30, n = 933).
Implicit racial ambivalence. Implicit racial ambivalence was operationalized as the
absolute value of the difference between individuals’ standardized (z-scored) score on the
implicit bias variable and their standardized (z-scored) score on the explicit bias variable.
Standardized bias scores are used to account for the fact that levels of bias on the feeling
thermometer variables are not necessarily equivalent to levels of bias on the AMP variables, and
so implicit ambivalence is measured as the absolute value of the difference between individuals’
relative points on the distributions of implicit and explicit bias (M = 0.83, SD = 0.78, n = 1000).
Due to a substantial skewness value of 1.52, this variable was subjected to a square root
transformation when included as a predictor in statistical models.
The direction of ambivalence is not expected to matter, but was taken into account in
analyses to test for dependence on whether ones explicit attitudes were more biased than their
implicit attitudes or vice versa. Separate strategies were used for bivariate versus multivariate
analyses. For bivariate analyses, the implicit ambivalence variable prior to the absolute value
transformation was used (M = 0.01, SD = 1.14). For multivariate analyses, a dummy variable for
direction of ambivalence were created using the implicit ambivilance variable prior to the
absolute value transformation such that individuals with greater levels of explicit prejudice than
implicit prejudice were coded as 0 and those with greater implicit prejudice than explicit
prejudice were coded as 1. Ambivalence was fairly evenly split in terms of direction, with 53.7%
of respondents having more anti-Black explicit than implicit attitudes relative to the respective
means of each measure.
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Need for Cognition. NFC was gauged via two items from the NFC scale (Cacioppo and
Petty 1982). Respondents were asked about the degree to which they like having responsibility
for handling situations that require a lot of thinking and whether they prefer simple or complex
problems, which were summarized into a single variable ranging from 0 to 1, with higher values
indicating greater NFC (M = 0.56, SD = 0.35, n = 1059).
Education. Education was gauged via the education summary variable provided in the
ANES data, which ranges from 0 (no high school diploma) to 7 (advanced degree).
Political Interest. In multivariate models, political interest was included to control for
variation explained by NFC and education that is due to knowledge about politics, specifically.
Political interest was measured via items asking about how often and/or closely the respondent
follows government and politics (M = 2.45, SD = 1.02, n = 1059).
Race-Related Political Attitudes. Race-related political attitudes were denoted by seven
variables. Symbolic racism was gauged via a composite variable created by averaging the four
items used in the standard symbolic racism scale (Kinder and Sears 1981; M = 3.59, SD = 0.93,
n = 1059).
Attitudes toward the influence of Blacks in politics were measured via a single item
asking whether respondents thought Blacks have 1 “too much influence” (n = 112), 3 “just about
the right amount of influence” (n = 546), or 5 “too little influence” (n = 300) in U.S. politics.
Attitudes toward Black elected officials were measured via a set of items ultimately
formed into a composite scale ranging from 1 “White candidates are a great deal better suited to
be an elected official than Black candidates” to 7 “Black candidates are a great deal better suited
to be an elected official than White candidates” (M = 3.89, SD = 0.50, n = 1039). A second
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variable was formed from items asking the same question except “in terms of intelligence” (M =
3.87, SD = 0.55, n = 1043).
Support for preferential hiring and promotion of Blacks was gauged via a composite
variable made up of an initial item asking if respondents were for or against preferential hiring
and promotion of Blacks, and a second item measuring strength of their position. The resulting
measure contained the categories: 1 “strongly against” (n = 681), 2 “not strongly against” (n =
198), 3 “not strongly for” (n = 52), and 4 “strongly for” (n = 47).
Support for the federal government’s role in ensuring the fair treatment of Black people
in jobs was gauged via a similar composite variable comprised of an initial item regarding the
respondent’s position and a second item measuring opinion strength. A preceding variable,
however, asked respondents if they had an interest in the topic, and so only respondents who
indicated an interest in the topic were asked about their position. Thus, the number of
respondents with scores for this variable is substantially lower than that of the first measure and
support is fairly higher. Higher scores indicate greater support for the federal government
ensuring fair treatment of Black people in jobs (“strongly against”, n = 247; “not strongly
against”, n = 60; “not strongly for”, n = 49; “strongly for”, n = 194).
Finally, a variable measuring Obama vote was measured with a question asking
respondents if they voted for Barack Obama in the general election (361 voted for Obama, 455
did not).
Higher-Order Principles. Higher-order principles were measured in two ways. Political
ideology was estimated via a traditional 7-point self identification scale ranging from “extremely
liberal” to “extremely conservative,” as well as a follow-up question asking those who intially
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chose “moderate; middle of the road,” “don’t know,” or “haven’t thought much about it” if they
would choose “liberal,” “conservative,” or “moderate” if they “had to choose.” These
respondents were then coded as “slightly liberal,” “slightly conservative,” and “moderate,”
respectively (M = 4.41, SD = 1.47, n = 1038).
Egalitarianism was estimated via the mean of 6 items asking about equality in society,
each using 5-point scales from “Disagree Strongly” to “Agree Strongly.” The resulting
composite variable was coded so that higher scores reflect greater levels of egalitarianism (M =
3.39, SD = 0.77, n = 1059, α = 0.70). The wording for all questions is shown in the Appendix.
Results
It is first worth taking advantage of the unique opportunity offered by a nationally
representative sample to note the degree to which implicit racial ambivalence exists in the United
States. Figure 4.1 shows two histograms illustrating implicit racial ambivalence as it existed in
2008 based on these data. The top panel shows implicit ambivalence scores before the absolute
value transformation, and so includes direction of ambivalence, whereas the bottom panel shows
the variable after the absolute value transformation but still before the square root
transformation. The implicit and explicit bias variables were both standardized, and so values on
the x-axis indicate the difference in z-scores between one’s implicit and explicit attitudes.
The average implicit ambivalence score is less than a standard deviation difference
between one’s implicit and explicit attitudes scores, which makes sense given the two types of
measures are often correlated but non-redundant. Yet there is variation, and the sample is
roughly evenly split between people whose implicit bias score exhibits a relatively more antiBlack bias than their explicit bias score and people whose scores exhibit the opposite pattern.

124

Figure 4.1: Implicit Racial Ambivalence in the United States (2008)

125
Moving on to the relationships implicit ambivalence has with other variables of interest,
Table 4.1 shows the correlations between each of the racial bias variables (absolute value
implicit ambivalence, directional implicit ambivalence, implicit bias, and explicit bias) and the
constructs for which there were theoretical expectations. The implicit and explicit bias variables
are included to compare the effects of implicit racial ambivalence to those of implicit and
explicit bias when modeled separately.
Table 4.1: Correlations Between Racial Attitude Measures and Covariates of Interest

Looking first at the non-racial variables, it is evident that implicit and explicit bias were
both negatively correlated with NFC and education, as expected, and implicit racial ambivalence
was also negatively associated with NFC and education (although only marginally with NFC),
supporting the hypothesis that cognitive sophistication and education are associated with an
increased ability of individuals to resolve discrepancies between implicit and explicit
preferences. It should also be noted that the direction of ambivalence did not seem to matter for
any of these variables, and so it seems to be the case that the relationship between implicit
ambivalence and these variables holds whether one’s implicit attitudes are more biased relative
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to the mean of implicit bias than their explicit attitudes are relative to the mean of explicit bias,
or vice versa.
Turning to race-related political attitudes, it is first evident that implicit and explicit
prejudice were consistently and unsurprisingly related to anti-Black positions on race-related
political outcomes. More importantly for the purposes of this paper, and unexpectedly, implicit
racial ambivalence also exhibited direct relationships with these political outcomes in a
consistent manner. Individuals high in implicit racial ambivalence were consistently more likely
to believe that Blacks have too much influence in U.S. politics (although only marginally), that
Whites are better suited than Blacks to serve as elected officials, and that the federal government
should not play a role in ensuring fair treatment of Blacks in jobs. Those high in implicit racial
ambivalence were also less likely to report having voted for Barack Obama in the 2008 general
election. The only exception was support for affirmative action, which implicit ambivalence did
not predict. Direction of ambivalence only mattered for attitudes toward Black elected officials,
such that individuals who exhibited more baised explicit than implicit attitudes (relative to the
means of each measure) were less likely to believe Blacks are equally or better suited to serve as
elected officials than individuals who expressed greater implicit than explicit bias (relative to the
mean of each measure).
With regard to higher-order principles, both implicit and explicit bias were significantly
related to ideological conservatism and anti-egalitarianism, but neither implicit ambivalence
variable exhibited a relationship with these two variables. However, the hypothesized
relationship of implicit racial ambivalence with higher-order principles is that implicit
ambivalence will moderate the influence of principles on race-related political attitudes such that

127
the influence of principles is diminished at greater levels of implicit ambivalence. Table 4.2
summarizes the results of regression models examining this moderation hypothesis.

Table 4.2: Implicit Racial Ambivalence, Principles, and Race -Related Political Outcomes

The results shown in Table 4.2 are the coefficients of interest from separate regression
models. Each column represents a different dependent variable. The rows labeled “Implicit
Ambivalence (abs)” indicate models examining the main effects of implicit racial ambivalence
controlling for direction of ambivalence, ideology, egalitarianism, NFC, education, political
interest, age, and sex. The “Implicit Amb*Direction” rows represent models interacting implicit
ambivalence with the direction of ambivalence dummy variable to determine if direction of
ambivalence matters. The other rows reflect the moderating effects of implicit ambivalence on
ideology and egalitarianism, respectively. Three-way interactions between implicit ambivalence,
ideology/egalitarianism, and direction of ambivalence were first tested to determine whether
moderation of ideology or egalitarianism was dependent upon direction of ambivale nce. If the
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three-way interactions were insignificant (which is what I expect), two-way interactions were
tested between implicit ambivalence and ideology/egalitarianism so that no higher-order
interactions were included unnecessarily. Linear regressions were used to predict symbolic
racism and attitudes toward Black elected officials. Ordered logistic regressions were used to
predict perceptions of Black influence in U.S. politics, support for affirmative action, and
support for the federal government ensuring fair job treatment for Blacks. Finally, a binomial
logistic regression was used to predict the probability of reporting having voted for Obama.
Importantly, the intention of the implicit ambivalence variables is to estimate levels of
discrepancy between implicit and explicit evaluations rather than focusing simply on one or the
other. Thus, a significant influence of implicit ambivalence should indicate that even among
individuals with equal levels of explicit prejudice, their political attitudes can be predicted by the
distance between their implicit and explicit attitudes. However, a concern might be that the
effects of implicit ambivalence are due simply to variation in one of the racial attitude variables
(implicit or explicit). The considerable degree of variation on both implicit and explicit attitude
measures alleviates this concern to some degree because it indicates that variation on the implicit
ambivalence variable reflects variation across both implicit and explicit measures. 13
Corroborating the bivariate results described above, implicit racial ambivalence showed
a direct relationship with six out of the seven dependent variables. In all cases except attitudes
toward affirmative action, the discrepancy between individuals’ implicit and explicit racial
preferences played a statistically significant role in predicting race-related political outcomes. In

13

Nonetheless, models were run controlling for implicit and explicit racial attitudes (one at a time) to ensure that the
effects of implicit ambivalence did not disappear when controlling for one racial attitude variable or the other (which
could indicate that the effect of implicit ambivalence was driven mainly by variation in only one of the variables).
The inclusion of these controls did not change results substantially and are available upon request.
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two of these instances – symbolic racism and whether the respondent reported voting for Obama
– the direction of ambivalence did not matter. However, in contrast to the bivariate analyses,
direction mattered for four of the political outcomes examined. In all cases where direction
mattered, implicit racial ambivalence was associated with anti-Black political attitudes among
individuals whose explicit attitudes were more (relatively) baised than their implicit attitudes, but
was unrelated to political attitudes among those whose implicit attitudes were more (relatively)
baised than their explicit attitudes. For example, among those with more (relatively) biased
explicit than implicit attitudes, implicit ambivalence was significantly associated with more
negative attitudes toward Black relative to White elected officials (b = -0.535, SE = 0.055, p <
.001); yet among those with more (relatively) biased implicit attitudes, there was no relationship
between implicit ambivalence and attitudes toward Black elected officials (b = -0.044, SE =
0.055, p = .421). The same interaction pattern is evident for perceptions of the influence of
Blacks in U.S. politics, attitudes toward Black elected officials “in terms of intelligence,” and
marginally regarding support for the federal government ensuring fair job treatment for Blacks.
As hypothesized, implicit racial ambivalence showed evidence of moderating the roles of
principles in predicting all political outcomes. However, there was substantial variation in how
implicit ambivalence moderated principles across dependent variables. There were five instances
of implicit ambivalence moderating the role of principles in the expected direction – that is,
principles were less predictive of political outcomes at high levels of implicit racial ambivalence.
For example, as shown in Figure 4.2, ideology exhibited a negative relationship with support for
affirmative action at mean levels of implicit ambivalence (OR = 0.739, CI = 0.674-0.810, p <
.001), but this relationship was significantly stronger at low levels of implicit ambivalence (OR =
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0.648, CI = 0.568-0.736, p < .001) and significantly weaker at high levels of implicit
ambivalence (OR = 0.843, CI = 0.748-0.950, p < .01).

Figure 4.2: Implicit Racial Ambivalence x Ideology Predicting Support for Affirmative
Action
This same pattern was evident predicting the probability of voting for Obama, symbolic
racism, perceptions of the influence of Blacks in U.S. politics, and attitudes toward Black elected
officials “in terms of intelligence”, but moderation of ideology was dependent on the direction of
ambivalence for all of these outcomes except for the probability of voting for Obama. Regarding
symbolic racism and attitudes toward Black elected officials “in terms of intelligence,” ideology
was only moderated by implicit ambivalence among those whose explicit attitudes were more
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(relatively) biased than their implicit attitudes. Regarding perceptions of the influence of Blacks
in U.S. politics, ideology was only moderated by implicit ambivalence among those whose
implicit attitudes were more (relatively) biased than their explicit attitudes. This variation in the
importance of direction of ambivalence is somewhat erratic, but all of these analyses nonetheless
provide evidence for the hypothesis that the influence of politica l ideology on political outcomes
is dependent on the degree to which individuals’ implicit and explicit preferences conflict with
one another.
Critically, however, the effects of egalitarianism were never moderated by implicit
ambivalence in the expected direction. In fact, there are four instances of the effects of
egalitarianism being amplified at high levels of implicit racial ambivalence, and one instance of
political ideology being amplified at high levels of implicit racial ambivalence. Figure 4.3
depicts the amplification of egalitarianism by implicit ambivalence when predicting the
probability of having voted for Obama in 2008.
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Figure 4.3: Implicit Racial Ambivalence x Egalitarianis m Predicting the Probability of
Voting for Obama in 2008
At mean levels of implicit ambivalence, egalitarianism was significantly associated with
a higher likelihood of reporting having voted for Obama (b = 1.005, SE = 0.130, p < .001). Yet at
low levels of implicit ambivalence, this relationship was significantly weaker (b = 0.632, SE =
0.167, p < .001), and at high levels of implicit ambivalence, this relationship was significantly
stronger (b = 1.379, SE = 0.200, p < .001). This same pattern of amplification of the effects of
egalitarianism was evident with regard to symbolic racism, attitudes toward Black elected
officials, and support for the federal government ensuring fair job treatment for Blacks, although
this amplification effect was marginal and dependent on direction of ambivalence for symbolic
racism and support for fair job treatment for Blacks. In both cases where direction of
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ambivalence seemed to matter, it was mainly among individuals whose implicit attitudes were
more (relatively) biased than their explicit attitudes that effects of egalitarianism were amplified.
What about Ingroup Favoritism?
The results presented thus far shed light on the construct of implicit racial ambivalence,
its covariates, and its ability to moderate the role of higher-order principles in predicting racerelated political outcomes. However, a key component of the theoretical framework of this
dissertation that I have not been able to examine with these data is how the role of ingroup
favoritism might depend on levels of implicit ambivalence. I have argued that the controlled
processing that comes along with resolving implicit-explicit discrepancies in racial attitudes
yields deference to principles when evaluating race-targeted policies, but I have also suggested in
previous chapters that controlled processing diminishes the influence of sheer ingroup
favoritism. Accordingly, it should be expected that individuals who have resolved discrepancies
between their implicit and explicit attitudes should be the least likely to support or oppose a racetargeted policy simply because of ingroup favoritism.
In these data, I do not have a measure of ingroup favoritism, and the racial attitude
variables I have are used in my measures of implicit ambivalence. However, by briefly turning
back to the data used in Chapter 3, I can construct a measure of implicit ambivalence using the
implicit and explicit minimal groups attitude measures from that study and see how it relates to
ingroup favoritism in terms of resource allocation – i.e. the behavioral task. Therefore, before
discussing the main findings of this chapter, I do exactly that.
An implicit ambivalence variable was constructed the same exact way as the implicit
racial ambivalence variable that was created using the ANES data. The only difference was that
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the groups were the minimal ingroup and outgroup from the MGP rather than Blacks and Whites
(M = 1.03, SD = 1.02). In these data, roughly 61% of the sample had more (relatively) biased
implicit than explicit attitudes. Given high skewness, this variable was also subjected to a square
root transformation before being included in statistical models. Across behavioral MG bias
measures, ingroup favoritism was, as expected, significantly positively related to implicit
ambivalence (ingroup favoritism: b = 4.397, SE = 1.392, p < .01; maximum differentiation: b =
4.353, SE = 1.378, p < .01; parity: b = -1.944, SE = 0.741, p < .01).14 In other words, individuals
with more resolved attitudes – even in the minimal groups setting – were less likely to favor their
ingroup. The relationship between implicit ambivalence and the behavioral variable representing
ingroup favoritism over maximum joint profit is illustrated in Figure 4.4.

Figure 4.4: Implicit MGP Ambivalence and Ingroup Favoritism

14

Due to substantial skewness in the parity variable, a new variable dichotomizing parity into whether or not
individuals chose one of the top three most equitable parity options was used as the dependent variable. All models
controlled for direction of ambivalence and the control variables used in the models in Chapter 3. There were no
cases in which the effect of implicit ambivalence was dependent on direction of ambivalence.
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Translating from Automatic to Controlled
The theoretical foundations of this dissertation emanate largely from work in psychology
showing that attitudes exist on a spectrum from automatic, gut-level and implicit to conscious,
deliberate, and explicit. This work has shown that implicit attitudes are useful for understanding
a variety of political attitudes and behaviors (e.g. Greenwald et al. 2009; Pasek et al. 2009; Pèrez
2010; Pèrez 2016) but are also often mediated by explicit self-reports (e.g. Ditonto, Lau, and
Sears 2013; Payne et al. 2010). I have argued that what is missing from this literature is work
that goes beyond simply estimating main effects of implicit and explicit attitude measures and
acknowledges the interactions between the automatic and controlled processes that underlay
these measures. Therefore, part of recognizing the spectrum of attitudes from implicit to explicit
involves looking at within-person discrepancies between implicitly and explicitly held
preferences. This is not only relevant to race-targeted policy attitudes, but also is an extension
beyond how we understand the range of attitudes and considerations people bring to the table
when evaluating political phenomena. In this chapter I have proposed that instead of comparing
the utility of implicit and explicit measures to find the “best” measures for predicting political
outcomes, it is more fruitful to embrace individual differences in the correspondence between
implicit and explicit attitudes as a useful and meaningful tool for understanding race and politics
as well as public opinion more broadly.
That is not to say measures of implicit ambivalence should in any way replace separate
measures of implicit and explicit preferences; indeed, the effect sizes of the implicit and explicit
attitude variables were often larger than that of the ambivalence variables. Instead, I suggest
implicit ambivalence should be acknowledged alongside the direct roles of implicit and explicit

136
prejudice as a critical factor in determining how much “room” there is for other considerations
when people evaluate political targets. Implicit ambivalence helps us to understand the
translation process from automatic to controlled processes, which I have suggested is key to
understanding how people evaluate race-targeted policies.
The results presented in this chapter largely support my proposed overarching
framework, albeit in somewhat mixed fashion. First, it is worth emphasizing that according the
the 2008 ANES data, Americans are roughly split in terms of wear they fall on implicit and
explicit racial attitude measures relative to the mean of each variable. A common argument built
on research showing the tremendous breadth of implicit racial biases is that for most people,
implicit attitudes are more prejudiced and people tailor their explicit self-reports to appear
unprejudiced. However, the simple descriptive statistics on implicit racial ambivalence in these
data suggest potentially that controlled processes can pull people’s explicit self-reports in either
direction. It is worth reiterating that because the implicit and explicit attitude variables in the
implicit ambivalence measure are both standardized, positive/negative implicit ambivalence
scores cannot be said to directly indicate that one’s implicit/explicit racial attitudes are more
“prejudiced” than their explicit/implicit racial attitudes. However, the relative differences
between implicit and explicit scores are nonetheless telling, and it is perhaps possible to imagine
individuals who are less biased at an automatic level but experience social pressure to exhibit
prejudiced racial attitudes. This suggests controlled processes may not be universally used to
inhibit prejudice. Instead, for some people, controlled processes may be more complex.
Implicit ambivalence was found to be associated with a broad swatch of politically
relevant constructs, consistently results in more prejudiced race-related political attitudes and
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behaviors in the aggregate, and, critically, often moderates the roles of competing considerations
that political evaluations might be based on such as ideology and egalitar ianism. In other words,
holding explicit racial attitudes constant, the degree to which one’s implicit attitudes differ from
one’s explicit attitudes holds substantial implications for how people evaluate race-related
political outcomes, including levels of symbolic racism, attitudes to the role of Blacks in politics,
race-targeted government assistance, and the probability of voting for Black candidates.
I did not expect implicit ambivalence to have a straightforward main effect on racerelated political attitudes and behavior. Specifically, greater implicit racial ambivalence was
associated with more prejudiced race-related political attitudes. This may be because as implicit
racial ambivalence increases, the fact that the issue deals with a racial outgroup becomes more of
a factor in people’s evaluations of the target. This may seem somewhat counter-intuitive. If an
individual is high in implicit racial ambivalence, it means that some aspect of their racial
attitudes are substantially prejudiced, and so it makes intuitive sense that their political
evaluations will be more prejudiced than those of someone who holds nonprejudiced explicit and
implicit attitudes. However, this would also suggest that individuals high in implicit racial
ambivalence exhibited more prejudiced political opinions than individuals with prejudiced
implicit and explicit attitudes, which is unexpected.
Yet we may be able to explain this effect by drawing from work on cognitive dissonance.
According to the action-based model of dissonance, conflicting thoughts and cognitions yield
negative feelings, which individuals strive to resolve by adjusting their cognition in a way that
involves the least resistance (Harmon-Jones 2008; Harmon-Jones, Amodio, and Harmon-Jones
2009). Critically, this cognitive adjustment aimed at resolving dissonance can lead individuals to
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“double down” on the cognition that is less easily manipulated. Given that the suppression of
prejudice has been shown to entail substantial cognitive effort and resources (e.g. Cunningham et
al. 2004; Devine 1989; Devine, Plant, Amodio, Harmon-Jones, and Vance 2002; Plant and
Devine 1998; Stanley, Phelps, and Banaji 2008), the “easier” cognition on which to double down
might be the prejudiced one. Yet that would also suggest the automatic preference is not
necessarily the “easier” one, which would not fit with any existing theory.
The moderation of the role of principles by implicit ambivalence in this chapter is crucial
because it speaks to the “principles or prejudice” literature as well as whether “principles” versus
“prejudice” are primarily responsible for constructs such as symbolic racism. The results
presented in this chapter suggest the degree to which individuals are conflicted or ambivalent
over their racial preferences consistently influences the degree to which “principles” or
“prejudice” are relevant in the first place.
There are several caveats and unanswered questions pertaining to the findings of this
chapter. First, the direction of ambivalence was sometimes found to matter and sometimes found
not to matter, and no clear pattern emerged regarding why direction mattered in some cases and
not others. It was sometimes the case that when explicit attitudes differed from implicit attitudes,
explicit attitudes tended to “win out,” which fits in line with work showing explicit attitudes can
mediate implicit attitudes (e.g. Ditonto, Lau, and Sears 2013). However, the more implicit
attitudes deviated from explicit attitudes, the more they “won out.” Given prior research, implicit
ambivalence should yield greater scrutiny and deliberation aimed at the target of ambivalence –
in this case, race – regardless of direction (Petty et al. 2006), but the sporadic influence of
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direction in this study suggests the ramifications of increased racial scrutiny via implicit
ambivalence vary depending on the target being evaluated.
Second, implicit racial ambivalence had a mostly consistent tempering effect on the role
of political ideology in predicting race-related political outcomes, as expected. However, implicit
ambivalence actually seemed mostly to amplify the effects of egalitarianism (and in one instance
the effects of political ideology) on several political outcomes, suggesting in some cases, values
may be deferred to in the face of racial scrutiny. Such an effect would be consistent with some
work suggesting anti-egalitarian values can be utilized as a socially acceptable tool for
expressing prejudiced attitudes (e.g. Federico and Sidanius 2002; Kinder and Mendelberg 2000).
This could also indicate that egalitarianism is more directly related to group-based attitudes than
political ideology, which arguably encompasses a wide range of “principles” beyond how people
feel about equality in society. Anti-egalitarianism may thus offer a closer structural fit for
expressing prejudice than political ideology.
Ultimately, the nuances in this chapter’s findings leave several questions unanswered.
However, the purpose of this chapter was to examine the implications of conflict between
automatic and controlled processes. As expected, individuals who were more resolved in their
racial preferences, which presumably came with effortful processing over time, were more likely
to rely on ideology as a guideline for evaluating race-related political objects. More work is
needed to obtain a more fine-grained understanding of the implications of when individuals’
implicit and explicit preferences diverge, but the translation process between automatic and
controlled processes seems to, as expected, largely determine the relative role of higher-order
principles.
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CHAPTER 5
Inhibition or Ideology? The Neural Mechanisms of P rinciples
and P rejudice
Bigotry is the disease of ignorance, of morbid minds; enthusiasm of the free and buoyant.
Education and free discussion are the antidotes of both.
- Thomas Jefferson15
Despite having owned slaves, Thomas Jefferson has been quoted as condemning bigotry
as the product of foolishness. But is racial prejudice due to ignorance, or does it reflect genuine
moral conviction? A predominant view, with deep roots in eighteenth-century enlightenment
thinking, is that bigotry and prejudice stem from deficiencies. Whether the deficiencies involve
education, reason, awareness, or even cognitive ability, the common assumption is that prejudice
is due to a lack of complex, enlightened thought. Accordingly, this view suggests prejudice
reflects a default, simplistic way of thinking and can be overcome through effortful thought and
learning about the logical fallacies of prejudiced beliefs. Although this viewpoint is primarily
evident in lay rhetoric, it is corroborated by work suggesting that people are most able to inhibit
racial biases when they engage in controlled processing – i.e. when they “think about” race (e.g.
Cunningham et al. 2004; Mendelberg 2001; Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002). However,
although it may be the case that controlled processing is associated with lower levels of racial
bias, this does not necessarily mean that inhibition of prejudice is the universal outcome of
controlled processing. It could be the case that for some, controlled processing allows for
prejudice inhibition, but for others, controlled processing actually exacerbates racial biases.

15

Jefferson, Thomas, 1735-1826. (1971). The Adams-Jefferson Letters: The complete correspondence between
Thomas Jefferson and Abigail and John Adams. L. J. Cappon (Ed.). New York: Simon & Schuster.
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I have argued that the function of controlled processing is not simply to diminish racial
biases, nor is it to produce more reasoned thought in general for that matter. Instead, in line with
work in social neuroscience (e.g. Bunge and Zelazo 2006; Cunningham and Zelazo 2007), my
model suggests controlled processing is part of an iterative routine whereby simple evaluations
become increasingly complex, and basic behavioral rules are transformed into broad principles
that can be applied to mass-scale society. It follows that controlled processing will not always
produce egalitarianism and inhibition of prejudice, and may often yield anti-egalitarian beliefs or
exacerbation of prejudice as long as individuals are then able to apply these attitudes to massscale society broadly. Put simply, I propose that controlled processing yields deference to
ideological principles rather than universal inhibition of prejudice.
The results presented throughout this dissertation thus far have largely supported my
proposed model, but without direct measures of the neural mechanisms assumed to be at work, it
remains difficult to understand the role controlled processing plays. In this chapter, I utilize
functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) to directly observe the neural processes
occurring when people evaluate race in the context of politics, as well as what happens when
automatic evaluations are translated into higher-level principles.
The contributions of this chapter are twofold. First of all, this chapter provides a
significant methodological advancement to not only this dissertation but also existing literature
by allowing me to directly observe the neural mechanisms assumed to underlay race-related
evaluations. Some work in social neuroscience has examined the neural correlates of automatic
racial biases as well as inhibitory processes that diminish racial biases (e.g. Cunningham et al.
2004; Shkurko 2012), but for the most part (and especially in political science), these neural
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processes are assumed, ignored, or measured indirectly (e.g. Huber and Lapinski 2006; Hurwitz
and Peffley 2005; Mendelberg 2001; Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002). This is in no small
part due to the tremendous cost of using direct measures such as fMRI, but it is also due to the
relative youth of fMRI technology and research necessary to formulate hypotheses about specific
neural processes. In this chapter, I build on the surfeit of social neuroscience research on racerelated evaluations that has accumulated over the past two decades to develop specific
hypotheses about which neural processes should underlay controlled versus automatic processing
of race-related political stimuli.
The second contribution of this chapter is to test the predictions of my model regarding
the role of controlled processing. Specifically, as mentioned above, whereas existing work
largely suggests controlled processing is used to inhibit racial biases, I suggest controlled
processing allows people to defer to broad ideological principles, which may diminish or
exacerbate racial biases depending on one’s ideological preferences. Without direct measures of
automatic versus controlled processes, it is impossible to know, for example, whether
conservatives tend to exhibit more anti-Black political views because of a lack of controlled
processing, or because the consequences of controlled processing are different for conservatives
than they are for liberals. Even in Chapter 4, the finding that ideology played a stronger role in
predicting race-related political attitudes at low levels of implicit ambivalence could be due to
controlled processing leading to different outcomes for liberals and conservatives, or it could be
due to liberals simply utilizing controlled processing to a greater degree than conservatives when
resolving conflicts in their racial preferences. Put differently, without directly observing
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controlled processes, we cannot determine whether encouraging people to “think about race”
leads to greater racial tolerance across the board or ideological polarization.
To be clear, the hypotheses derived from my model are not necessarily incompatible with
findings from existing literature (that controlled processing is associated with greater racial
tolerance). It may very well be the case that individuals who express lower levels of racial bias
exhibit greater levels of controlled processing than individuals who express high levels of racial
bias. However, the central test of my model is not whether controlled processing is greater
among racially tolerant individuals than among racially intolerant individuals. The central test is
whether controlled processing results in greater racial tolerance for everyone, or in greater racial
tolerance for those embracing liberal, hierarchy-attenuating ideologies and greater racial
intolerance for those embracing conservative, hierarchy-enhancing ideologies.
The Consequences of “Thinking about Race”
The idea that encouraging effortful thought can reduce prejudice emanates largely from
work on when racial cues in political messages are most likely to trigger racial attitudes. This
work focuses on political attitudes broadly rather than race-targeted policy attitudes. Mendelberg
(2001) developed a framework describing the conflict that most White Americans face when
they evaluate a racialized political message. According to this framework, the racial appeals
most likely to be influential are those that only implicitly prime race because when race is
primed explicitly, people are cued to reject prejudiced instincts and abide by egalitarian norms
encouraged by society. However, when race is primed implicitly, the argument is that prejudiced
instincts can influence political attitudes uninhibited. This model is supported by an array of
empirical evidence showing that a wide range of implicit racial cues can trigger race-based
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evaluations of political messages, and that the mechanism implicit cues operate through is by
making race cognitively accessible (Mendelberg 2001; Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002).
The assumptions of this model are therefore that implicit racial cues trigger uncontrollable racial
biases, that explicit racial cues trigger higher-level cognitive processes, and that higher- level
cognitive processes triggered by explicit racial cues necessarily yield inhibition of prejudice. The
implication is that when race is explicit (as it always is with race-targeted policies), prejudice
influences race-targeted policies because some individuals simply do not engage in controlled
inhibition. As explained by Valentino, Hutchings, and White, “For most people, the argument
goes, negative racial attitudes affect political thinking automatically or not at all” (2002, 77).
Despite evidence supporting this framework, some findings call its assumptions into
question. The effects of implicit racial cues are diminished when the cue presents a racial group
in a counter-stereotypic way (Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002) – a finding explained as
due to greater controlled processing of counter-stereotypic information (Brewer, Dull, and Lui
1981; Hastie 1981). Also, the greater ability of implicit racial cues rather than explicit racial cues
to trigger racial attitudes when evaluating a political message seems concentrated only among
the highly educated (Huber and Lapinski 2006). These findings suggest that although the
framework constructed by Mendelberg (2001) may be somewhat robust, there are significant
limits to its generalizability. It seems that implicit cues do not necessarily lead to uncontrollable
racial biases. Further, the finding that the model holds mainly among the highly educated
suggests that the effects of making race explicit depend on the person: among highly educated
individuals it seems likely that controlled processing will reduce the effects of prejudice, but less
educated individuals may hold egalitarian values a bit more loosely, and so controlled processing
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may often yield an equal or greater role for prejudice. Indeed, work on “motivation to respond
without prejudice” suggests that individuals vary a great deal in the degree to which they are
internally or externally motivated to use controlled processes to inhibit prejudice, even when race
is explicit (e.g. Plant and Devine 1998). Not everyone holds the egalitarian views assumed to
yield controlled inhibition when racial appeals are explicit. Nonetheless, this assumption remains
largely accepted: that higher- level, controlled processing universally yields prejudice inhibition.
The best way to reduce the role of prejudice then is to make race explicit and encourage greater
controlled processing.
In this study, I explore the possibility that equal levels of controlled processing can
nonetheless yield variation in the degree to which prejudice influences policy opinions. For
some, according to this hypothesis, controlled processing leads to inhibition of prejudice because
of higher- level principles that call for hierarchy attenuation. For others, controlled processing
simply reinforces and even exacerbates the role of prejudice because of higher- level motivations
to enhance hierarchy and reject egalitarian norms.
A Neural Framework of the Automatic and Controlled Components of Prejudice
A variety of methodologies have been used to estimate the influence of racial prejudice
on political attitudes, but these methods rely heavily on assumptions regarding the mechanisms
by which prejudice influences policy attitudes. To understand how prejudice influences such
attitudes and thus how its role can be diminished, the most promising avenue of research is to
directly examine the hypothesized mechanisms at work in the brain. Advances in medical
technology have made it possible to obtain quantitative measurements of brain activity by
tracking the increases in oxygenated blood that accompany increases in activity in particular

146
parts of the brain. Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) uses a magnetic field in
conjunction with pulses of radio frequencies to track the iron that comes with movement in
oxygenated blood (Friston 2009).
There is one simple, overarching finding of research using fMRI methodology – the
human brain is extremely complex, and to suggest that any attitude or behavior can be traced
solely to a single region of the brain, or conversely that any single region of the brain has just
one behaviorally relevant function, would be tremendously misguided. Nonetheless, research has
advanced our understanding of neural activity substantially, and we can look at trends in brain
activity in response to specific stimuli to infer which parts of the brain are generally active in
particular contexts, including contexts related to politics (see Schreiber 2011). Through
replication and convergence, we can develop frameworks of specific neural processes so brain
activity can be used to predict “real-world,” ecologically valid outcomes (Berkman and Falk
2013). Neuroscience research on prejudice has provided an excellent starting point for
understanding the mechanisms by which prejudice might influence policy attitudes. Findings
from this work have essentially left us with a roadmap for how the brain functions when
prejudice occurs automatically versus when controlled processes inhibit racial biases.
Group-based categorization seems hardwired into the brain’s processing of social
information. Some work has shown that even when group membership is meaningless (i.e.
created within the confines of an experimental task), the brain reacts to fellow ingroup members
by activating certain regions associated with awareness of self (Volz et al. 2009; Shkurko, 2012;
Molenberghs et al. 2013; Van Bavel, Packer, and Cunningham 2008). With regard to reactions to
outgroups, the most commonly activated brain regions include the amygdala and insula,
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suggesting that people immediately categorize outgroup members as emotionally significant (e.g.
Cunningham et al. 2004; but also see Wheeler and Fiske 2005) and associate them with
uncertainty or danger, which must be avoided (Rilling et al. 2008; Risheson et al. 2003; see
Shkurko 2012 for meta-analysis). This reaction – that is, the activation of these brain regions –
occurs automatically and even when race is only primed implicitly (Cunningham et al. 2004;
Cunningham et al. 2007).
Something interesting happens, however, when race is consciously recognized and there
is a conflict between people’s implicit adverse reactions to outgroups and their explicit goals of
being or appearing unprejudiced (e.g. “I feel threatened by the Black man walking toward me but
know I should not”): the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) detects the goal conflict, the amygdala
response is suppressed, and certain parts of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) kick in that are associated
with higher- level cognitive functioning (see Stanley, Phelps, and Banaji 2008). Controlled
processes are thus triggered when race makes the jump from covert to overt, and these processes
can allow people to inhibit prejudiced reactions. This basically means the precise mechanisms
assumed to be occurring under the framework of this dissertation are detectable when observing
brain data. Overall, we are left with relatively distinct patterns of neural activity when someone
reacts adversely to a racial outgroup member, detects a conflict between this adverse reaction
and one’s conscious goals regarding race, and subsequently attempts to supersede adverse
reactions through controlled processing. Note that conflict detection and controlled processing to
inhibit adverse reactions should only be evident when race is explicit enough so as to be
consciously recognized; otherwise, automatic reactions should occur uninhibited (Cunningham et
al. 2004).
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Critically, the research on the aforementioned neural processes does not suggest that
controlled processing in the PFC will necessarily yield inhibition of prejudiced reactions – just
that it is necessary for such inhibition to be possible. An alternative possibility, which has not
been explored thoroughly in the neuroscience literature let alone in political science, is that
controlled processes ultimately lead individuals to reinforce their pre-existing biases as a form of
rationalization. In terms of the brain, PFC activation may be necessary for inhibition to occur,
but in some situations, it may act as a catalyst for “doubling down” on prejudiced instincts. The
implication for reducing the role of prejudice is glaring: encouraging people to think more about
the racial component of race-targeted policies will not diminish the influence of prejudice and
may even bolster its influence because people will turn to ideological principles that may either
enhance or attenuate group hierarchy.
Expectations for the Role of Controlled Processing
The central test of this chapter has to do with the expected role of controlled processing
in people’s race-related political evaluations. I expect that broadly, controlled processing will be
associated with greater deference to ideological principles that either enhance or attenuate
hierarchy, and so individuals who hold most strongly to hierarchy-enhancing or hierarchyattenuating ideologies should experience the greatest amount of controlled processing when
evaluating race-related political stimuli. I test this broad hypothesis using data from an fMRI
experiment during which participants make decisions about whether or not individuals should
receive monetary aid from the government. The race of the individuals applying for aid varies
between Black and White, and race is primed either implicitly or explicitly. By priming race
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either implicitly or explicitly, I am able to simulate the conditions under which we should expect
automatic versus controlled processing related to race.
In line with the research described earlier in this chapter, it should be expected that when
race is primed implicitly, individuals will exhibit greater automatic processing when evaluating
Black applicants for government assistance compared to White applicants. When race is primed
explicitly, individuals should exhibit greater controlled processing when evaluating Black
applicants compared to White applicants. This has been established in prior research (e.g.
Cunningham et al. 2004; Shkurko 2012). The critical test in relation to this dissertation has to do
with the correlates of controlled processing when race is explicit. When race is explicit, I expect
anti-Black racial biases in support for government assistance to be diminished among those who
endorse hierarchy-attenuating ideologies and exacerbated among those who endorse hierarchyenhancing ideologies. Further, because my model proposes that these effects of priming race
explicitly are due to controlled processing among both “hierarchy-attenuators” and “hierarchyenhancers,” controlled processing when race is explicit should be greater for those at the tailends of the ideological spectrum (i.e. those who are more ideologically extreme) compared to
those who are more ideologically moderate. The critical tests of this study in terms of relevance
to this dissertation are therefore constrained to involving activation in the cortical regions of the
brain such as the ACC and PFC (i.e. the brain regions associated with controlled processing), and
so only results pertaining to these brain regions are reported. 16

16

Nonetheless, results regarding brain regions associated with automatic processing (e.g. amygdala and insula) are
available upon request.
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Data and Methods
Twenty-Three White adults were recruited to participate in the study through flyers
placed around the community surrounding a large Midwestern university, as well as a volunteer
participant registry created by the facility housing the MRI. Participants were each compensated
$25. All participants were right-handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Participants were safety screened to ensure eligibility for MRI and provided informed consent in
accord with study approval by the Institutional Review Board. The sample was 60.9% female,
65.2% Christian, and 100% U.S.-born with English as a first language. The median age was 22
years old (range: 19 to 57) and 39.1% of the sample had a 4-year college degree or higher. Some
screening was also done during recruitment to ensure the sample was adequately diverse in terms
of political ideology and partisan affiliation. Nonetheless, the sample exhibited a
liberal/Democratic skew (16 participants identified as liberal or strongly liberal, 1 identified as
moderate, and 6 identified as conservative or strongly conservative; 13 participants identified as
Democrats, 1 identified as Independent, 7 identified as Republican, and 2 identified as
“something else”).
Experimental Design
The experimental task used a 2 (race of applicant: White vs. Black) x 2 (conscious
awareness: non-conscious/implicit vs. conscious/explicit) rapid event-related within-subjects
design consisting of 4 blocks. Race of applicant varied at the trial-level (i.e. within blocks) and
conscious awareness varied at the block-level (i.e. between blocks). There were 40 trials within
each block for a total of 160 trials. Each block lasted approximately 7 minutes. Experimental
stimuli were presented in the scanner using PsychoPy2 v1.83.01 (Peirce, 2007; 2009). Both trial
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order and interstimulus interval (ISI) duration were predetermined using Optseq2
(https://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/optseq), a software package that maximizes efficiency in
modeling the hemodynamic response in rapid event-related designs (see Burock, Buckner,
Woldorff, Rosen, & Dale, 1998; Dale, Greve, & Burock, 1999).
Each trial presented participants with a random piece of information about the applicant and
asked them to decide whether they strongly oppose, oppose, support, or strongly support
monetary aid to that individual using response pads (one response pad for each hand, with
buttons under each of participants’ pointer and middle fingers). Response options were shown at
the top of the screen throughout the task, and their positions on the screen remained constant
across trials. Descriptions were constructed in such a way that they would not explicitly indicate
any sort of deservingness or merit on the part of the applicant (e.g. “has an outie belly button” or
“hums when eating”; see Appendix for complete list of statements). All applicants were males in
order to avoid any effects of applicant sex. The phrase “A man that:” was shown on the screen
just below the response options at all times.
Prior the description of each individual, a Black or White face was presented for an amount
of time that either allowed for conscious recognition of the face (Explicit blocks) or not (Implicit
blocks). The order of Conscious and Nonconscious blocks was randomized for each participant.
All faces were taken from the Chicago Face Database (Ma, Correll, and Wittenbrink, 2015), a
database of high-resolution standardized photographs of 158 Black and White individuals
between the ages of 18-40. Each image has been coded for 41 physical characteristics (e.g. nose
width, face width to height ratio, eye closeness) and rated along 22 perceptual dimensions (e.g.
threatening, attractive, masculine) by an independent sample of raters, and was matched as
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closely as possible across these characteristics and dimensions. Only 80 images were used (40
Black faces and 40 White faces), and so each image was shown twice (once during an Explicit
block and once during an Implicit block). Images were randomly paired with applicant
descriptions for each participant.
Each trial began with a fixation cross shown for 500 milliseconds (ms). In Explicit blocks,
this was followed by an image of a Black or White face for 1 second, and then an applicant
description for 3.5 seconds. In Implicit blocks, the fixation cross was followed by a noise mask
(a picture of random black and white pixels) for 934 ms, a Black or White face for 30 ms, a
second noise mask for 36 ms, and then an applicant description for 3.5 seconds. As such, Explicit
and Implicit trials were identical except that whereas Explicit trials showed a Black or White face
for a full second before each applicant description, Implicit trials showed noise masks during that
second with a Black or White face shown rapidly in between masks. Thus, participants were
expected not to be consciously aware of the influence of the Black or White face in the Implicit
trials. Prior research has explored similar protocols and shown that a short stimulus presentation
time such as the one being used here for the implicit face primes is sufficient to yield only
nonconscious recognition of a stimulus (see Rohr, Degner, and Wentura 2015). The exact
timings used for this experiment were pre-tested on a small sample of undergraduate students as
well as during pilot runs in the fMRI scanner.
Survey Measures
Participants were in the scanner for approximately 45 minutes to 1 hour. Before being
removed from the scanner, participants were asked a series of questions about whether they were
able to see faces during the Implicit blocks (8 participants reported being able to see faces, and
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11 said they were able to make out the race of faces seen between noise masks). Afterward, they
completed a 15-minute long survey, which included, among other things, the 3 race-based policy
support items used in chapters 2 and 3 (α = 0.89; M = 5.36, SD = 1.44), SDO (SDO-D: α = 0.82,
M = 2.19, SD = 0.98; SDO-E: α = 0.90, M = 2.27, SD = 1.11), and demographic items. SDO-D
and SDO-E are used as the primary measures of hierarchy-attenuating/hierarchy-enhancing
ideological principles. Both SDO scales were folded at their midpoint so that higher values
indicate greater ideological extremity in either direction (SDO-D: M = 1.14, SD = 0.54; SDO-E:
M = 1.21, SD = 0.51).
MRI Data Acquisition
A Siemens Skyra 3.0 Tesla MRI with a 32-channel head coil was used to collect brain
activation data. Prior to functional imaging, a high-resolution T1-weighted 3D anatomical image
(MPRAGE; field of view (FoV) read = 256 millimeters, slice thickness = 1.0 x 1.0 x 1.0 mm,
repetition time (TR) = 2400 ms, echo time (TE) = 3.37 ms, inversion time (TI) = 991 ms, prescan
normalize on, PAT mode GRAPPA) was obtained for spatial normalization. Functional MRI data
was acquired with acquisition parallel to the AC-PC line to maximize whole-brain coverage (42
slices, FoV read = 220 mm, slice thickness = 3.0 x 3.0 x 3.0 mm, TR = 2500 ms, TE = 30 ms, flip
angle = 80 degrees, prescan normalize off). The first 12.5 seconds of each block showed a blank
grey screen so that the first five volumes of each block could be discarded to avoid variability
due to pre-steady state functional data.
MRI Data Preprocessing and Analysis
MRI data were preprocessed using fMRI Expert Analysis Tool (FEAT) in FMRIB
Software Library (FSL; Jenkinson, Beckmann, Behrens, Woolrich, & Smith, 2012; Smith et al.,
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2004) on Mac OS X. The MPRAGE image was skull stripped using FSL’s Brain Extraction
Function (BET; Smith, 2002). Functional data were subjected to normalization, registration to
both MPRAGE and standard space (MNI152), spatial smoothing at FWHM of 5mm, slice timing
correction (to correct for interleaved data acquisition), and motion correction using MCFLIRT
(Jenkinson, Bannister, Brady, & Smith, 2002).
General linear models (GLMs) were used as implemented in FSL. Time-series data was
modeled at the first level (the trial level) using FMRIB’s Improved Linear Model (FILM), and
then higher-level analysis (across blocks first, and then across participants) was done using
FMRIB’s Local Analysis of Mixed Effects (FLAME; see Smith et al., 2004). The blood oxygen
level-dependent (BOLD) signal was first modeled at the trial level for each run as a function of
race (Black/White). At the block-level, BOLD signal differences for Black compared to White
trials were modeled as a function of conscious awareness (Explicit/Implicit). The subject-level
analyses were then combined into group-level region of interest (ROI) analyses using FSL
FLAME1. ROI analyses on left amygdala, right amygdala, bilateral insula, anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC), and frontal orbital cortex (OFC) were masked prior to analysis (using anatomical
masks from the Harvard-Oxford Cortical/Subcortical Atlases provided with FSL). Due to the
small sample size, these analyses remained uncorrected for multiple comparisons.17 Analyses of
the race*conscious awareness contrasts (before taking into account between-subject variables)
were used to examine whether controlled processing was, as expected, more likely for Black
compared to White trials in Explicit compared to Implicit blocks. To examine how brain
activation mapped onto individual differences in SDO extremity, BOLD signal differences for
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As such, the results presented in this chapter are preliminary and should not be cited without consulting the
author.
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the race*conscious awareness contrasts were modeled as a function of each of the SDO
extremity variables (analyses for SDO-D and SDO-E were carried out separately).
Results
Behavioral Task Results
Before turning to the fMRI results, analyses of participants’ responses to the task were
done to determine whether support for government assistance was influenced by race, conscious
awareness, and SDO in the expected directions. Multilevel models were run with trial as the unit
of analysis nested within blocks, nested within participant. An empty model was run estimating
random effects for participant, block, trial number, and face image (because each image was
shown twice). Only the random effects for participant explained a substantial amount of variation
in support for government assistance (approximately 10% of the variance), and so all subsequent
models include only random effects for participant. All models also controlled for fixed effects
of participant’s sex, education, religion (Christian or non-Christian), and whether participants
reported being able to decipher the race of faces shown in between noise masks in the Explicit
blocks.
First, I examined the relationship between racial biases in support for government
assistance during the task and support for race-based policies as measured during the post-scan
survey in order to determine the degree to which the task reflected evaluations of “real-world”
policies. Support for government assistance during the task was regressed on a dummy variable
for conscious awareness condition (0 = Explicit, 1 = Implicit), a dummy variable for race of the
applicant (0 = Black, 1 = White), race-based policy support (mean-centered), and the interaction
between race of applicant and race-based policy support. Indeed, there was a significant
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interaction between race of applicant and race-based policy support (b = -0.052, SE = 0.022, p <
.05). Once decomposed, it was evident that at low levels of support for race-based policies (-1
SD from the mean), there were no significant racial biases in support for government assistance
during the task (b = 0.011, SE = 0.048, p = .811), but at high levels of support for race-based
policies (+1 SD from the mean), there was a significant pro-Black bias (b = -0.135, SE = 0.044, p
< .01). This suggests that although opposition to “real-world” race-based policies was not
associated with anti-Black bias during the task, support for race-based policies was indeed
associated with pro-Black bias during the task.
The primary behavioral analyses concern the interaction between race of applicant and
conscious awareness. A main effects model indicated no significant main effect of conscious
awareness, but there was a significant main effect of applicant race such that on average,
participants were less likely to support White applicants than Black applicants (b = -0.069, SE =
0.033, p < .05). Next, an interaction was calculated between applicant race and conscious
awareness. The interaction was marginally significant (b = 0.106, SE = 0.057, p = .062), and
showed that although a pro-White racial bias existed in Explicit blocks (b = -0.122, SE = 0.044, p
< .01), no significant racial bias existed in Implicit blocks (b = -0.017, SE = 0.043, p = 0.696).
Thus, although the lack of racial bias in Implicit blocks was unexpected, more racially tolerant
evaluations were observed in Explicit blocks as hypothesized.
The final, critical, behavioral analysis relating to the hypotheses of this chapter involved
a three-way interaction between applicant race, conscious awareness, and SDO. Separate models
were run testing SDO-D and SDO-E. With regard to SDO-D, a significant three-way interaction
was evident. At mean levels of SDO-D, there is a significant pro-Black bias (b = -0.120, SE =
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0.040, p < .01), and this bias is marginally stronger in Explicit blocks than in Implicit blocks. At
low levels of SDO-D, there is a stronger pro-Black bias (b = -0.399, SE = 0.143, p < .01), but this
bias is only significant in the Explicit blocks (b = 0.516, SE = 0.200, p < .01). Finally, among
those high in SDO-D, there is no significant racial bias in either Implicit or Explicit blocks.
Therefore, although individuals high in SDO-D unexpectedly showed no evidence of racial
biases regardless of conscious awareness of race, individuals low in SDO-D exhibited the
expected pattern of greater racial tolerance in Explicit compared to Implicit blocks. Figure 5.1
illustrates this interaction.

The y-axis indicates support for government assistance, and applicant race is plotted on
the x-axis. Left panels indicate Explicit blocks and right panels indicate Implicit blocks.
Top panels indicated -1 SD SDO-D, and bottom panels indicate +1 SD SDO-D.
Figure 4.1: Interaction between Applicant Race, Conscious Awareness, and SDO-D
The same three-way regarding SDO-E was not significant. However, both two-way
interactions comprising the three-way were significant. An applicant race by SDO-E interaction
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showed that as should be expected, greater levels of SDO-E were associated with lower levels of
pro-Black bias (b = 0.066, SE = 0.026, p < .05). Unexpectedly, a conscious awareness by SDO-E
interaction showed that greater levels of SDO-E were also associated with greater support for
government assistance in the Explicit blocks compared to the Implicit blocks, regardless of race
(b = -0.067, SE = 0.026, p < .05).
Taken together, these behavioral results suggest that contrary to expectations, the
predominant effect of applicant race was pro-Black/anti-White. Even among individuals high in
SDO, there were no racial biases rather than pro-White racial biases. However, in line with
expectations, and more importantly with regard to the framework of this dissertation, conscious
awareness of race (i.e. explicit racial primes) was associated with more pro-Black evaluations,
but only among individuals low in SDO-D (although this three-way interaction was not evident
for SDO-E).
fMRI Results
Two sets of analyses were conducted. First BOLD signal was modeled as a function of
the interaction between applicant race and conscious awareness to see which brain regions
exhibited significant activation for Black (compared to White) faces in Explicit blocks
(compared to Implicit blocks) as well as Implicit (compared to Explicit) blocks. Then, the SDO
extremity variable was added to the model to see which brain regions in the above contrast
exhibited significant activation that was associated with SDO extremity. ROI analyses were done
for each contrast for ACC and OFC in order to limited analyses to only the brain regions
implicated in the critical tests of this chapter. Further, SDO analyses were carried out separately
for SDO-D and SDO-E.
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In the aggregate, there was a small but significant cluster of activation in ACC for
Implicit compared to Explicit trials, and contrary to the expectation that ACC would be more
active in Explicit trials, significant activation was also found in ACC for Explicit compared to
Implicit trials but it was only a single voxel. Thus, ACC activation was evident in both types of
trials for Black compared to White faces, but this activation was stronger in Implicit trials.
Regarding OFC, significant clusters of activation were evident for both contrasts (i.e. in both
Explicit and Implicit trials), but as expected, activation was stronger for the Explicit > Implicit
contrast than for the Implicit > Explicit contrast. Therefore, although ACC activation did not
behave as expected, OFC activation did. These results are shown in Table 5.1, and the significant
clusters of OFC associated with Explicit compared to Implicit trials are depicted in Figure 5.2.
Table 5.1: Significant Clusters of Bold Activation n ROIs for Applicant Race*Conscious
Awareness
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Images were created by overlaying the thresholded Z-statistic image on a standard space
template (MNI152). Images are centered on the peak voxel for each cluster from the ROI
analyses. Areas highlighted in blue indicate the ROI for the analysis, and areas highlighted
in green indicate regions of significant activation.
Figure 5.2: BOLD Activation in OFC in Response to Explicit > Implicit Blocks for Black >
White Trials
If the theoretical framework of this dissertation is correct, besides an interaction between
applicant race and conscious awareness, it should also be evident that activation in ACC and
OFC in Explicit (compared to Implicit) blocks for Black face (compared to White face) trials is
associated with greater extremity in one’s ideological principles – in this case, SDO. Analyses
were first conducted for SDO-D extremity. Small yet significant clusters of activation in ACC
were found for both contrasts, suggesting some degree of ACC activity occurred in both Implicit
and Explicit blocks was associated with greater SDO-D extremity. However, contrary to
expectations, the cluster for the Implicit > Explicit contrast predicting SDO-D extremity was
somewhat stronger. Conversely, patters of activation in OFC supported my hypotheses. That is,
although significant activation in OFC was found to be associated with greater SDO-D extremity
for both contrasts, this activation was somewhat stronger for the Explicit > Implicit contrast
(despite involving fewer voxels).
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Regarding SDO-E, there were significant clusters of activation associated with SDO-E
extremity across all contrasts for both ACC and OFC, but the relative strengths of activation
varied entirely as expected. For ACC, activation associated with high SDO-E extremity was
stronger for Explicit (compared to Implicit) blocks than it was for Implicit (compared to Explicit)
blocks. Further, this same relative difference in strength of activation was evident for OFC.
These associations between brain activation patterns and SDO-E extremity strongly support the
hypothesis that greater controlled processing when race is explicitly (rather than implicitly)
primed is associated with greater adherence to ideological principles regardless of the direction
of those principles. These results are presented in Table 5.2, and the clusters of ACC and OFC
for Explicit (compared to Implicit) blocks that are significantly associated with SDO-E extremity
are illustrated in Figures 5.3 and 5.4, respectively.
Table 5.2: Significant Clusters of Bold Activation n ROIs for Applicant Race*Conscious
Awareness*SDO
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Images were created by overlaying the thresholded Z-statistic image on a standard space
template (MNI152). Images are centered on the peak voxel for each cluster from the ROI
analyses. Areas highlighted in blue indicate the ROI for the analysis, and areas highlighted
in green indicate regions of significant activation.
Figure 5.3: BOLD Activation Associated with SDO-E Extremity
In ACC in Response to Explicit > Implicit Blocks for Black > White Trials

Images were created by overlaying the thresholded Z-statistic image on a standard space
template (MNI152). Images are centered on the peak voxel for each cluster from the ROI
analyses. Areas highlighted in blue indicate the ROI for the analysis, and areas
highlighted in green indicate regions of significant activation.
Figure 5.4: BOLD Activation Associated with SDO-E Extremity
In OFC in Response to Explicit > Implicit Blocks for Black > White Trials
Inside the Black Box of “Principles and Prejudice”
The results presented in this chapter are mostly consistent with the model laid out in this
dissertation. The findings presented in chapters 3 and 4 have largely corroborated a theoretical
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framework in which race-related political objects trigger automatic processes associated with
ingroup favoritism but controlled processes allow individuals to defer to ideological principles.
However, up to this point, the neural mechanisms thought to be responsible for deference to
ideological principles have yet to be directly observed. The use of fMRI allowed for such
observation, and an experiment was developed to distinguish between neural processes occurring
during explicitly race-related political evaluations and neural processes occurring during political
evaluations that are only implicitly related to race. Prior research in social neuroscience has
established that whereas implicit racial cues are associated with automatic processing (e.g.
amygdala and insula), explicit racial cues are associated with more controlled processing (e.g.
ACC and PFC), which can lead to decreases in racial bias (e.g. Cunningham et al. 2004).
However, it remained unknown whether controlled processing universally leads to inhibition of
racial biases or to deference to ideological principles, as my model suggests.
The behavioral task results suggested that individuals were, as expected, less likely to
express bias against a racial outgroup when racial primes were explicit than when they were
implicit. However, the precise pattern of results was somewhat unexpected. Contrary to the
hypothesis that anti-Black racial biases would be strongest during Implicit blocks, no anti-Black
racial biases in support for government assistance were observed anywhere in these data. This
could have been due to multiple reasons. First, although brain activation patterns indicated that
participants did respond differently to Black than White faces in Implicit blocks, it could be the
case that the primes were shown too fast for any behavioral consequences to manifest. This
would be somewhat surprising given the pilot testing as well as the fact that quicker primes have
been used in prior research to produce racial biases (e.g. Rohr, Degner, and Wentura 2015).
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Another possibility is simply limited sample size. Although the within-subjects design allowed
for a large sample in terms of trials, the limited between-subject variation may have made it
difficult to detect anti-Black biases. Nonetheless, pro-Black biases were evident only in Explicit
blocks, which suggests that on average, explicit racial primes led to more pro-Black evaluations.
The behavioral task results involving SDO told a similar story. Unexpectedly, individuals
high in SDO-D or SDO-E exhibited no racial bias. Although this was contrary to expectations, it
makes some sense for SDO-E because the ideology promoted by high SDO-E is thought to
involve endorsement of existing group inequality rather than a preference to enhance or
exacerbate inequality (Jost and Thompson 2000; Kugler, Cooper, and Nosek 2010). In that sense,
a pro-Black bias among those low in SDO may indicate an acknowledgement of existing racial
inequality and efforts to address it rather than simply a lack of racial prejudice. However, SDO D is thought to involve active degradation of groups perceived to be low in the societal
hierarchy, and so the lack of racial bias among individuals high in SDO-D remains unexplained.
This lack of bias may, as with the lack of anti-Black bias in the aggregate, be due to sample size
issues. Nonetheless, SDO-D interacted with applicant race and conscious awareness in the
expected direction, as pro-Black biases in support for government assistance among individuals
low in SDO-D were primarily evident during Explicit blocks rather than Implicit blocks.
The primary contribution of this chapter centers on the fMRI results. It is first worth
noting that across analyses, significant brain activation in both the ACC and OFC was evident
for both Implicit and Explicit blocks, suggesting that in line with the IR model (Cunningham,
Haas, and Jahn 2011; Cunningham and Zelazo 2007; Cunningham, Zelazo, Packer, and Van
Bavel 2007), controlled processes seem to be active to some degree at all stages of race-related
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evaluation (i.e. when race is implicitly primed as well as when it is explicitly primed). The main
tests of the hypotheses of this chapter therefore involve relative strength of activation between
Explicit > Implicit contrasts and Implicit > Explicit contrasts.
In the aggregate, brain activation patterns in the OFC followed expectations, as activation
for Black versus White face trials was substantially stronger in Explicit (compared to Implicit)
blocks than in Implicit (compared to Explicit) blocks. However, only low levels of activation in
ACC for Black versus White face trials were observed to differ across blocks, and activation was
somewhat stronger for the Implicit > Explicit contrast. This result for ACC was unexpected, but
may fit with understandings of the functions of the ACC. The findings described earlier in this
chapter suggest the ACC plays sort of a mediating a role in racial evaluations by detecting
conflict between automatic reactions and conscious beliefs. If this is the case, it would not be
surprising if conflict detection was occurring during Implicit blocks, and by the time evaluations
were made during Explicit blocks, conflicts had already been detected and the OFC kicked in to
regulate one’s response. However, this finding would still be contrary to some existing work
(e.g. Cunningham et al. 2004). It could also be the case that the ACC was responding simply to
the “strangeness” of the Implicit trials, because a series of flashing black and white noise masks
were shown prior to every applicant description.
The fMRI analyses regarding SDO were done using extremity variables because my
model suggests controlled processing should be evident when race is primed explicitly for
individuals at either end of the ideological spectrum. My hypotheses for SDO were supported
more strongly for SDO-E than for SDO-D, which is not surprising given the fact that SDO-E is
thought to be associated with redistributive policies, as described in Chapter 2. Both ACC and
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OFC showed stronger activation associated with SDO-E extremity in the Explicit > Implicit
contrasts than in the Implicit > Explicit contrasts. This same pattern was evident for SDO-D
regarding activation in OFC but not ACC. However, even with regard to the OFC results, the
activation associated with SDO-D extremity in the Explicit > Implicit contrast was stronger than
the activation in the Implicit > Explicit contrast but was observed in fewer voxels (i.e. less
anatomical space). ACC activation was more strongly associated with SDO-D extremity in the
Implicit > Explicit contrast than in the Explicit > Implicit contrast, and in all analyses activation
was relatively weak. These results regarding SDO-D are not terribly concerning given that prior
research has suggested SDO-D is more directly related to social identity motives than SDO-E
(Jost and Thompson 2000; Kugler, Cooper, and Nosek 2010), and SDO-E has been the primary
workhorse of group-based principles throughout this dissertation, but further research should
nonetheless investigate these differences in the neural underpinnings of SDO-E versus SDO-D.
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CHAPTER 6
A Neural Toolkit for Change, Anchored in the P ast
“Nihilists! Fuck me. I mean, say what you want about the tenets of National Socialism, Dude, at
least it’s an ethos.”
- Walter Sobchak (John Goodman) in The Big Lebowski18
The question posed at the beginning of this dissertation was: how much control do people
have over their racial attitudes and behaviors? A review of the literature, in conjunction with the
results presented throughout this dissertation, suggests the answer is (in true academic fashion):
it depends. It depends largely on the degree to which automatic versus controlled processes have
influenced one’s attitudes or behavior. From work in social neuroscience, we know that attitudes
exist on a spectrum from “more influenced by automatic processes” to “more influenced by
controlled process,” and that where a particular attitude falls on this spectrum is largely a
function of the degree to which over time, controlled processes are able to interact with
automatic processes and thus influence evaluations (Cunningham, Haas, and Jahn 2011;
Cunningham and Zelazo 2007; Cunningham, Zelazo, Packer, and Van Bavel 2007). Therefore,
when it comes to the topic of this dissertation – race-related political attitudes – we should expect
controlled, conscious processes to be quite powerful, but also for people’s attitudes to be
grounded substantially in innate reflexes.
I have argued that group-based principles such as SDO are the most dominant predictors
of race-related political attitudes because they reflect the translation process between people’s
automatic group biases and the controlled processes that allow them to interact with mass-scale
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Coen, J. and Coen, E. (Writers and Directors). (1998). The Big Lebowski [Motion picture]. United States:
Polygram Film Entertainment and Working Title Films.
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society. More specifically, as people think about race in the domain of politics and how societal
resources should be allocated across racial groups, automatic ingroup favoritism is translated
through controlled processes into higher-order principles about how groups should be organized
in society. Accordingly, people’s attitudes toward policies such as affirmative action and racebased education spending are not simply the result of whether or not the policy benefits their
group, nor are they the result solely of their beliefs about deservingness and the proper role of
government. Instead, race-targeted policy attitudes seem primarily driven by individuals’
preferences regarding how groups in society should be organized hierarchically. The results of
the studies presented in this dissertation have largely supported this theoretical framework.
In the remainder of this chapter, I elaborate on the implications of the theory and results
of this dissertation. I start by summarizing the findings of each chapter. Then, I expand on the
implications of this dissertation for the “principles or prejudice” literature, and how an
acknowledgement that “principles” and “prejudice” operate together can benefit this literature.
Next, I dive deeper into the distinct consequences of group-based principles as opposed to sheer
ingroup favoritism. Turning to the “principled” component of group-based principles, I talk
about what this dissertation suggests principles really are, and how this conceptualization of
principles differs from the conceptualizations of prior work. I then describe how the findings of
this dissertation call for more cross-fertilization between the NMSoT and CCSoT. Ultimately, I
suggest this dissertation holds tremendous implications for how we might go about reducing the
role of prejudice in politics, and so I conclude by discussing ways in which public policy may be
informed by the theoretical model of this dissertation.
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Summary of Results
In Chapter 2, I surveyed the landscape by pitting survey measures of various constructs
against one another to see which factors were most strongly associated with race-based policy
attitudes. Using data from a moderately sized online sample, I looked at three broad categories of
factors: social identity motives, individualism, and group-based principles. I hypothesized that
group-based principles, measured as SDO-E and SDO-D, would outperform the social identity
motives (i.e. the role of ingroup favoritism) and individualism in predicting attitudes toward
race-based policies. This hypothesis was strongly supported. SDO-E, in particular, was the
foremost predictor of race-based policy attitudes. Social identity motives played a minor role,
and the only independent effects of social identity motives were positive relationships between
ingroup importance and commitment and support for race-based government assistance, which
was unexpected. As for the role of individualism, work ethic and self-reliance both maintained
weak but significant independent relationships with race-based policy attitudes. However, an
experimental manipulation of how hardworking Blacks versus Whites were perceived to be had
no effect on policy attitudes. Further, contrary to some existing research (Federico and Sidanius
2002; Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1996), the hypothesis that the role of individualism is explained
by group-based preferences was not supported.
These results suggest first and foremost that group-based principles rather than ingroup
favoritism or individualistic values underlay race-targeted policy opinions. This finding, in
particular, is central to the theoretical framework outlined in this dissertation. These findings also
suggest that “principles,” as traditionally conceptualized in the “principles or prejudice”
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literature, are not simply socially acceptable vehicles for the expression of group biases but are
also not necessarily “pure” indicators of deservingness-based evaluations either.
In Chapter 3, I utilized the Minimal Groups Paradigm (MGP) to strip away any context,
history, and stereotypes that might be attached to “real-world” groups and thus obtain purer
estimates of the relationships between ingroup favoritism, perceptions of deservingness, groupbased principles, and race-based policy attitudes. I started by replicating the correlational results
of Chapter 2 in a smaller, student sample (except for the unexpected results regarding ingroup
importance and commitment, which did not replicate). SDO-E was the strongest predictor of
race-based policy attitudes even when the measures of social identity motives were specific to
the minimal groups in the experiment. In order to manipulate the perceived deservingness of the
minimal groups, and thus gauge the degree to which individuals evaluated groups based on merit
rather than sheer ingroup favoritism, I experimentally manipulated whether the participant was
told their ingroup was relatively good or bad at a task they completed during the study. In the
aggregate, participants showed significant ingroup bias and no sensitivity to the merit
manipulations. However, most importantly for the purposes of this dissertation, the only
component of the minimal groups task that significantly predicted race-based policy attitudes
was implicit ingroup favoritism. Further, SDO was associated with implicit ingroup favoritism as
well as some instances of explicit ingroup favoritism and sensitivity to the merit manipulations in
a way indicative of merit-based evaluation.
These results are important for two reasons. First, they suggest ingroup favoritism is not
entirely unrelated to race-based policy attitudes, but instead its role is implicit and based in
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automatic processes. Second, group-based principles seem to represent some combination of
automatic (and to some degree controlled) group biases and higher-order principles, as expected.
Although Chapter 3 demonstrated that automatic group biases are associated with racebased policy opposition, and group-based principles seem to embody some combination of
ingroup bias and deservingness-based values, I was nonetheless unable to test the hypothesis that
individuals become more “principled” in their evaluations as controlled processes interact with
automatic group biases. Therefore, in Chapter 4, I used nationally representative data from the
2008 ANES to gauge implicit racial ambivalence – or the discrepancy between one’s implicit
and explicit racial attitudes – as it exists in the United States and its consequences for how
people evaluate race-related political issues. Psychology work has shown that implicit
ambivalence is associated with greater controlled processing aimed at resolving dissonance
associated with the target of ambivalence, and so I use implicit ambivalence as a measure of the
degree to which individuals’ controlled and automatic preferences have interacted. I
hypothesized that individuals low in implicit racial ambivalence – i.e. those who are the most
“resolved” in their racial attitudes – would be the most likely to rely on higher-order principles
such as ideology and egalitarianism to evaluate race-related political objects.
In support of this hypothesis, this was the case with regard to the role of ideology across a
range of race-related political outcome variables. The role of egalitarianism was also moderated
by implicit racial ambivalence but counter to expectations, such that the effects of egalitarianism
were exacerbated at high levels of implicit ambivalence. I suggest this is because the
egalitarianism items are inherently group-based and so this interaction actually depicts greater
reliance on group biases at high implicit ambivalence.
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These results suggest that the degree to which individuals defer to higher-order principles
when evaluating race-related political objects is, as hypothesized, largely moderated by the
degree to which they have used controlled processing to “adjust” their automatic biases. Further,
the result of the interaction between controlled processing and automatic biases is not always
inhibition of racial biases or more liberal policy attitudes. In half of the sample, explicit
preferences were more biased relative to the mean of the explicit bias measure than implicit
preferences, and having resolved racial preferences was associated with ideological polarization
rather than simply more liberal policy positions. Returning to the data from the experiment in
Chapter 3, I also was able to construct an implicit ambivalence variable using the implicit and
explicit attitudes measures in the MGP and show that, as expected, individuals low in implicit
ambivalence toward the minimal groups (i.e. those with more resolved attitudes) were the least
likely to express ingroup favoritism behaviorally in the MGP.
In Chapter 5, I directly examined the neural mechanisms thought to be at play throughout
this dissertation by using fMRI. Specifically, I examined brain activation patterns in cortical
areas of the brain – the ACC and OFC, in particular – when people evaluated applicants for
government assistance who varied in race as well as whether their race was primed explicitly or
implicitly. I found that in terms of decisions to support or oppose government assistance,
contrary to expectations, no racial biases were apparent when race was primed implicitly, but
more importantly for the purposes of this dissertation, pro-Black evaluations were greater when
race was primed explicitly than implicitly, and this pattern was exacerbated among individuals
low in SDO-D (but not SDO-E). In terms of fMRI results, I found that contrary to expectations,
activation in ACC was greater when race was primed implicitly. However, in line with
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expectations, OFC activation was greater when race was primed explicitly, and this pattern was
exacerbated at high levels of SDO extremity (i.e. both ends of the SDO-E and SDO-D
spectrums). This same pattern was evident for SDO-D for OFC, but not for ACC.
Principles, Prejudice, or Principled Prejudice?
The questions addressed in this dissertation stemmed largely from the “principles or
prejudice” literature. The central question of the “principles or prejudice” literature is: are
people’s attitudes toward race-targeted policies like affirmative action due more to racial
prejudice or individualistic values? Research aimed at answering this question has spanned
decades, and ultimately the result has been a vast array of mixed findings.
On the one hand, proponents of constructs like symbolic racism (Kinder and Sears 1981;
Sears and Henry 2003) and modern racism (McConahay 1986) have argued that racial prejudice
has become inherently fused with conservative, individualistic values, and that “principled”
arguments against policies like affirmative action are in fact socially acceptable means of
expressing racial prejudice (Bobo and Smith 1998; Kinder and Mendelberg 2000; Kinder and
Sander 1996; Sears, van Laar, Carrillo, and Kosterman 1997). An array of empirical findings
support these claims (e.g. Gilens 1999; Henry and Sears 2003; Rabinowitz et al. 2009; Sears et
al. 1997). On the other hand, other research argues that constructs like symbolic racism confound
racial prejudice with nonracial conservative values, and that when accounted for separately,
individualism explains the bulk of variation in race-targeted policy attitudes (Sniderman and
Carmines 1997; Sniderman et al. 1996).
I have proposed that the mixed findings that beset the “principles or prejudice” literature
are largely due to limited, unidimensional conceptualizations of what “principles” and
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“prejudice” are. Scholars have primarily been interested in whether racial biases underlay
opposition to race-targeted policies or not, and so a simple dichotomy between racial prejudice
and individualism has been functional. However, the limited conceptualizations of principles and
prejudice (as well as the mechanisms of each) have prevented the literature from advancing
along with work in political psychology and social neuroscience. By decomposing the multiple
dimensions comprising common conceptualizations of prejudice and individualism, I have
derived critical tests that may advance the “principles or prejudice” literature.
One critical test that a limited conceptualization of principles and prejudice has obscured
is whether racial biases in support for government assistance (i.e. effects of prejudice) are due to
social identity motives – motivations to favor ingroups and derogate outgroups – or broad
ideologies about how groups in society should be organized hierarchically. The implications of
this test are straightforward. If race-targeted policy attitudes are primarily due to ingroup
favoritism, it suggests a sort of self-interest at play whereby individuals are mainly out for their
own groups’ (and thus their own selves’) best interest and so will support policies that benefit
their group and oppose policies that benefit other groups. Members of disadvantaged groups are
thus, as Jost, Banaji, and Nosek put it, “revolutionaries- in-waiting” (2004, p. 883), who are in
constant conflict with members of advantaged groups who cling onto their disproportionate share
of resources. In terms of race-based policy attitudes, this suggests variation in support for
policies that assist Blacks is a function of variation in race as well as the degree to which people
identify with their racial ingroup. However, the findings in this dissertation suggest the role of
prejudice is explained mainly by group-based principles, and so opposition to race-based policies
is less about any kind of self-interest and more about efforts to instill order on society (Chapters
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2 and 3). What is important is the system rather than the ingroup, and individuals who believe in
maintaining group-based hierarchy will oppose government assistance to any disadvantaged
group, regardless of whether or not they are a member of that group.
Another critical test allowed by a more comprehensive view of “principles” and
“prejudice” is of what sorts of principles are most important with regard to race-based policy
opinions. In the existing literature, the term “principles” has been used primarily to reflect the
influence of any values not indicative of racial animus. Some work has deferred primarily to
Weber’s ideas about the Protestant Work Ethic, or a high valuation of hard work and the belief
that hard work is the key to success; other work has defined individualism more in terms of
Tocqueville’s or Emerson’s conceptualizations of self-reliance and isolation from mass-scale
society; still other work explicitly talks about both versions of individualism and then measures
only one dimension of it. The implications of which version of individualism actually underlays
people’s race-based policy opinions are substantial because it essentially determines which sort
of principles a government assistance policy might be framed around in order to manipulate
support for that policy.
Results from this dissertation suggest that the most dominant form of principles driving
race-based policy attitudes is group-based principles. Work ethic and self-reliance maintain
independent but weak relationships with race-targeted policies when controlling for group-based
principles (Chapters 2 and 3), and the only evidence of deservingness-based evaluations found in
this dissertation was among individuals high in SDO (Chapter 3). Existing work thus seems to
have missed the mark to some degree in postulating that the principles of individualism are the
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primary values at work when people evaluate race-based policies. Instead, the principles people
seem to be basing their opinions on have to do with how groups should be arranged in society.
A final critical test made possible by broadening our view of “principles or prejudice” is
of the mechanisms that drive the effects of ingroup favoritism, principles, and group-based
principles on race-based policy attitudes. By acknowledging that principles and prejudice are
multidimensional, interrelated constructs, we can ask the question: when are people more likely
to evaluate government assistance policies based on group biases versus ideological principles? I
have argued that based on research in social neuroscience as well as evolutionary psychology,
we should expect the role of ingroup favoritism to be driven primarily by automatic processes
and the role of higher-order principles to be driven primarily by controlled processes.
Indeed, I found that only implicit measures of ingroup favoritism predicted race-based
policy opposition (Chapter 3), and individuals who had utilized controlled processing to resolve
discrepancies between their implicit and explicit racial attitudes (i.e. those low in implic it racial
ambivalence) were the most likely to rely on ideology to evaluate a range of race-related political
outcomes (Chapter 4). Further, group-based principles – the dominant predictor of race-based
policy opinions – seem to consist of a combination of these forces (Chapter 3). Finally, by
studying the neural processes thought to underlay automatic ingroup biases versus ideological
thinking directly using fMRI, it was found that racial biases aligned with one’s ideology (in
terms of SDO) most when race was primed explicitly, and that individuals at either extreme of
SDO were most likely to exhibit brain activation in OFC (and to some degree ACC) when race
was primed explicitly, which suggests ideological thinking is exacerbated by controlled
processing (Chapter 5). Understanding the neural mechanisms of race-targeted policy attitudes
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allows us to understand the potential for change in these attitudes, as well as the sorts of
interventions most likely to create attitude change. In other words, instead of simply looking at
the degree to which race-targeted policy opinions are primarily principled or prejudiced, we can
start to investigate how to reduce the role of prejudice that exists.
Other Group-Based Principles, Symbolic Racism, and System Justification
In this dissertation, the primary operationalization of group-based principles was SDO
(more specifically, the two subdimensions of SDO-D and SDO-E). However, it is reasonable to
wonder what other sorts of group-based principles exist and the role they would play in
influencing race-targeted policy attitudes. Although SDO is likely one of the most influential
constructs representing group-based principles, I would not suggest it is the end-all-be-all of
group-based principles, or that the term “group-based principles” is simply a synonym for SDO.
Instead, I use the term group-based principles to represent conscious beliefs about how groups in
society should be organized, and I argue that they stem from interactions between innate group
biases and higher-order values and beliefs.
SDO is one manifestation of group-based principles and reflects the degree to which
people think groups should be arranged hierarchically and high-status groups should dominate
subordinate groups. However, it is also possible to imagine other group-based principles such as
beliefs about how rigid group boundaries should be, whether diversity should be tolerated within
groups, how conflicts between groups should be addressed (e.g. through hostility or diplomacy),
whether groups should be integrated or stay separate from one another, or whether groups should
even be defined in the first place. Only SDO is tested in this dissertation, and its dominant role in
predicting race-based attitudes shows that broadly, beliefs about how groups should be organized
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matter more than positive feelings toward ingroups. Yet if group-based principles comprise the
interaction between automatic group biases and higher-order principles, it should be expected
that this interaction results in other sorts of group-based principles as well, and so the roles of
other group-based principles should be tested in future research. In fact, different types of groupbased policies may be driven by different group-based principles. Race-targeted government
assistance such as affirmative action and race-based education spending has most directly to do
with the distribution of resources across groups in a country, but other policies may be more
aimed at integration between groups, equal protection under and enforcement of the law, or
conflicts between warring nations of relatively equal status in terms of global hierarchy.
Symbolic Racism: Not So “New”
Given the theoretical framework developed in this dissertation, I would also suggest that
constructs such as symbolic racism in some ways tap the effects of group-based principles. As
explained earlier, proponents of symbolic racism argue that it reflects a fusion between racial
prejudice against Blacks and individualistic values. The theoretical model developed in this
dissertation accounts for such a fusion. Specifically, the model suggests symbolic racism is a
form of group-based principles specific to Blacks in the contemporary United States. Americans
– especially White Americans – have internalized negative feelings toward Blacks, but these
negative feelings run counter to social pressures to be unprejudiced, and so as Kinder and
Mendelberg (2000) suggest, individualism becomes a socially acceptable vehicle for the
expression of anti-Black prejudice. Indeed, implicit racial biases as well as explicit racial biases
and ideology have been shown to contribute to symbolic racism (e.g. Ditonto, Lau, and Sears
2013).
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The model I propose interprets the origins of symbolic racism (and thus the implications
of its effects) differently in three major ways. First, my model suggests that despite the fact that
group biases and higher-order principles often interact, they are nonetheless separable
components of group-based principles. Indeed, although non-group-based principles such as
work ethic and self-reliance did not play a substantial role throughout my studies, they did at
times exhibit independent relationships with race-based policy attitudes.
Second, my model suggests the construct of symbolic racism is unnecessarily constrained
to attitudes toward Blacks, because although the unique history of Blacks in the United States
has undoubtedly influenced the particular stereotypes that are applied to them as a group, the
interaction between principles and prejudice is not unique to attitudes toward Blacks and in fact
is perfectly explained by evolutionary processes. Said differently, the processes underlying
symbolic racism have likely been around for millennia, and so the term “new racism,” as
symbolic racism has often been referred to, is in some ways misleading. My model proposes that
since humans have interacted with one another in small-scale groups, automatic group-based
adaptations have interacted with controlled processes that respond to the nuances of the
immediate social context.
Second, my model suggests the degree to which constructs like symbolic racism (and
group-based principles more broadly) are driven by group biases versus higher-order principles
like individualism depends on the amount of controlled processing applied to the attitude object
(in this case, Blacks). As demonstrated in Chapter 4, the degree to which political ideology
predicted constructs including symbolic racism was moderated by how resolved their implicit
and explicit racial attitudes were.
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SDO or System Justification?
Another construct that should be addressed in relation to group-based principles is system
justification. System Justification Theory (SJT) posits that individuals vary in the degree to
which they strive to defend and rationalize the existing social, economic, and political systems as
well as the status quo more broadly (Jost and Banaji 1994; Jost, Banaji, and Nosek 2004; Jost,
Kay, and Thorisdottir 2009;). SJT has been incredibly influential and supported across a range of
empirical tests in a variety of domains (e.g. Balabanis and Diamantopoulos 2016; Blasi and Jost
2006; Feygina, Jost, and Goldsmith 2010; Jost et al. 2012; Jost and Kay 2005; Kay and Jost
2003; Montieth, Burns, Rupp, and Mihalec-Adkins 2016).
A critical difference between SJT and group-based theories revolving around ingroup
favoritism or ethnocentrism is that according to SJT, members of disadvantaged groups will
often favor the status quo even when it works against them because the structure and order
provided by the system alleviates the distress associated with thinking the world is unfair (Jost
and Banaji 1994; Jost and Burgess 2000). This tenet of SJT is nearly identical to what
differentiates SDO from social identity motives. Although some work has recognized this
similarity between SJT and SDO (Jost and Thompson 2000; Kugler, Cooper, and Nosek 2010), a
thorough examination of the differences between the two constructs remains to be done and the
most notable difference is simply that SDO has explicitly to do with groups as the unit of
analysis whereas SJT does not necessarily use groups as the unit of analysis. Future research is
needed to parse out the distinct implications of SJT compared to SDO, as SJT was not measured
in this dissertation.
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In fact, the model in this dissertation may be applied to SJT as a potential explanation of
the mechanisms underlying system justification. Are system justification motives driven by the
interaction between innate group biases and higher-order principles? Some SJT work suggests
system justification motives can manifest implicitly (e.g. Jost, Banaji, and Nosek 2004; Jost,
Pelham, and Carvallo 2002), suggesting the automatic components of system justification are not
necessarily indicative of sheer ingroup favoritism. However, a comprehensive analysis of the
degree to which system justification is driven by automatic or controlled processes has yet to be
done. From an evolutionary standpoint, it makes sense that “the system” the brain is responding
to automatically is not mass-scale society, but instead the reflection of some system that could
exist in small-scale groups. My model suggests the brain might utilize controlled processes to
adjust these automatic responses to address the social, political, and economic “systems” of
contemporary mass-scale society.
Rules for Radicals, and Reactionaries Too
Principles, values, ethoses, belief systems, philosophies, dogmas, ideologies, moral
codes; regardless of what you call them, higher-order belief structures seem important to
understanding attitudes toward government assistance. Through this dissertation, I have
attempted to unify, to some degree, the divergent conceptualizations of “principles” that would
be posited at the extreme ends of the NMSoT and CCSoT. The implications of my proposed
model for how we should conceptualize principles flies in the face of the extreme forms of both
schools of thought.
I propose that reliance on principles to evaluate political objects stems from evolutionary
adaptations aimed at adjusting behavioral rules to accommodate the needs of a complex
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immediate environment. This conceptualization of principles is based on work in social
neuroscience on the functions of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) regarding complex behavioral rules
used by humans (Bunge and Zelazo 2006; Zelazo, Frye, and Rapus 1996; Zelazo, Muller, Frye,
and Marcovitch 2003), and on work in evolutionary psychology on how political cognition
largely emanates from adaptations suited for small-scale group interactions (Petersen 2014;
Petersen and Aarøe 2012; 2013; Petersen et al. 2013). Essentially, my model’s conceptualization
of principles comes from acknowledging that controlled processes are driven by millennia-old
neural hardware that primarily serve the function of allowing humans to respond to a complex
and rapidly changing environment in a nuanced way. Small-scale group interactions did not call
for behavioral guidelines that extended beyond a handful of tribes, yet the contemporary political
world often necessitates belief systems that apply universally and span the globe. Ultimately, I
therefore suggest controlled processes do not necessarily simply lead people to express more
egalitarian views. Instead, controlled processes lead people to adopt and adhere to a set of
principles, whether those principles are progressive, conservative, radical, reactionary, capitalist,
socialist, hierarchy-attenuating, hierarch-enhancing, or ideological in some other way.
Acknowledging Factors Formerly “Beyond Our Scope”
This conceptualization of what principles represent is somewhat counter to the tenets of
the CCSoT because it suggests that when individuals utilize controlled processing, it does not
necessarily entail the deliberate weighing of costs and benefits or active choosing of one value
system over another, and it certainly does not indicate processing that is detached from innate
predispositions. As mentioned throughout this dissertation, most scholars – even those working
mainly within the CCSoT – have acknowledged that predispositions and evolutionary forces
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likely play a role in shaping political opinions but neglected to study such forces directly due to
the lack of tools available for studying them (e.g. Zaller 1992). However, the tools for studying
automatic processes, innate predispositions, and nonconscious motivations are no longer beyond
the scope of political research, and so it seems overdue that a model accounting for these factors
is applied to the study of race-targeted policy opinions.
Social Desirability “Influence,” Not “Bias”
The conceptualization of principles offered in this dissertation also runs counter to some
models that have focused on NMSoT factors. As referenced in the epigraph of the first chapter in
this dissertation, Stephen Pinker (2008) has suggested that just because science has been
uncovering the mysteries associated with what he refers to as the “temptation systems” in the
brain, it does not mean we need to disregard the “inhibition systems” in the brain. In other words,
the research by scholars of the NMSoT has advanced our understandings of automatic processes
tremendously, but this does not mean we should neglect the role of controlled processes. Most
scholars primarily focused on studying NMSoT factors have recognized this (e.g. Smith et al.
2011). As mentioned in the caveats outlined in Chapter 1, my use of the term “controlled
processing” should not be taken to indicate control in a metaphysical sense or “free will.”
However, I do suggest (in line with work in social neuroscience) that controlled processes are
more likely to reach conscious awareness. Individuals are sometimes, though not always, able
and even willing to self-report their attitudes (mostly) “accurately.” Especially with regard to
politics, individuals take enough time before reporting their attitudes that controlled processing
are able to lay substantial claim to evaluations of a political object, whether it be a policy, a
candidate, a party, or an issue.
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Some work has explicitly acknowledged the role of controlled processing but in a way
that suggests it is less valuable than the role of automatic processing. One thing some researchers
are particularly wary of with regard to surveys, and an example often held up as representing the
limitations of self-report measures, is social desirability “bias.” The argument regarding social
desirability “bias” is often that social desirability leads individuals to report responses that are
somehow disingenuous. Social desirability, the argument goes, leads people to obfuscate or skew
their self-reported attitudes away from their “true” attitudes, which are deep-seated, in order to
appease conformity pressures or abide by perceived social norms (e.g. Greenwald et al. 2009).
Or, alternatively, it is sometimes argued that people are simply unaware of their “true” attitudes.
However, the model proposed in this dissertation suggests controlled processes are an inherent
component of attitudes. Further, the concept of a single, coherent “true” attitude does not fit well
with the model I propose, because the model suggests that due to the constant iterative process
between automatic and controlled processes, any particular attitude will manifest differently
depending on when and how it is expressed. In fact, evaluations that are heavily influenced by
controlled processes are expected to differ substantially from evaluations made primarily at the
automatic level, because over time controlled processes should adjust evaluations of an attitude
object to fit the needs of the immediate environment (e.g. Cunningham and Zelazo 2007). Even
in cases when individuals are consciously aware of how they feel yet report something different
to exude a socially acceptable image, I suggest that this is nonetheless an example of controlled
processing adjusting one’s evaluations (albeit evaluations that have already been somewhat
influenced by controlled processing). Ultimately, this suggests social desirability “bias” would
be better worded as social desirability “influence.”
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The model in this dissertation also holds substantial implications for what effects we
should expect from controlled processes and social desirability influence. A common assumption
of NMSoT work is that when people utilize controlled processing or tailor self-reports in light of
social pressures, they tailor their attitude toward being more egalitarian and unprejudiced. A
common assumption of scholars using implicit measures is that they are useful because at the
conscious level, people realize it is socially unacceptable to be racially prejudiced so adjust their
self-reports accordingly (e.g. Greenwald et al. 1998; Greenwald et al. 2009; Pasek et al. 2010;
Payne et al. 2005; Payne et al. 2010; see Fazio and Olson 2003). According to Tali Mendelberg
(2001), implicit racial cues in political campaigns are the most effective at evoking prejudice
because when racial cues are explicit, controlled processes allow individuals to inhibit racial
biases and abide by egalitarian norms (see also Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002). Even
work in social neuroscience suggests that controlled neural processes are associated with
individuals inhibiting automatic racial biases (Cunningham et al. 2004). However, if controlled
processes are simply utilized to adapt automatic processes to the social pressures of the
immediate environment, then should it be expected that controlled processes always lead to less
prejudiced, egalitarian, liberal views? I suggest not.
Instead, I argue controlled processing can lead people to mimic culturally learned
stereotypes, support group hierarchy, or defer to anti-egalitarian principles instead of egalitarian
ones. Indeed, the results of Chapter 4 support this proposition. Although ingroup favoritism was
diminished at low levels of implicit racial ambivalence (i.e. among those who had used
controlled processing to resolve their racial attitudes), controlled processing seemed to lead some
individuals (approximately half the sample in those data) to self-report racial attitudes that were
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more (relatively) biased than their implicit racial attitudes. Further, the controlled processing
associated with low implicit racial ambivalence was also related to a stronger role of political
ideology. In other words, individuals who presumably underwent the most controlled processing
to resolve their racial attitudes were not the most likely to report liberal race-based policy
attitudes, but instead were the most likely to report race-based policy attitudes in line with their
ideology. The result of having resolved racial attitudes was ideological polarization rather than
universal inhibition of prejudice.
Given this broader understanding of controlled processing, I argue that the impact of
social desirability is not greater egalitarianism and inhibition of group biases but instead the
application of some broader set of principles to one’s automatic group biases. For some, this
means appearing unprejudiced, and for others, it means “telling it like it is” and rejecting
“political correctness.” For some, this means expressing pro-social attitudes, and for others, it
means abiding by the “bootstraps” model of individualism. For some, it means striving to
attenuate hierarchy, and for others, it means striving to enhance it. As advocated by Walter
Sobchak in The Big Lebowski in the quote at the beginning of this chapter, what really seems to
be universally socially desirable is just being “principled” in some way.
Nudging Away Prejudice?
One of the ultimate goals of the model developed in this dissertation is to inform efforts
to reduce the role of prejudice in politics. Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler, in their book
Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness, suggest that through
psychologically informed public policy, relatively minor adjustments in how policies are
developed and implemented can allow government to take a proactive role in increasing the well-

187
being of the public while also refraining from becoming invasive (2008; see also Sunstein 2013).
If decreasing the role of racial prejudice in politics is a desirable outcome (at least for many
people), then an understanding of the mechanisms of the role of prejudice could be quite useful
to policymakers. The model developed in this dissertation offers several tangible tools for
nudging people’s attitudes toward race-targeted policies.
This dissertation advances our understandings of the mechanisms of how prejudice
influences political attitudes – when people are most likely to abide by higher-order ideological
principles when evaluating race-related political objects rather than resorting to innate, primal
ingroup biases. Indeed, according to the model, humans are not helplessly bound by millenniaold motivations to favor ingroups over outgroups. There is room for change. However, humans
are also not detached from these millennia-old forces. Controlled processes allow individuals to
adjust automatic, reflexive group biases in accordance with higher-order principles. The major
role controlled processes are argued to play offers some room for optimism among those
interested in reducing the role prejudice plays in driving policy opinions.
Structuring (Not Simply Encouraging) Racial Thought
Two of the major heuristics Sunstein and Thaler suggest are useful for policymakers are
framing, which structures the way in which individuals think about a topic, and priming, which
influences what issues come to mind when people evaluate a topic (see e.g., Iyengar and Kinder
1987; Kahneman and Tversky 1984). In this dissertation, it is argued that prejudice and ingroup
favoritism are least likely to drive people’s attitudes toward race-targeted policies when they
have time to think about it, when controlled processes have a chance to “reiterate” automatic
evaluations, and when individuals have had the opportunity to use controlled processes to resolve
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disparities that exist between their gut-level preferences and their consciously held values. In
terms of public policy, then, it seems efforts to frame policies in a manner that encourages
effortful thought or prime relatively complex aspects of an issue may be useful in discouraging
the role of prejudice.
However, I suggest this conclusion would be problematic. As described above, it should
not be assumed that controlled processing yields egalitarian, liberal political views. Instead, it
may very well be the case that controlled processing can result in ideological polarization or
even exacerbate racially prejudiced views. Getting people to “think more” about race or priming
people to think about race explicitly has been upheld in much research as a tool for diminishing
racial prejudice (e.g. Cunningham et al. 2004; Hurwitz and Peffley 2005; Mendelberg 2001;
Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002). Yet as mentioned in Chapter 5, some of these findings
likely exist in the aggregate but are limited by a range of factors linked to whether one embraces
egalitarian views, such as education (Huber and Lapinski 2006).
The results presented in this dissertation and the model more broadly suggest that
although some controlled processing allows some individuals to abide by egalitarian norms, it
also allows other individuals to abide by anti-egalitarian norms. The group-based principles
people abide by can entail a range of beliefs, some of which explicitly exacerbate group-based
inequality. As such, getting people simply to “think about race” is likely not enough to shift
opinions in a conservative or liberal direction, or even in an unprejudiced direction. If the goal is
simply to remove the influence of ingroup favoritism, the model suggests sheer encouragement
of controlled processing will be effective, but racial biases may manifest through more
“principled” means. If the goal is to diminish racial biases in support for government assistance,
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or to encourage support for group-based equality more broadly, more direct restructuring of
controlled processes through policy framing and priming is likely necessary.
Further, careful consideration should be taken not to prime individuals to think in terms
that are easily translatable into small-scale, tribal interactions. The automatic processes
underlying people’s evaluations get “first dibs” when it comes to shaping policy attitudes, and so
the easier it is for automatic group biases to take root, the less need there will be for controlled
processing to step in. Indeed, Nelson and Kinder (1996) showed that group centrism was
significantly more likely to play a role in people’s policy opinions when issues were framed in a
way that drew attention to the policy’s beneficiaries. When it is easy for people to revert to
thinking in terms of the ingroup-outgroup distinctions of millennia past, they likely will.
Leveraging Social Desirability Influence
Another psychological phenomenon Sunstein and Thaler suggest might be useful to
policymakers is the spotlight effect, whereby individuals tend to overestimate the degree to
which others notice and assign importance to their actions (Gilovich, Medvec, and Savitsky,
2000; Gilovich and Savitsky 1999). Since classic conformity studies like those conducted by
Solomon Asch, Stanely Milgram, and Philip Zimbardo, social psychology research has shown
that social pressure is a very powerful force (Asch 1956; Milgram 1964; Haney, Banks, and
Zimbardo 1973), and can be leveraged even for political ends such as encouraging voter turnout
(e.g. Gerber and Green 2008; Panagopoulos 2010). The model in this dissertation suggests
individuals use controlled processing to translate their automatic group preferences into higherorder, group-based principles that address the demands of their complex social environment. As
such, if the social environment demands egalitarianism then we should expect controlled
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processing to push people toward egalitarianism. In this way, social desirability can be thought
of as a tool for persuasion rather than a “bias” to be avoided. “Public shaming” has in many ways
become a problem in social media (e.g. Whittaker and Kowalski 2015), but at the same time it is
largely through social influence that norms and principles are created (e.g. Benford and Snow
2000). When individuals are “put on the spot” – when they perceive their attitudes and behaviors
to have social consequences – they may be more likely to utilize controlled processing to adjust
their deep-seated biases in a more egalitarian direction, as long as the social environment
encourages egalitarianism.
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APPENDIX
Chapter 2
Group Identification:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

I feel strongly affiliated with most groups I belong to.
Other groups can learn a lot from the groups I belong to.
Belonging to groups is an important part of my identity.
In times of trouble, the only way to know what to do is to rely on the group leaders.
I am glad to contribute to the groups I belong to.
Compared to other groups of the same kind, the groups I belong to are particularly good.
It is important to me that I view myself as a member of groups I belong to.
All group members should respect the customs, the institutions, and the leaders of the
group.
9. I am strongly committed to the groups I belong to.
10. Relative to other groups, the groups I belong to are very moral groups.
11. It is important to me that others see me as a member of groups I belong to.
12. It is disloyal to criticize the group.
13. I like to help the groups I belong to.
14. The groups I belong to are better than other groups in all respects.
15. When I talk about the group members, I usually say “we” instead of “they.”
16. There is usually a good reason for every rule and regulation that the group leaders
propose.
1 (Strongly Disagree)
2 (Disagree)
3 (Neither Agree nor Disagree)
4 (Agree)
5 (Strongly Agree)
Importance – 3, 7, 11, 15; Commitment – 1, 5, 9, 13; Deference – 4, 8, 12, 16; Superiority – 2, 6,
10, 14.
Error covariance estimated between items 5 and 13.
SDO:
1. Some groups of people are just more worthy than others.
2. It would be good if all groups could be equal.
3. In getting what your group wants, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other
groups.
4. Group equality should be our ideal.
5. Superior groups should dominate inferior groups.
6. All groups should be given an equal chance in life.
7. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.
8. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.
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9. If certain groups of people stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.
10. Increased social equality.
11. It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the
bottom.
12. We would have fewer problems if we treated different groups more equally.
13. Inferior groups should stay in their place.
14. We should strive to make incomes more equal.
15. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.
16. No one group should dominate in society.
1 (Strongly Disagree)
2 (Disagree)
3 (Neither Agree nor Disagree)
4 (Agree)
5 (Strongly Agree)
SDO-D – 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15; SDO-E – 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16.
Error covariances estimated between items 3 and 7, items 2 and 4, and items 8 and 14.
Individualism:
1. To be truly successful, a person should be self-reliant.
2. Nothing is impossible if you work hard enough.
3. Self-reliance is the key to being successful.
4. If one works hard enough, one is likely to make a good life for oneself.
5. Hard work makes one a better person.
6. People would be better off if they depended on themselves.
7. One should live one's own life independent of others as much as possible.
8. I do not like having to depend on other people.
9. Working hard is the key to being successful.
10. By working hard a person can overcome every obstacle that life presents.
11. One must avoid dependence on other persons whenever possible.
12. Any problem can be overcome with hard work.
13. I strive to be self-reliant.
14. If you work hard you will succeed.
15. Anyone who is able and willing to work hard has a good chance of succeeding.
16. Having a great deal of independence from others is very important to me.
17. A person should always do the best job possible.
18. Only those who depend on themselves get ahead in life.
19. It is important to control one's destiny by not being dependent on others.
20. By simply working hard enough, one can achieve one's goals.
1 (Strongly Disagree)
2 (Disagree)
3 (Neither Agree nor Disagree)
4 (Agree)
5 (Strongly Agree)
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Work Ethic – 2, 4, 5, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 17, 20; Self-Reliance – 1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 16, 18, 19.
Error covariances estimated between items 8 and 16, items 7 and 13, items 11 and 13, items 10
and 12, and items 2 and 12.
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Chapter 3
Affective Evaluations:
*Asked with regard to the minimal ingroup and minimal outgroup.
1. Please rate how "warm" or "cold" you feel toward each of the following groups on the
below scales from 0-100. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you
feel favorable and warm toward the group. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees
mean that you don't feel favorable toward the group and that you don't care too much for
that group. You would rate the group at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly
warm or cold toward the group.

Attitudes toward race-targeted policies:
1. Affirmative action for Blacks in hiring for jobs.
2. Increased federal education spending in neighborhoods predominantly populated by
Blacks.
3. Federally funded college scholarships for Blacks.
4. Policies that make it illegal for law enforcement to profile Blacks (use the fact that an
individual is Black to decide whether or not to engage in enforcement).
1 (Strongly Oppose)
2 (Moderately Oppose)
3 (Slightly Oppose)
4 (Neither Oppose nor Support)
5 (Slightly Support)
6 (Moderately Support)
7 (Strongly Support)
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Minimal Groups Logos and Description

Minimal Groups Resource Allocation Task
*For detailed instructions used, contact author.
As a reminder, on each matrix you are to award points (which are valuable in this experiment) to
two other participants in this experiment. The top row of numbers within the boxes are the points
awarded to a fellow member of your group, the [Ingroup], and the bottom row are points to be
given to a member of the other group, the [Outgroup]. After looking at each box of the matrix,
you must choose only one box that represents your choice of how you wish to award the points.
Remember that you are distributing resources between members of your group and the
other group, but no yourself.

Points to member
of the [Ingroup]

19

18

17

16

15

14

13

12

11

10

9

8

7

1

3

5

7

9

11

13

15

17

19

21

23

25

Points to member
of the [Ingroup]

25

23

21

19

17

15

13

11

9

7

5

3

1

Points to member
of the [Outgroup]

1

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

Points to member
of the [Outgroup]
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Points to member
of the [Ingroup]

19

18

17

16

15

14

13

12

11

10

9

8

7

Points to member
of the [Outgroup]

25

23

21

19

17

15

13

11

9

7

5

3

1

Points to member
of the [Ingroup]

1

3

5

7

9

11

13

15

17

19

21

23

25

Points to member
of the [Outgroup]

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

Points to member
of the [Ingroup]

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

15

14

13

12

11

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

Points to member
of the [Ingroup]

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

Points to member
of the [Outgroup]

28

27

26

25

24

23

22

21

20

19

18

17

16

Points to member
of the [Outgroup]
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Chapter 4
Symbolic Racism
1. Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their
way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.
2. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it di cult for
blacks to work their way out of the lower class.
3. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.
4. It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder
they could be just as well o as whites.
1 (Strongly Disagree)
2 (Disagree)
3 (Neither Agree nor Disagree)
4 (Agree)
5 (Strongly Agree)
Influence of Blacks in U.S. Politics
1. Would you say that blacks have TOO MUCH INFLUENCE in American politics, JUST
ABOUT THE RIGHT AMOUNT of influence in American politics, or TOO LITTLE
influence in American politics?
Black Elected Officials
1. Do you think that most white candidates who run for political office are better suited to
be an elected official than are most black candidates, that most black candidates are better
suited to be an elected official than are most white candidates, or do you think white and
black candidates are equally suited to be an elected official?
Respondents then asked how strongly they hold that position.
Black Elected Officials - Intelligence
1. Do you think that most white candidates who run for political office are better suited in
terms of their intelligence to serve as an elected official than are most black candidates,
that most black candidates are better suited in terms of their intelligence to serve as an
elected official than are most white candidates, or do you think white and black
candidates are equally suited in terms of their intelligence to serve as an elected official?
Respondents then asked how strongly they hold that position.
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Affirmative Action
1. Some people say that because of past discrimination, Blacks should be given preference
in hiring and promotion. Others say that such preference in hiring and promotion of
Blacks is wrong because it gives Blacks advantages they haven't earned. What about your
opinion - are you for or against preferential hiring and promotion of Blacks?
Fair Job Treatment
1. Some people feel that if black people are not getting fair treatment in jobs, the
government in Washington ought to see to it that they do. Others feel that this is not the
federal government's business. Have you had enough interest in this question to favor one
side over the other?
How do you feel? Should the government in Washington see to it that black people get
fair treatment in jobs OR is this not the federal government's business?
Respondents then asked how strongly they hold that position.
Vote Obama
1. How about the election for President? Did you vote for a candidate for PRESIDENT?
Who did you vote for?
Feeling Thermometers
1. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm
toward the person. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel
favorable toward the person and that you don't care too much for that person. You would
rate the person at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward
the person.
Need for Cognition
1. Some people like to have responsibility for handling situations that require a lot of
thinking, and other people don't like to have responsibility for situations like that. What
about you? Do you like having responsibility for handling situations that require a lot of
thinking, do you dislike it, or do you neither like it nor dislike it? Do you like it a lot or
just somewhat?
2. Some people prefer to solve simple problems instead of complex ones, whereas other
people prefer to solve more complex problems. Which type of problem do you prefer to
solve: simple or complex?
Education
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1. What is the highest grade of school or year of college you have completed?
2. Did you get a high school diploma or pass a high school equivalency test?
3. What is the highest degree that you have earned?
Political Interest
The political interest and political discussion variables were part of an experimental
manipulation in the 2008 ANES, in which respondents were randomly assigned to
receive either old or new versions of questions. For political interest, the old version
asked only about how often respondents follow government and public a airs whereas the
new version asked one item about how closely respondents follow government and
politics and a second item about how often. Thus, for respondents in the new condition,
political interest is measured as the mean of the two items. The old version for political
discussion first asked whether or not respondents discuss politics with family and friends
and then asked how often they did in the past week, whereas the new version just asked
how often in a typical week.
“old”
1. Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the
time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you
say you follow what's going on in government and public a airs MOST OF THE TIME,
SOME OF THE TIME, ONLY NOW AND THEN, or HARDLY AT ALL?
“new”
1. How closely do you pay attention to information about what's going on in government
and politics? EXTREMELY CLOSELY, VERY CLOSELY, MODERATELY
CLOSELY, SLIGHTLY CLOSELY, or NOT CLOSELY AT ALL?
2. How often do you pay attention to what's going on in government and politics? ALL
THE TIME, MOST OF THE TIME, ABOUT HALF THE TIME, ONCE IN A WHILE,
or NEVER?
Ideology
Where would you place YOURSELF on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?
Extremely liberal, Liberal, Slightly liberal, Moderate; middle of the road, Slightly conservative,
Conservative, Extremely conservative
Egalitarianism
1. Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal
opportunity to succeed.
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2.
3.
4.
5.

We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country.
One of the big problems in this country is that we don't give everyone an equal chance.
'This country would be better o if we worried less about how equal people are.
'It is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than
others.
6. If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer problems.
Table A4.1: Full Model Predicting Symbolic Racism
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Table A4.2: Full Model Predicting Perceived Influence of Blacks in Politics
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Table A4.3: Full Model Predicting Attitudes toward Black Elected Officials
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Table A4.4: Full Model Attitudes toward Black Elected Officials – Intelligence
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Table A4.5: Full Model Predicting Support for Affirmative Action
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Table A4.6: Full Model Predicting Support for Fair Job Treatment for Blacks
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Table A4.7: Full Model Predicting Self-Reported Vote for Obama
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Chapter 5
Applicant Descriptions
[All descriptions were preceded by the phrase, “A man that:”, which was shown constantly at
the top of the screen below the response options]
has never left the United States.
almost never eats vegetables.
has 3 pet birds.
cannot tell his left from his right.
likes to travel to exotic places.
chews with his mouth open.
claims to have seen a ghost.
is a vegetarian.
is eccentric.
once hallucinated from a bad fever.
loves to go to parties.
prefers ice cream in a cup rather than a cone.
never learned to ride a bike.
has a habit of nail biting when nervous.
is known to march to his own drummer.
has been described as very sensitive.
has a hard time remembering birthdays.
enjoys playing sports.
enjoys making jokes at family gatherings.
enjoys playing video games.
winks a lot.
has never seen the ocean.
hums when eating.
is deeply religious.
has an unusually high-pitched voice.
collects insects.
tends to follow the crowd.
has a stutter.
prefers heat over cold weather.
enjoys science fiction novels.
talks to his mother once per week.
was once bitten by a venomous spider.
hates the feel of velvet.
believes in many conspiracy theories.
only wears brown shoes.
performs magic as a hobby.
enjoys dressing in many different styles.
enjoys solving crossword puzzles.
hates people who complain a lot.
wanted to be an astronaut as a child.
has never had a cavity.
reads many philosophy books.
tends to mumble.
does not like solving puzzles.
talks very fast.
was in a rock band as a teenager.
talks with his hands.
was in the marching band in high school.
has a lot of body hair.
is very flirtatious.
accidentally stares at people often.
spends a lot of time looking in the mirror.
believes he has a long lost brother.
never wears shorts.
will be the best man at a wedding.
is prone to severe allergies.
makes odd noises while sleeping.
is very shy around strangers
has a loud voice.
has had many romantic relationships.
has poor hand-eye coordination.
is known to be quirky.
has never been in a fist fight.
does not believe in any religion.
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has a large scar on his shoulder.
has no sense of rhythm.
is allergic to cats.
was once on TV as an extra in a sitcom.
takes a long time to make decisions.
stays informed about sports news.
enjoys extreme sports.
enjoys romantic comedies.
is obsessed with the size and shape of chairs.
whistles all of the time.
is a very picky eater.
prefers Coca-Cola over Pepsi.
has won several pie-eating contests.
is a huge comic book fan.
is said to make the best grilled cheese.
regrets not exercising more.
dated a woman with 11 toes.
plays chess once per week.
thinks surfers are very courageous.
spent last weekend at a funeral.
makes bird houses.
still remembers his high school prom.
knew someone who wound up being famous.
enjoys the fine arts.
has an outie belly button.
can run a mile in 6 minutes.
plays video games with his nephew.
enjoys writing fiction in his spare time.
did not like the movie Titanic.
always thinks about the big picture.
is a sculptor in his spare time.
is considered a tree hugger.
plays many musical instruments.
smoked cigarettes as a teenager.
used to be nicknamed Smiley.
spent last weekend helping a friend move.
took karate lessons as a child.

thinks tattoos are disgusting.
is color-blind.
lost his left foot to diabetes.
keeps his opinions to himself.
wanted to be a movie star as a child.
often speaks in rhymes.
hates the idea of bottled water.
loves classic movies.
wore braces throughout high school.
is fascinated by history.
knows every state capital.
cannot swim.
claims not to fear death.
prefers to be indoors.
has never been kissed.
is an only child.
has four siblings.
prefers dogs over cats.
had a pet pitbull as a teenager.
plays drums in a jazz band.
has written several romance novels.
writes poems on napkins.
is afraid of germs.
is afraid of open spaces.
has a collection of leather jackets.
hates puns.
is afraid of thunder.
falls in love easily.
has trouble choosing clothes that match.
spends a lot of time thinking about life.
often daydreams about flying.
has never won a game of bingo.
prefers not to wear shoes.
likes to analyze people.
enjoys spicy food.
squints a lot.
always has mints in his car.
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prefers driving over being a passenger.
received a speeding ticket two months ago.
tends to be vague when speaking.
likes looking at the clouds.
has an odd fashion sense.
always falls asleep during movies.
is always making nicknames for people.
enjoys pulling pranks on people.
does not like roller coasters.
stands close to people when talking to them.
believes time travel will exist soon.
enjoys standup comedy.
is bad at keeping secrets.
often wears sunglasses indoors.
does not need glasses but wears them
anyway.
has a large collection of action figures.
believes strongly in Zodiac signs.

cannot hear out of his left ear.
does not believe love is real.
is great at impressions.
collects scented candles.
prefers camping over staying in a hotel.

